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ABSTRACT 
Children's thinking has been described by Piaget and others in general 
terms, which suggest that there are major developmental changes that 
affect children's thinking at various stages of their development. 
Some criticisms of Piaget's theory have related to his approach to 
describing children's thinking as a context free phenomenon. In 
relation to this point, arguments have been put forward for the need 
to investigate the development of children's thinking, within particular 
content areas, and the investigations reported in this thesis have con-
centrated on the development of religious thinking of children aged from 
~6 to 11 years. 
A reV1ew of preVlOUS investigations into this area of children's 
thought development reveals major shortcomings, both in the experimental 
approaches used and in the theories that have been constructed. In 
particular it is argued that there has been a tendency for investi-
gators to propose stage development theories on the basis of inadequate 
results. It is argued that there is a need for investigations which 
approach this problem from new directions. As a first step, a series 
of investigations, which employ a variety of approaches and which 
investigate various cognitive and semantic factors that may influence 
the development of religious thinking in children, are presented. 
The investigations that are reported involved individual interviews 
with 440 children, in the age range from 6 to 11 years. A variety 
of experimental techniques were employed, including those investi-
gating the children's understanding of various biblical parables, 
their understanding of the meaning of words used in religious discourse, 
their conception of historical time and ability to sequentially order 
events in time, and the way that these factors affected their under-
standing of religious ideas. 
The results of the investigations are discussed in terms of the variety 
of aspects, which they reveal, relating to the development of religious 
thinking J.n children. It is argued that this evidence does not support 
the idea of the development of religious thinking being a unidimensional 
stage related process; however, the evidence collected from these 
studies is insufficient to form the basis of an alternative model. It 
is argued that future studies that follow this approach will be necessary 
if a satisfactory theory is to be constructed. 
The educational implications of these findings are discussed and it is 
argued that certain curriculum changes in the area of religious 
education may have been made on the basis of insufficient evidence and 
inadequate theories. 
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C HAP T E R ONE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THINKING IN CHILDREN 
1.1 Introduction 
One popular approach to an understanding of the way children acquire 
knowledge, formulate opinions and generally develop in their thinking, 
in psychology in the past, has been to study the way that children's 
understanding of various concepts develops as they grow older. This 
method generally involves sampling populations of children of different 
ages to see whether patterns of development can be consistently 
observed, and, on the basis of observations such as these, theories 
are constructed to describe the normal development of children's 
thinking about these concepts, and the factors that are of prime 
importance in influencing this development. 
Often, certain kinds of c~ncepts will be mastered earlier than others, 
or else a certain level of understanding of particular concepts will 
be reached before another level, and observations such as these can 
lead to theories of thought development that have wider applications 
than for the particular concepts being studied. For instance, Jean 
Piaget's theory of cognitive development in children is based on 
studies of the development of a variety of concepts, from which 
Piaget has postulated an overall pattern of cognitive changes. 
One problem with this method is that of deciding what the under-
lying cognitive factors are that will develop to allow a certain 
collection of concepts to be understood at a certain level, and 
then, once these factors have been established, the real test of 
2 
the theory is whether it can predict which other concepts can be 
acquired at the same stage of development. In other words, can a 
theory of cognitive development give an overall description of the 
cognitive factors underlying any thought or concept, and therefore 
give a probable indication of the order in which levels of thought 
and levels of understanding of different concepts may occur? Theories 
such as this will often assume a high importance for genetically 
determined biological maturational factors in influencing cognitive 
development, but still ieave a certain amount of variance to depend 
on experiential factors. This is where a cognitive development 
theory, such as Piaget's, will conflict with a behaviourist view of 
development (e.g. Watson, 1968), which would see learning and experi-
ence as the prime factors influencing the sequence of the development 
of children's thinking. 
It is possible to categorise three particular approaches to the 
problem of studying the development of thinking in children. The 
first of these is an approach that has already been mentioned briefly 
and that is usually associated with the work of Piaget. This approach 
depends on viewing children's thinking as a whole and analysing its 
major constituents. All thinking, Piaget claims, is based on a system 
of logic, which can be represented by a number of cognitive structures. 
Piaget also claims that the development of thinking is based on an 
invariant progress through a number of stages, which depend on distinct 
underlying cognitive structures. The details of Piaget's theory will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two and again in later chapters 
in relation to our own results, but the main point to be made here is 
that Piaget's search is for a description of the underlying processes 
and structures which dominate children's thinking, regardless of what 
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the children are thinking about. Thus, Piaget's description of 
the development of thought is based on a system of logical oper-
ations which, it is claimed, is context-free and which can be used 
to explain children's level of thinking in any particular context. 
The claim of Piaget that development depends on the maturation of 
logical systems (maturation is used here to allow for the influence 
of both biological and environmental factors), which in their turn 
dictate the style or level of children's thinking in any particular 
context, is a point where Piaget's theory has received much recent 
criticism - Piaget's claim is that the findings which have been 
produced and replicated on a number of his well known experiments 
(such as the classic class inclusion and conservation tasks) are in 
no way restricted to those particular tasks, or contexts, but are 
purely illustrative of an unde~lying developmental system which would 
dictate children's behaviour in all problem solving contexts. This 
issue of the transferability of Piaget's findings to other contexts 
has been seriously questioned by Brown and Desforges (1977), Bryant 
(1974), Donaldson (1978) and others, and we will be discussing their 
criticisms of Piaget, in relation to our own findings, in later 
chapters. 
A second popular approach to the study of the development of children's 
thinking is to take a general theory of intellectual development such 
as Piaget's and apply it to a particular specialised area of children's 
thinking. The aim of this type of investigation is to explore how 
well the demands of a particular area of thought (or academic discipline 
in most cases) can be explained in terms of Piagetian levels of thinking, 
and also see how adequate an explanation Piaget's theory gives for 
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children's thought development in these areas. Examples of this 
approach can be found in the work of Shayer, on the demands of '0' 
level examination syllabuses in Physics, Chemistry and Biology 
(Ingle and Shayer, 1971; Shayer, 1972 and 1974), Hallam (1966, 1967 
and 1979) on historical thinking in children and adolescents and 
Goldman (1964a, 1964b, 1965a and 1965b) on religious' thinking in 
children and adolescents. In addition to these studies, Peel (1972) 
reviewed a number of other studies of thought development in the 
secondary school years in the areas of science, history, geography, 
mathematics .and religion. Peel was, in fact, a most influential 
figure in influencing a number of researchers into studying the 
application of Piaget's theory to a number of different educational 
disciplines, and he himself has written extensively on this topic 
(see, for example, Peel, 1959, 1960, 1971 and 1975). In Chapter Two 
we will be considering, in some detail, one particular study which 
was set up under Peel's supervision and which was conducted by 
Ronald Goldman, on the development of religious thinking in children 
and adolescents. 
A third approach which may be taken to the study of children's 
thinking is to investigate children's thinking in relation to a 
particular task or problem, or group of tasks or problems, which 
might, for example, form one part of the educational curriculum. 
The essential difference between this approach and the previous 
approach is that it aims to identify skills and abilities within 
the context of a single problem, or related group of problems, which 
are important aspects of children's thought development. This approach 
has been strongly recommended by Brown and Desforges (1977) in an 
article in which they are highly critical of the progress made by 
S 
Piaget and those who have followed him in pursuing the first approach, 
which we have already outlined. Brown and Desforges conclude that, 
rather than following Piaget in attempting to construct a context-
free (or content-free, as Brown and Desforges describe it) theory of 
cognitive development, "It would seem more profitable to locate 
cognitive structures within specific content domains." (Brown and 
Desforges, 1977, pIS). This third approach, then, is based on the 
idea of taking a particular content area and investigating children's 
thinking in that context, with the intention of revealing the major 
skills and abilities (cognitive structures, in the terms of Brown and 
Desforges) which are relevant to that area. The question of the 
degree of overlap of cognitive and other skills between different 
content areas then becomes a secondary question, which can only be 
answered when sufficient individual content areas have been explored. 
An additional advantage of following the third of these approaches 
is the opportunity which it allows for a more thorough diagnosis to 
be made of the actual skills which are involved in a task. Flavell 
(1977), in his most illuminative critique of Piaget's work, refers to 
this issue in a general discussion of the problems of making cognitive 
developmental diagnoses. Flavell describes a, lower level of diagnostic 
problem, which is ascertaining whether a child "has" or "has not" 
acquired a certain cognitive ability; this problem is at its acutest 
when a child appears "to have it" but is actually making inspired 
guesses, or alternatively when he may appear "not to have it" under 
other conditions, when he may actually "have it". This, Flavell 
states, is what is generally thought of as the problem of cognitive 
developmental diagnosis, but he suggests an even greater diagnostic 
problem "is not just determining whether a child has or hasn't 
6 
acquired a certain cognitive ability (e.g. transitive inference), 
but is to do with determining the exact cognitive processes which 
are involved in a cognitive ability" (Flavell, 1977, p227). Others 
than Flavell have highlighted the importance of this issue. Smedslund 
(1969), for instance, referred to this as the problem of higher order 
inferences and wrote that, "An even more complex diagnostic task is 
to determine the exact content and sequencing of the mental processes 
involved in solving a given task." (Smedslund, 1969, p244). Thus, 
one can argue that one of the shortcomings of the work of those who 
have followed the first approach of searching for a general context-
free theory of cognitive ability is that they have too loosely 
associated general labels for cognitive abilities (such as transitive 
inference) with wide ranging assortments of tasks, without closely 
enough investigating the actual processes involved in the solution 
of the tasks. The work of Bryant (1974) and Trabasso (1975) has 
shown that, in the case of transitive inference, there are a number 
of processes which go together to form the general ability which is 
used by most subjects to solve transitive inference problems. In 
addition to the variety of skills and processes involved, Bryant and 
Trabasso have also highlighted the fact that not all subjects will 
solve a given problem by using the same skills. There is often more 
than one route to the correct solution, and different rout~s may 
well involve the use of different skills. Driver (1978) reinforces 
this point by stating that two subjects may solve the same problem, 
one using what Piaget would call formal operations and the other 
using concrete operations. 
The preceding arguments lead us to conclude that in future studies 
that seek to understand further the process of intellectual 
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development in children, three principles should be applied. Firstly, 
they should be carried out within restricted content areas, so that 
developmental features relevant to each particular content area can 
be identified. Secondly, the skills involved in solving tasks within 
these content areas should be analysed as closely as possible, to 
identify the underlying processes involved. Thirdly, the performance 
of individual children should be studied in such.a way that differ-
ences in problem solving strategy, and hence in some cases the skills 
employed, can be identified. 
In following the first of these principles, we have chosen a single 
content area as the context for the series of investigations to be 
reported in this thesis. We will be introducing the rationale 
behind our own investigations in the next section of this chapter, 
and in the following sections we will provide a brief survey of 
previous investigations in this particular area of children's thinking. 
A more detailed review of the literature relating to this earlier 
work and other relevant developmental research will be provided in 
Chapter Two. The remaining chapters of the thesis present the 
results of our own empirical investigations and discuss them in 
relation to the particular issue of the development of religious 
thinking in children, as well as discussing their implications for 
more general theories of intellectual development. 
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1.2 The Question to be Considered 
The area of development of children's thinking that we are going 
to study in this thesis is that of the development of religious 
thinkingl. This is an area which, at the present time, has a 
certain topical interest, because of the debate over compulsory 
religious education in British schools, and some of the arguments 
being used in this debate, which are based on theories about what 
children are capable of understanding about religion at different 
~ges. We will address ourselves occasionally to the educational 
implications of our research, but the predominant viewpoint will 
be a psychological one. 
As has already been mentioned in the previous section, there are 
in existence several psychological theories concerning the d'evelop-
ment of thinking in children, and we shall be looking at some of 
these to see how well they explain any developments, in religious 
thinking, that we observe. Inevitably this will mean considering 
some of Piaget's theories concerning the intellectual development 
of the child, but we will also look at some other theories of 
thought development in children, as well as some theories more 
specifically to do with the development of language in children. 
The importance of language, and the development of ~.,ord meaning 
in particular, will be introduced as a key factor in our consider-
ation of this topic. This approach will lead us into another central 
lAlthough we are interested in "religious thinking" as a general 
consideration, we shall be mainly considering thinking about the 
Christian religion, as this is the most prevalent religion in 
this country. However, this should not, we feel, hinder us from 
extrapolating to "religious thinking" in its application to differ-
ent religions. (A fuller discussion of exactly what is meant by 
religious thinking may be found on pp2l6-2l7.) 
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theme of recent psychological enquiry, that of the interaction 
between language and thought, and we will be discussing some of 
the theoretical standpoints in this area in Chapter Two. 
Basically, then, the question we are starting off from is "What 
are the major cognitive factors affecting the development of 
religious thinking in children aged 6 to 11 years2?" This, we 
recognise, is a complex question, and is one which presents a 
number of major research problems. Firstly, research into human 
thinking is always beset by the problem of bridging the gap 
between actual levels of thought and the evidence of that thought 
which is available to the experimenter. The normal practice is 
to infer, from subjects' actions or their responses to questions, 
what thought processes they have been through. This, clearly, is 
not an ideal method of investigating thinking and, particularly 
in the case of children, it may lead to ambiguous or even mislead-
ing results. The only solution to this problem appears to be to 
probe children's thinking from a number of different directions, 
combining, for example, different experimental techniques with 
observational studies, until as complete as possible an under-
standing of the children's competencies may be attained. 
The preceding discussion of the first problem leads into the second 
problem, which is to do with constructing suitable experiments 
2The age group was not an arbitrary choice, but was chosen because 
it was thought to cover the most critical years of development, 
from the point of view of existing theories. For instance, in 
Piaget's theory these years are thought to contain the major 
cognitive restructurings, and in the major theories of the develop-
ment of religious understanding, these are the years where there 
is the most disagreement between theories. 
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which reveal children's actual competencies. Recently, Donaldson 
(1978) has written with much insight about the problems of conducting 
research into children's thinking. It is clear, from her experience 
and the experience of other child development researchers, that 
children need to be confronted with meaningful tasks, and every 
effort needs to be made to make sure that they are both motivated 
to perform the tasks, and are clear about what it is that they have 
to do. Donaldson cites a number of examples to illustrate the point 
that small changes in the design of an experiment can have enormous 
effects on the performance of children. In many of these examples 
the task, which the children were required to perform, remained the 
same, and the only change which was made was in the way in which 
the task was presented to the children. We will be returning to 
discuss the work of Donaldson and her associates in more detail in 
later chapters, but at the present time the point to be made from 
her studies is that the design of experiments, in terms of the way 
tasks are presented to children, is crucial in determining the 
meaningfulness of the results which will be obtained. 
Another problem in child development research relates to the choice 
between cross-sectional and longitudinal studies. In a cross-
sectional study children from different age groups are studied and, 
if differences are observed between their performances on similar 
tasks, then inferences are drawn about the effect that development 
must have had on the older children. In longitudinal studies a 
single group of children are studied over a number of years, so 
that actual differences due to development may be observed. There 
have been relatively few longitudinal studies carried out in child 
development research (Wohlwill, 1973), and as Sigel and Cocking (1977) 
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conclude, this is a major deficiency in the available evidence which 
is presented in support of current developmental theories. Having 
said that, it is clear to see why cross-sectional studies have been 
more popular than longitudinal studies, in terms of the ease of 
carrying out such investigations within the time-span of most 
research programmes. Despite their limitations, cross-sectional 
studies are probably the best approach for exploratory investigations 
using new experimental techniques. In such studies, it is necessary 
to refine the experimental techniques as one moves from one study to 
the next, and in longitudinal studies this would not be possible. 
Even so, one must bear in mind that the findings from cross-sectional 
studies can only be interpreted after certain major assumptions have 
been made about the different groups of children representing the 
various age ranges, and longitudinal studies will always have a place 
in verifying such findings. 
A final general problem with thought development research in children, 
is to do with the lack of control that it is possible to have over 
the experience of children. The most common approach to take to 
this, is to investigate children from the point of view that "given 
the experience that they have had, can they solve this task?". 
Occasionally, in cross-cultural studies or studies comparing 
differences between children brought up in families with social 
class differences, assumptions will be made about the different 
types of experience that the children will have had. In a small 
number of cases, experience has been manipulated by employing 
different classroom teaching methods (e.g. Hallam, 1979 and Houston, 
1974), and there is now quite a literature on developmental training 
studies where experimental techniques have been employed to attempt 
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to enhance children's performance on certain experimental tasks 
(for a review of this work see Brainerd, 1978). In general, it 
is not possible, and is not considered to be humane, to control 
the experience of children on a large scale for experimental 
purposes. Because of the large amount of support that there has 
been for theories regarding biological factors as the major 
determinants of child development, and because of the similar 
experiences of children produced by education systems, this has 
not been perceived as a major problem. Indeed, in our own studies, 
we will not be controlling the experience of the children we 
investigate, and we will return to discuss the implications of 
this fact when we are discussing our results in later chapters. 
Thus, if we return to the formulation of our problem as it was 
stated at the beginning of this section, we would now qualify our 
question by stating that before embarking upon our investigation 
we are aware that there are certain problems that will inevitably 
limit the degree of certainty which we can place on any conclusions 
which we might put forward. In designing our own investigations 
and in evaluating the work of previous researchers we will bear 
these problems in mind, and see how far it is possible to either 
minimise their effects or else estimate their possible influence 
on the results. 
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1.3 What Answers Already Exist? 
In Section 1.1 we have already introduced our critique of general 
theories of cognitive development and their possible application 
to specific content areas, such as the one which we have outlined 
in Section 1.2, as the particular context for our investigations. 
In Section 1.1 we also argued the case for the need to concentrate 
child development research, in the area of thinking, on certain 
specific content areas, and as a result of this argument we have 
designated, in Section 1.2, an individual area for our enquiry. 
As we mentioned briefly in Section 1.1, the most well known 
investigations into the development of religious thinking of 
children have predominantly followed the second approach that 
we outlined in that section, which has meant that these studies 
have largely attempted to apply Piaget's general theory to this 
particular area of child development. The work we are referring 
to here is that, already mentioned, of Goldman (1964b) and also 
that of Peatling (1973). 
In our detailed literature review, which will be presented in 
Chapter Two, we will mention in some detail a fairly large body 
of studies that have been conducted in this area, and a number 
of these have applied techniques which could be classified within 
the framework of our preferred third approach to studying children's 
development of thinking. We will, however, be making some general 
criticisms of this whole body of research and the existing state of 
both experimental techniques and theories in this area. 
Out of all of the existing literature on this topic, Goldman's 
experimental findings and theories are the most well known, although 
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in terms of experimental work some of the other studies have been 
done on a similar scale. It will be argued, in Chapter Two, that 
Goldman has gone beyond the possible interpretations of his experi-
mental data in constructing his theory, concerning the religious 
development of children. In addition, it will be argued that there 
is a striking lack of cohesion between Goldman's and other existing 
theoretical standpoints in this area. One of the major reasons that 
will be suggested for the unsatisfactory nature of the existing state 
of knowledge in this area, is the somewhat restricted approach which 
has been taken to researching into this aspect of child development. 
These arguments will be developed in more detail in the next chapter, 
and will gradually form the rationale for the choice and design of 
our own investigations. They will also be developed in relation to 
previous research investigations that have been identified as being 
particularly relevant to the question we posed in Section 1.2. In 
case we may be misunderstood for taking a critical approach to 
previous investigations in this area, perhaps it should be said, at 
this point, that in many cases we feel that there is much to be 
learned from individual studies, and a good deal of this previous 
work has much to commend it. It is, however, our intention in 
critically assessing the whole spectrum of research techniques and 
theoretical positions in the area, to try to point the way to 
newer and more fruitful avenues of exploration and explanation. 
We are particularly aware that investigations within the study of 
the psychology of religion have always met with such problems 
that the whole field of study has had an extreme tendency to lack 
both cohesion and direction. This point is well illustrated by a 
quote from the introduction to a review of investigations into the 
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psychology of religion by James Dittes (1969). 
" ••• Yet the same complexity and intensity of important 
processes which attract psychological investigations 
of religion also frustrate it. The field has been marked 
largely by brief flurries of interest as one investigator 
after another is attracted to it, then bewildered by the 
difficulties of study. There has not been sustained 
development of theory, empirical findings, or research 
techniques. Publications today are not substantially 
advanced over the earliest writings. All surveys of the 
field agree, whether in apology or in indictment, on the 
primitive state of the study of the psychology of religion, 
and the material to be presented in this chapter provides 
little basis for disputing this jUdgment-" 
(Dittes, 1969, p603.) 
As has been pointed out by Brown, L.B. (1976), a comparison of 
Michael Argyle's (1958) review of the psychology of religion, 
with that of Argyle and Beit-Ha1lahmi (1975), suggests that the 
field can hardly be seen to have moved forward in more recent 
years either: 
Thus, in drawing together investigations out of this particular 
area of the psychology of religion, which has indeed been marked 
by "flurries of interest", and little "sustained development of 
theories", we will hope at least to locate some of the blind alleys 
and pitfalls which have contributed to holding back previous 
enquirers, and at the same time try to see new approaches to our 
problem that will enable us to build on the foundations which have 
already been laid. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
In the literature review, to be presented in this chapter, we will 
be covering a number of different areas of research and theory 
related to different aspects of child development. Initially we 
will consider studies which are specifically related to the develop-
ment of religious thiru~ing in children. These have been carried out 
over a large time period and have employed a variety of approaches 
to investigating this problem. We will be making a number of 
critical comments about this body of literature, both in terms of 
the shortcomings of some of the individual studies and in terms of 
the progress which has been made overall. 
In the remaining sections of this chapter we will provide a review 
of certain major psychological theories of the development of 
thinking in children, and a discussion of the relationship between 
these and the work which has been carried out specifically on 
children's religious thinking. In addition we will be reviewing 
literature, concerning the relationship between language and 
thought, and then discussing in some detail certain specific studies 
of word meaning development in children. The relationship between 
all of this previous work and our own investigations will also be 
discussed. 
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2.2 The Development of Religious Thinking in Children 1 
We will start this review by referring to the name that has been 
most closely associated with the question of the religious develop-
ment of children during the last fifteen years or so, which is that 
of Dr. Ronald Goldman. However, before considering the significance 
of his contribution, which was brought to the eyes of the general 
public mainly by the publication of his two books (Goldman, 1964b 
and 1965b), let us look first at the background of research and 
theory which had come before that time. 
Pre-Goldman Research 
Early explorations into an understanding of religious development, 
published at around the turn of the century, lacked any clear basing 
of theory upon sound empirical research. Researchers such as Barnes 
(1892) and Brown (1892) recognised and catalogued problems that 
children, whom they had observed, were having in understanding 
certain religious ideas. Barnes, for instance, reported, as part 
of his study, on the compositions written by 1091 Californian 
children between the ages of 6 and 20, on the subjects of heaven 
and hell. There was, however, very little attempt made to formulate 
these fascinating observations into any kind of developmental pattern 
which could be mapped onto an understanding of how the problems had 
occurred, through processes of intellectual or other kinds of develop-
ment in the children. 
lSome of the contents of this section are drawn from a review paper 
(Murphy, 1978) which itself was an updated version of a paper which 
was presented at the University of Lancaster Colloquium on the 
Psychology of Religion in 1976. 
18 
This kind of research can be contrasted with the more elaborate and 
detailed accounts of religious development, given by people less 
dedicated to empirical research and more concerned with setting up 
theoretical explanations. In this category could be placed men such 
as G. Stanley Hall (1908) who used a recapitulation theory to describe 
the first fourteen years, or so, of a child's religious development. 
It was his view that children's religious ideas developed in the same 
way as had the religions of many nations over several centuries. 
This involved developing from an animistic fetishistic stage, to a 
mythopoeic or myth forming stage, to a polytheistic stage, and then 
on finally to a spiritual-ethical theistic religion. This, in many 
ways, may be a theory which contains more insight than has ever been 
attributed to it in later years. Recent support for it could be 
drawn from the developmental theory of Jean Piaget (1952) in which, 
for example, he suggests a relation between egocentric and animistic 
modes of thought in early child development. Other theories, such 
as those of Bovet (1928) and Freud (1928), explained religious 
development in terms of a shifting of feelings, felt early on by 
children towards their parents, into a Deity concept, formed later, 
as a kind of parental substitute. (For a summary of the evidence 
supporting this theoretical approach, see Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle, 
1975.) Again these are interesting theories, especially so in the 
light of later empirical evidence which has been collected showing 
relationships between parental images and images of God (Nelson and 
Jones, 1957; Strunk, 1959; and Deconchy, 1968), but they have failed 
to sustain much support for two main reasons. Firstly, their foundation 
depends on the kind of introspective psychoanalytical approach, which 
is now largely regarded as being unacceptable because of its subjec-
tivity and consequent unreliability as compared with more scientific 
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or empirical methods of approach. Secondly, their explanations 
have concentrated upon the development of thinking about certain 
key concepts (e.g. God), and because of this it can be argued 
that they do not give an adequate description of the development 
of religious thinking as a whole. This second criticism also 
applies to the more recent work of Kousoulas (1973) who limited 
her investigation of religious development to a study of children's 
developing concepts of God. 
Credit is usually given to Harms (1944) and Loomba (1942) for develop-
ing the first theories, based on empirical research, which described 
religious development as a structured process of religious thinking 
which moves through various stages of development as the child becomes 
older and more experienced. This idea of stage development is central 
to many modern theories of child development, and it is vital to an 
understanding of much of what has gone on in the theory and research 
on the development of religious thinking since 1944. A theory of 
stage development attempts to explain developmental processes in 
terms of fundamental changes that take place in the child, and which 
are characterised by different kinds of behaviour at each individual 
stage. This is not a random grouping together of like kinds of 
behaviour that occur at around the same time, but is a theoretical 
attempt to explain fundamental cognitive developmental changes which, 
at each of a number of stages of development, generate various charac-
teristic kinds of behaviour. Stage development theories do not 
necessarily directly link the movement through stages with specific 
chronological ages; it is generally recognised that differences in 
children's experience, caused by living in different cultural 
environments, for example, will affect the rate of movement through 
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any sequence of stages. The concept of stage development in children 
has, of course, been made famous by Jean Piaget, and although he 
himself has not applied it specifically to religious development, 
he has applied it to moral development in children (Piaget, 1932). 
A more extensive discussion of Piaget's stage development theories 
will be provided in Section 2.3. 
The first two stage development theories of religious development 
were constructed at almost the same time by Harms (1944) and Loomba 
(1942). Harms claimed to examine expressions of religious develop-
ment by examining pictures of God drawn by several thousand children 
from 3 years upwards. He concluded from this that the development of 
religious experience was slower than any other field of experience, 
and also that there were three main stages which the children passed 
through in terms of their religious development. 
Stage 1 (3-6 years) The Fairy tale Stage 
Stage 2 (7-12 years) 
Stage 3 (12+ years) 
The Realistic Stage 
The Individualistic Stage 
Although this study is of interest because it was one of the first 
real attempts to apply a stage development theory to religious 
development, there are obvious criticisms in terms of the technique 
used for evaluating the children's drawings. In addition, the 
assumption of Harms that religion is basically a non-intellectual 
activity and is better expressed in a non-verbal form is highly 
questionable, and has never received much support from other re-
searchers in this area. It is true that expressing thoughts about 
religion through written or spoken responses is difficult for 
children below a certain age, but even adults are limited in the 
way they can express such things, and it has never been accepted 
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that it is necessary to use picture drawing in studies of adults' 
understanding of religion. Loomba (1942), at about the same time, 
proposed another three stage theory of religious development, based 
on work done in India. He found a gradual transition from "a reli-
gion of pure externals" to a religion "of the inner life". He 
noticed that at around 7 years children stopped attributing things 
such as wind, sun and time and other phenomena of the physical 
world to the personal power of God, and started developing more 
"realistic" ideas of the world of nature. 
Other studies that employed the idea of stage development in reli-
gious thinking were those of Elkind (1961, 1962 and 1963) on the 
child's conception of his religious denomination. These were 
studies of Jewish, Catholic and Protestant children and Elkind 
noted a general movement through three stages of religious identity 
concepts: 
1. global undifferentiated concepts (5-7 years) 
2. concretely differentiated concepts (7-9 years) 
3. abstractly differentiated concepts (10-12 years). 
This development described the child moving from a stage where he 
confused his denomination with his race and nationality, through a 
stage where he used observable features or actions to define his 
denomination (e.g. Catholics go to Mass every Sunday and go to 
Catholic schools), on to a stage where the child defined his deno-
mination in terms of non-observable mental attributes such as belief 
and understanding. 
These studies, along with one on the child's conception of prayer 
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(Long, Elkind and Spilka, 1967) which produced similar results, 
all employed a semi-clinical interview approach, where the child 
was asked certain standard questions in an otherwise unstructured 
interview situation. Elkind (1971) remarks in a later review that 
it is the unstructured nature of approaches like these, and that of 
Harms, that allows distinct stages in the development of spontaneous 
religious conceptions to appear. This is used as an argument against 
accepting the conclusions of studies such as that of Graebner (1960), 
which employed an "Ideas about God Inventory" and which did not 
reveal any age-related changes. Although Elkind may be correct in 
making this statement, there is certainly a danger of children's 
responses being manipulated in both structured and unstructured 
situations. 
Another study which postulated a stage development theory of religious 
thinking was that of Deconchy (1964). In this study, Catholic 
children in France were required to produce five associations to 
several words of "secular or religious tonality". In particular, 
Deconchy used his semantic methodology to look at the way children's 
concepts of God developed between the ages of 7 and 16. By using 
factor analysis on his data, Deconchy located three ma~n stages of 
development of the God concept: 
1. Attributivity (9-10 years) - thinks of God ~n 
terms of attributes learned at school. 
2. Personalisation (12-13 years) - three main themes 
of sovereignty, redeemer and fatherhood. 
3. Interiorisation (15-16 years) - stress on subjec-
tive themes such as trust, dialogue and fear. 
These, then, are the main studies which were carried out before 
Goldman's investigation. Credit must be given to Goldman for spotting 
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an area where there was a sparsity of research being done, but at 
the same time it should be noted that this fact alone was bound to 
increase the impact of what he published. It is, thus, very impor-
tant, from the point of view of assessing Goldman's contribution, 
to separate out his actual research findings and the theories which 
he associated with them, from the controversies and debates which 
they appeared to generate and after a time became immersed in. What 
we are interested in assessing is whether Goldman's stage development 
theory of religious development was better than what had gone before 
and whether it now stands up to all of the available research evidence. 
The Research and Theory of Ronald Goldman 
Goldman's (1962) investigations, which were carried out nearly twenty 
. 
years ago now, have received considerable attention in terms of the 
publicity that has been given to them, and also in terms of the 
debate which has ensued concerning their implications. A number of 
Goldman's reviewers (e.g. Fleming, 1965; Francis, 1976; Gates, 1976; 
Howkins, 1966; Langdon, 1969; and Prince, 1970) have levelled critic-
isms both at the conclusions which he drew from his work, and at 
the methods which he used to collect his results. After outlining 
the basic design of his study, we will go on to assess these critic-
isms in the light of Goldman's later replies to some of them (Goldman, 
1967 and 1969). 
Goldman initially interviewed 200 children in the age range from 6 
to 17 years old, on their projected impressions of three pictures 
of "religious" significance (a mutilated Bible, a child entering 
church with a man and a woman, and a child kneeling and praying 
beside a bed) and also on their interpretations of three tape 
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recorded biblical stories (Moses at the Burning Bush, Israelites 
crossing the Red Sea, and the Temptations of Jesus). Each age 
group was represented by twenty children (ten boys and ten girls) 
and these groups were balanced for intelligence. The responses 
of the children were then evaluated by forty "independent theo-
logical experts" on an agreed scale of theological concepts. 
These were analysed by using the Guttman Scalogram method, which 
suggested that an age-related series of responses had been observed. 
Goldman described the process of development in terms of three main 
stages: pre-religious, sub-religious and fully religious, and drew 
parallels between these stages and those that Piaget has used to 
describe intellectual development in children in his theory. 
Goldman did not start out with a clearly defined hypothesis, although 
it may be inferred that his hypothesis was that the development of 
religious thinking would conform to Piagetian stages of thought 
development. Closely allied to this was a particular interest in 
the Agreed Syllabuses (for religious education) being used in British 
schools. It was Goldman's view that certain biblical material, 
included in the Agreed Syllabuses, was unsuitable for children of 
certain ages, and having conducted his research he went on to publish 
a book specifically about the teaching of religion (Goldman, 1965b) 
along with a new religious education syllabus, based on his findings, 
and specially constructed teaching materials for use with this sylla-
bus. Goldman's quite apparent theological and religious education 
presuppositions have led several of his critics to question the extent 
to which these biased both the way that he designed his investigations 
and the conclusions which he drew from them (Gates, 1976; Howkins, 1966; 
Langdon, 1969; and Prince, 1970). One way in which Hawkins and Langdon 
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have suggested that Goldman biased his study was in terms of the 
particular Bible stories, which he chose to use, and in some subtle 
changes that he made to them before presenting them to the children. 
Both of these critics comment that it would have been difficult to 
think of a harder story for children to understand than the Temptations 
of Jesus, and this was the only New Testament story which Goldman 
included in his study. In addition, Howkins and Langdon commented 
on the way that Goldman left out any mention of the strong east wind 
in the story of the Crossing of the Red Sea, suggesting that this 
enhanced the magical effect of Moses raising his hand and the waters 
parting. Similarly, it is suggested that Goldman's inclusion of the 
word "suddenly", \vi th reference to the appearance of the Angel in the 
story of Moses and the Burning Bush, is out of keeping with the original 
and may, again, have heightened the dramatic and magical effect of the 
story. 
Another related set of criticisms of Goldman's studies concerns other 
ways in which his presuppositions may have influenced the design and 
outcome of his studies. Hilliard (1965) discusses several of these, 
including Goldman's selection of stories, and in particular he is 
most critical of the order in which the various questions about the 
three Bible stories were put to the children. Hilliard suggests 
that by placing the questions in the order in which he did, there 
was a distinct danger that, in some cases, Goldman implied to the 
children the answers that he expected to later questions. Hilliard 
concluded that Goldman's research suffered from "certain weaknesses 
in technique and limitations in scope" and that it needed "to be 
followed up by investigations which begin from the same point of Vlew 
but are conducted with refined and improved techniques" (Hilliard, 
26 
1965, p15). Others have questioned Goldman's v~ew of what constitutes 
mature religious judgment (Howkins, 1966; Langdon, 1969; Murphy, 1976 
and Rowe, 1978), and although the judgments of the children's responses 
were evaluated by a team of "forty independent theological experts", 
it has been declared by Goldman that they all held a centra1-to-
liberal theological viewpoint. In Goldman's terms mature religious 
thinking is equated with an abstract symbolic understanding of Bible 
stories, and this is a position which even Goldman recognised would 
not be shared by those who did not hold to his own theological view-
point: 
"there will be those who differ radically in their theology 
from the above statements and in their case this research 
will have little to offer" 
(Goldman, 1964, p49). 
In a society where mature adult thinkers have a great variety of 
religious viewpoints, it would seem unfortunate that Goldman has 
designated one of these as "mature religious thinking" and has 
based his studies around examining whether children have progressed 
to this particular style of religious thinking. It is interesting 
that a recent study by Hoge and Petrillo (1978) has tested Goldman's 
theory that highly developed abstract religious thinking was impor-
tant if children were to form a positive attitude of religion. They 
found that their evidence was actually in the opposite direction, 
and that more abstract religious thinking was associated with negative 
views of doctrine and the church. Hoge and Petrillo also concluded 
that religious thinking is more influenced by educational experience 
than Goldman suggested, which reinforces the criticism of Cox (1968) 
that Goldman only investigated how children who had followed a 
particular educational course thought and in no way, therefore, 
logically investigated what type of religious thinking they would 
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have been capable of, if they had followed other courses. 
Even more unfortunate is the fact that the major follow-up study 
to Goldman's work (Peat1ing, 1973) has followed both his approach 
to defining, and his specific definition of mature religious 
thinking. In the highly controversial field of studying religious 
thinking it would seem much more appropriate to investigate how 
religious thinking develops in children, rather than assuming that 
it develops in a certain way and trying to fit children's thinking 
into that pre-determined model. 
Francis (1976) shares Hoge and Petrillo's (1978) doubts about the 
adequacy of Goldman's evidence for suggesting a link between poorly 
developed cognitive skills, in relation to religious thinking, and 
a decline in religious attitudes in the adolescent years. Both 
Francis and Hoge and Petrillo, in their own experimental work, have 
gone some way towards providing sufficient empirical evidence to 
counter Goldman's speculations about the causes of changes in 
children's religious attitudes. Indeed, Francis (1979a) has pointed 
out that the whole area of children's attitudes to religion has not 
received sufficient research attention for firm conclusions to be 
drawn about how children's religious attitudes develop, quite apart 
from understanding how this development is related to cognitive 
developmental changes. 
Goldman has also been criticised by Attfield (1976) for neglecting 
to recognise that the Bible stories which he selected were, in some 
cases, presenting children with moral problems, the solution to 
which would depend on their level of moral development, quite apart 
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from attributes which Goldman put down specifically to religious 
development. This criticism emphasises the need, which we have 
already referred to, of making a detailed breakdown of the demands 
of tasks which are used in child development research. It also 
relates to the issue raised by Francis (1977a and 1977b) of the 
need which there is for researchers to formulate a closer definition 
of what actually is meant by "religious thinking" as opposed to any 
other sort of thinking. 
Many of the criticisms that were levelled at the conclusions and 
applications, which Goldman drew from his investigations, could 
have been avoided if he had made it clear which of these depended 
on established research findings and which could be better described 
as his own speculations. Langdon (1969) discusses this point and 
suggests that Goldman would have made things much clearer "had his 
book Religious Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence been set out 
somewhat as follows: 
Part I 
Part II 
Part III 
Report of the research and its established findings. 
Inferential conclusions. 
Practical implications. 
His second book would then have been a logical outcome of Parts II 
and III and would not appear, as it does at present, to be based on 
his 'established research findings'" (Langdon, 1969, p63). 
At the present time we are most interested in Goldman's actual 
research findings, and despite the criticisms of these, which have 
already been noted, it must be stated that there was much about 
Goldman's work which was innovative and there were many aspects of 
his studies for which he has been commended (Hyde, 1968 and Cox, 1968). 
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It must also be recognised that some of the criticisms of Goldman's 
research methodology, in terms of the size of his samples and the 
fact that he used a cross-sectional approach (Fleming, 1965), are 
not really justifiable as he has followed the example of what are 
apparently quite acceptable studies in other areas of child develop-
ment. Indeed Goldman (1967), himself, has replied quite adequately 
to a number of points relating specifically to the design of his 
experiments and has pointed out that this "was approved by no less 
eminent psychological researchers than Sir Cyril Burt and Professor 
E.A. Peel" (Goldman, 1967, p14). 
Goldman's work should be seen as an important step towards developing 
an understanding of a largely unresearched area of child development. 
The deficiencies in his investigations should be noted along with an 
acceptance that he was inclined to speculate far beyond their possible 
implications. What is required in response to his investigations is 
for other researchers to follow up these initial studies, so that 
they may be in a better position to evaluate his speculative proposals 
concerning a theory of the development of religious thinking in 
children. As a first stage it should be possible to develop Goldman's 
own stories and questions technique, although there are clearly other 
aspects to religious thinking than can be tested in this way. What 
is required, in addition, is a range of studies which will apply 
other experimental techniques of child development research to this 
area of children's thinking. 
In order to understand the process of development of religious 
thinking more fully, we need to look to see how children's develop-
ment can be affected by the provision of religious materials and 
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experiences which are best suited to their limited intellectual and 
conceptual abilities. Also, if one is prepared to accept some form 
of stage development theory such as Goldman's, there is an obvious 
need to go on beyond this to further explorations into the ways that 
children's religious thinking differs from one developmental stage 
to another, and to look more closely at the factors that affect the 
movement through these stages. 
Also a stage development theory, if it is really to be acceptable, 
needs to be based on some definite cognitive restructurings in the 
child, which are producing changes across a whole range of behaviour. 
This condition can be seen as a clear and fundamental tenet in 
Jean Piaget's stage development theory of intellectual growth in 
children (see Piaget, 1950, 1970a). Now it can be said that Goldman 
has come closer than most of the other stage theorists in this area, 
to providing an explanation of development along these lines. He 
did at least look at the religious thinking of his children, as it 
related to several religious stories and pictures, which is more 
than can be said for Harms, for instance, who was only looking at 
the child's representation of one religious concept (i.e. God). 
However, it would seem necessary to call into question the whole 
idea of a stage development theory of the development of religious 
thinking, until such time as an adequate theory can be provided for 
basic stages of cognitive restructuring, which would be necessary 
to explain such stage changes in thinking. It would also seem impor-
tant that, if such a theory were to exist, it should be shown that 
changes were taking place across the whole range of religious thinking 
in children, which coincided directly with these stages of cognitive 
restructuring. 
31 
Goldman, undoubtedly, stands out as a major contribution to the 
area but it is surprising that, despite the amount of criticisms 
which were levelled both at Goldman's methodology and his conclu-
sions, there has not been a greater amount of follow-up work done. 
We will now go on to review the more recent studies which have been 
done. 
Post-Goldman Research 
Peatling (1973) followed up Goldman's study by converting his 
structured interviews into a multiple choice test. This test 
employed the same three Bible stories, as were used by Goldman, and 
was originally administered to nearly 2,000 children in American 
Episcopal Schools. Peatling concentrated on differentiating between 
abstract and concrete religious thinking in his children, and claimed 
that his general findings supported Goldman's idea of a movement 
through various stages of religious thinking ranging from a purely 
concrete stage, through an intermediate stage and on to a more 
abstract stage later on. Peatling noticed slight differences in 
the ages at which his children passed through the various stages, 
and it is quite possible that these could be due to the ~ffect of 
using a mUltiple-choice test approach to investigating their levels 
of thinking. Children at an early stage may be assisted by the 
availability of more abstract answers, whereas children at a later 
stage may be distracted by the availability of more concrete answers. 
Another explanation could be put forward in terms of basic differences 
in the children's rate of development, in the way that Piaget allows 
for d~calage in his stage development theory. If this is, in fact, 
the case then the difference would not be so important, as a stage 
development theory is generally concerned more with describing the 
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order in which different stages are passed through, rather than 
the exact ages at which each particular stage is reached or left. 
Peatling, in fact, found his children moving out of the concrete 
stage earlier than Goldman's, whereas they took longer to reach 
the final stage of abstract religious thinking. This study, as 
well as lending support in a general way to Goldman's study, also 
highlights the distinction that Goldman drew between concrete and 
abstract religious thinking and it is highly questionable as to 
whether this is necessarily the most important factor in the 
development of religious thinking. Prince (1970), in an evalua-
tion of Goldman's work, points out the important distinction 
between the psychological Piagetian use of the word abstract, to 
mean the ability to reverse one's thinking to entertain hypothetical 
propositions, and the more general use, especially in religious 
writings, to mean immaterial. Prince goes on to make the logical 
point that even when children cannot think abstractly in the psycho-
logical sense, they are still perfectly capable of appreciating 
abstract elements of religious thinking and experience in the 
general sense of the word. (This point is discussed further, in 
the introduction to Chapter Three.) 
Peatling's (1973) Thinking About the Bible test has been used in a 
number of more recent research investigations (Hoge and Petrillo, 
1978; Kay, 1978; Peatling, 1978; Peatling and Laabs, 1975 and 
Tamminen, 1976), but the results of these studies depend on the 
validity of Peatling's test as a good measure of the religious 
thinking of children and adolescents. The criticism that has been 
made of Goldman, concerning his narrow view of what developed 
religious thinking should be like, can equally well be made of 
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Peat1ing. Kay (1979) comments that "Interpretations of the results 
have, therefore, to make some allowance for the theological presup-
positions in the test" (Kay, 1979, p5), and Rowe (1978) summarises 
his critique of Peat1ing's test by stating that "This American 
revised version looks a much cruder instrument than Goldman's tests 
and one cannot help wondering to what extent it really reveals the 
thinking of those who take it, or forces them to make options between 
possible answers which they feel are inadequate." (Rowe, 1978, p8). 
We have already argued that there is a need to move on to take new 
approaches to studying the development of religious thinking, and 
although Peat1ing's test may provide one way of doing this, it does 
not avoid many of the shortcomings which we consider exist in Goldman's 
studies. 
Beechick (1974) has followed the earlier approach of Ainsworth (1961) 
in looking at the way that children of different ages interpreted 
the meaning of biblical parables. Beechick concluded that children 
go through three stages of development, during which they move from 
an understanding of parables in purely literal terms to a period 
when they draw some application to themselves, but only in terms of 
the actual events of the parables, to a final period when they use 
greater insight to understand the general meaning and application 
of the parables. This study has many interesting implications. 
Firstly, the task of having to draw a meaning out of a story is 
obviously one which requires certain intellectual abilities in the 
child, so it demonstrates the reliance that certain kinds of reli-
gious thinking have on intellectual operations. Secondly, the fact 
that Beechick showed that certain kinds of analogies are easier to 
understand than others, demonstrates that this development is not 
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just a simple one. Thirdly, Beechick suggested that this kind of 
understanding of a developmental process should indicate different 
ways of presenting parables to children, so that what is being 
taught may fall within the area of what the child is capable of 
understanding from the story. 
There are obvious methodological problems with this type of study, 
which relies on presenting children with biblical stories and then 
asking them questions about them. The understanding of children 
in these age groups will depend, to a degree, on the kind of expla-
nation they are given and also prior training on similar tasks. In 
this context, it is important to recall the comments of Cox (1968) 
concerning the point that investigating how children apparently 
think about certain concepts and stories is not the same as investi-
gating what kind of thinking they are capable of, given different 
instruction and teaching. This is the problem which Bortner and 
Birch (1970) have referred to elsewhere, in stating that "performance 
levels under particular conditions are but fragmentory indicators of 
capacity" (Bortner and Birch, 1970, p735), and which Flavell (1977) 
calls "the problem of cognitive-developmental diagnosis" (Flavell, 
1977, p227). 
Despite this general criticism which is common to the studies of 
Peatling, Beechick and Goldman, it does seem that these studies 
have provided a good approach by which to examine the intellectual 
problems that children have in thinking about religion in their 
developing years. Also, by relating this kind of study more to 
the prior experiences that the children have had with religion, it 
may be possible to make this methodology more illuminating. 
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Stage Development Theory of Religious Thinking - An Overview 
It seems clear that if we accept the comment of Elkind (1971), 
about the need for an unstructured approach to examining the 
development of religious thinking, then the majority of studies 
present us with a three stage picture of development (see Fig. 1). 
What these stages are called and when they are described as 
appearing seems, however, to vary a good deal. Obviously, method-
ologies have varied and undoubtedly the samples will have had 
individual differences, especially in terms of prior experiences 
with religious materials, with many groups being taken from 
denominational or church schools. It does seem, however, that 
all that many of these theories have in common is the fact that 
they have three stages, ojten first occurring at very different 
times. The very fact that all of these investigators have come 
up with such different explanations as to the process of develop-
ment of religious thinking, could well lead us to question the 
usefulness of trying to apply a stage development theory at all. 
It could well be that if this approach of trying to derive theo-
retical stages from observational studies continues along these 
lines, we will continue to get as many stage development theories 
as we have investigators. This argument has been developed else-
where by Murphy (1977b), in an article which suggests that the 
preponderance of three stage theories of the development of the 
religious thinking may be more a result of a rather stereotyped 
approach to researching into this area of children's thinking, 
rather than being an indicator of the real nature of this develop-
mental process. 
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FIGURE 1 
PROPOSED STAGE DEVELOPMENT THEORIES OF RELIGIOUS THINKING . 
PROPOSED BY STAGE I , STAGE II STAGE III 
LommA RELIGION OF REALISTIC RELIGION OF (1942) PURE EXTERNALS (7-12) INNER LIFE 
- ideas about God (up to 6) (12+) 
HARMS FAIRYTALE REALISTIC INDIVIDUALISTIC (1944) (3-6) (7-12) (12+) 
- pictures of God 
ELKIND GLOBAL UNDIF- CONCRETELY ABSTRACTLY (1961, 62, 63) FERENTIATED DIFFER- DIFFER-
- concepts of CONCEPTS ENTIATED ENTIATED 
religious (5-7) CONCEPTS CONCEPTS denominations (7-9) (10-12) 
LONG, ELKIND 
AND SPILKA 
(1967) " " " 
- concepts of 
prayer 
GOLDMAN 
(1964) PRE-RELIGIOUS SUB-RELIGIOUS RELIGIOUS 
- understanding (up to 7/8) (7/8-13/14) (Above 13/14) 3 Bible stories 
and projecting 
on 3 'religious' 
pictures 
DECONCHY 
(1964) PERSONALI- INTERIORI-
- semantic ATTRIBUTIVITY 
test of (9/10) SAT ION SAT ION 
concepts of (9/10-12/13) (15/16) 
God 
PEATLING 
(1971) 
- mUltiple CONCRETE INTERMEDIATE ABSTRACT 
choice questions (up to 9) (10-15) (16+) 
on 3 Bible 
stories 
BEECHICK 
(1974) CONCRETE FORMAL 
- interpreting INTUITIVE OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL 
meaning of 3 (up to 7) (8-10) (11+) biblical 
parables 
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The question that we must now ask is whether or not there is a 
simple pattern of development of religious thinking, or is it 
something that varies mainly with prior experience and training, 
and also the kind of task that is being performed? Whether or not 
stage development theories will help in providing the answer to 
this question remains to be seen. Movements in other areas of 
psychology (Phillips and Kelly, 1975), along with criticisms of 
Piaget's stage theory (Brown and Desforges, 1977 and 1979; 
Donaldson, 1978 and Driver, 1978) suggest that the demands being 
made of many existing stage theories may lead to are-evaluation 
of the assumptions which they are based on, and a questioning of 
their usefulness. We will pursue this discussion concerning the 
status of stage development theories in developmental psychology, 
as a whole, in the next section of this chapter. 
The influence of Piaget's stage development theory has been felt 
in many areas of child development research, and as such its 
influence on the studies reviewed in the previous sections is not 
surprising. '~at needs to be explored in more detail is the re-
lationship between different stage development theories in different 
areas of children's development. Following this approach Jones 
(1968) attempted to related Harms's (1944) theory of religious 
development to three more general theories of child development; 
those of Robert Havighurst (1952) on the general development of 
children and adolescents, Jean Piaget (1952) on conceptual growth, 
and Erik Erikson (1959) on identity formation. At the end of this 
study she concluded that the theories of Erikson, Piaget and Harms 
could be integrated under a holistic model, but that these three 
theories did not fit together so well with Havighurst's. This 
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problem of integrating Havighurst's theory seems to be caused 
mainly by the fact that he only has one developmental stage to 
cover the pre-school period from 1 to 6 years of age, whereas the 
other three theories have two stages to cover this period. It is, 
perhaps, indicative of the lack of depth of this theoretical 
analysis that the problem of integration of the theories is met 
at the level of deciding how to divide up the years of development, 
rather than at a deeper level, such as the reconciling of the 
processes that these theories are proposing underly the develop-
mental sequences which they describe. It is also unfortunate 
that this attempt to relate the somewhat isolated theoretical 
disciplines of religious development and other areas of child 
development, chose to use Harms's (1944) theory to represent 
theories of religious development, when the only record of it 
which we have is contained in one fairly short experimental paper. 
It also seems strange that, in 1968, Jones should choose to use 
this loosely formulated theory, without even considering other 
theoretical developments, such as Goldman's. 
Recent work by Francis (1976), Gates (1976) and Hay (1977) may 
have marked the start of a movement away from both the approach 
and the theoretical standpoint of the stage development theorists. 
Francis (1976) has developed a test, which is designed to measure 
children's attitudes to religion, and he has used this to investi-
gate empirically some of Goldman's propositions concerning the 
relationship between children's cognitive development and their 
attitude towards religion. As was mentioned in our discussion of 
Goldman's conclusions, Francis's work, along with the study of 
Hoge and Petrillo (1978), has shed considerable doubt on the 
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validity of Goldman's claims concerning the influence of cognitive 
development on children's religious attitudes. Both Gates (1976) 
and Hay '(1977) have taken a much less structured approach to 
studying children's religious thinking and religious experience, 
and it is a characteristic of both of these studies that they have 
revealed a much greater richness in children's religious thinking 
than many previous investigations have credited them with. Gates's 
study involved interviews with 1,000 children, in the age range of 
6 to 15 years, and during the course of these interviews children 
were questioned on a great variety of topics, such as superstition, 
death, space exploration, church attendance, and beliefs in Father 
Christmas and God. Because of the nature of this investigation, the 
analysis of the results was mainly descriptive. This was also the 
case with Hay's (1977) study of religious experience, in which he 
asked adults to recall the religious experiences which they had as 
children. Neither of these last two studies provide the type of 
empirical approach which is necessary to build theories on, but they 
have provided evidence to support the view that children's religious 
thinking, in the pre-adolescent years, may be more developed and 
involved than has sometimes been suggested. 
In concluding this section, it is necessary to bear in mind the 
comments of both Gates (1975) and Batson (1971 and 1974) that a full 
understanding of the religious qevelopment of children will depend 
on much more than factors related to their cognitive development. 
It should, in this context, be recognised that by limiting our own 
explorations to the development of religious thinking in children, 
we are, in fact, only studying one part of their complete religious 
development. 
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2.3 Psychological Theories of the Development of Thinking in Children 
Piaget has been described by Hunt (1969) as lithe giant of develop-
mental psychology". His contribution to theory and research on 
child development has been enormous, and his writings have been so 
extensive as to preclude any comprehensive evaluation within this 
review chapter. (Flavell, 1963 and 1977, has provided two among the 
best of a number of extensive reviews of Piaget's work.) We will, 
however, consider some of the essential features of Piaget's theory 
before discussing its implications for, and influence on, work on 
children's developing religious thinking. 
At the centre of Piaget's theory are three concepts, termed assimi-
lation, accommodation and equilibration. The theory states that 
children's cognitive systems tend towards a state of equilibrium; 
this is not a state of rest but is, in fact, a state of continual 
activity. The process of cognitive development is, therefore, based 
around maintaining equilibrium in the child's cognitive system. As 
the child interacts with the world around him, this equilibrium can 
only be achieved by a process of adaptation and change. The adap-
tive process, Piaget theorises, comes about through the processes 
of assimilation and accommodation. These two processes are inter-
active and complementary and are, therefore, difficult to separate; 
however, assimilation is essentially the process of fitting an 
interpretation of the external environment, as viewed by the child, 
into the child's existing cognitive structures. Accommodation 
involves an adaptation of the child's cognitive structures, so 
that new understandings of the external environment may be taken 
account of. Piaget suggests this model as an explanation of how 
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the child's cognitive system gradually evolves through maturation 
and experience. 
Piaget goes much further than merely describing the processes of 
development, by hypothesising that the order of major cognitive 
changes is the same for all children. Although Piaget insists that 
development is a continuous process, he also claims that there are 
several major stages of development which are each represented by 
a single unified set of cognitive operations. All children move 
through these stages in the same invariant order, even though the 
speed with which they move through them will vary from child to 
child. 
Piaget suggests that there are three main stages in the process of 
q •. 
cognitive development, although within these there are certain sub-
divisions. The first stage is called the sensori-motor period, and 
this is assumed to take place generally between birth ~nd 18 months. 
During this stage, the child learns to distinguish himself2 from the 
rest of the world and forms an understanding of the fact that things 
go on in the world which are independent from him and his actions. 
This is followed by the concrete operational period, which occurs 
approximately between 18 months and 11 years. This stage has two 
major subdivisions; the preoperational period which lasts up until 
around 7 years of age, and the later period during which concrete 
operations are established. It is this sub-period of concrete 
2The personal pronouns 'he', 'his', 'him' and 'himself' are used in 
the customary way throughout this thesis on occasions when we are 
referring to a child who could equally well be male or female. 
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operations, which would, according to Piaget's guidelines, include 
most children within the age range which we are concentrating on, 
from 6 to 11 years. During this sub-period, children are expected 
to demonstrate their ability to solve tasks such as Piaget's con-
servation and class inclusion tasks, and their ability to perform 
these tasks is taken by Piaget to demonstrate the presence of 
operational structures, which allow them to decentre and reverse 
their thinking, by working back from one set of events to an 
earlier set of events (e.g. in the conservation experiments). 
The final stage in Piaget's theory is the formal operational 
period, which normally starts at about 12 years of age, although 
as with all three of the periods Piaget goes to great lengths to 
stress that the ages which he quotes are intended to be averages. 
In this period, the child is thought to have moved into an adult 
stage of thinking. He will then be able to reason logically not 
only about actual things, but also about ideas, hypotheses and 
propositions. Piaget details the structures which he suggests 
underlie this level of thinking, and he describes these in terms of 
a mathematical model (Piaget, 1953). 
Piaget's theory 1S undoubtedly elegant and has certainly had a 
major impact on the whole field of developmental psychology in 
recent years. Indeed, Modgi1 and Modgi1 (1976) have documented 
37,000 research studies that have been inspired by Piaget's theory, 
and there surely have been many others. There are, however, many 
doubts that have been expressed about this theory, and those who 
have followed up Piaget's work have clearly had difficulty in 
building on his theory and refining it. One of the doubts, which 
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has been raised about this theory, concerns the relationship between 
it and Piaget's experimental data. His theory can be described as 
an "a priori" theory, in that the majority of his experimental work 
has been done to illustrate it. The question is frequently raised 
as to whether the theory has ever been properly tested or, indeed, 
whether it is, in fact, testable (Brown and Desforges, 1977; Driver, 
1978). In addition, one problem with the replication studies which 
have been done is that so many of them have stuck closely to Piaget's 
procedures. Recent work by Donaldson (1978) and Bryant (1974), 
which will be discussed in more detail in later chapters, has 
indicated that changes in Piagetian tasks can lead to dramatic 
changes in the performances, of children attempting them. Driver 
(1978) has pointed out that the weakest aspect of Piagetian type 
studies is the lack of analysis of the thought structures, which 
children use in solving the various tasks. In relation to this 
comment, Brown and Desforges (1977) have reported that the majority 
of studies that have presented the same children with a range of 
Piagetian tasks, which are supposed to be testing the presence of 
the same underlying cognitive structures, have revealed low corre-
lations between the children's performances on the various tasks. 
This highlights an aspect of the untestability of Piaget's theory, 
because such instances can be explained in terms of the theory as 
instances of d~calage (this concept is explained in more detail in 
Section 3.4). One can quite properly question, however, whether 
data such as these are not better interpreted by asking whether 
Piaget may have failed in his attempt to describe the underlying 
structures of children's thinking. In addition, as soon as one 
casts doubt on the structures which Piaget has modelled concrete 
and formal operational thinking on, one begins to cast doubt on the 
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invariant stage developmental aspects of his theory. It may be that 
the process of cognitive change is not as unified as Piaget has 
described it to be, and as we have already argued in Chapter One, 
it may be that a more fruitful approach will be to study the process 
of cognitive change as it relates to other developmental changes 
and in relation to specific tasks or specific areas of children's 
thinking. These conclusions are supported by those of Flavell 
(1977) which are part of a most illuminating evaluation of the 
current status of Piaget's theory: 
"My own hunch is that the concept of stage will not, in 
fact, figure importantly in future scientific work on 
cognitive growth. This does not imply disbelief in the 
existence of unidirectional and bidirectional develop-
mental dependencies, wherein one development assists 
another and perhaps conversely. Nor does it imply that 
there is no unity or consistency in cognitive functioning 
across situations. But it does imply that there may be 
less unity, consistency, and developmental interdependence 
than theories like Piaget's would have us believe." 
(Flavell, 1977, p249). 
We will leave that issue for further consideration, later on, 
and continue to briefly look at Piaget's theory in relation to 
other general theories of child development. 
We have already mentioned Piaget's use of stages to describe the 
cognitive development of the child. These stages are not to be 
confused with another type of stage which is sometimes used (e.g. 
by Gesell, 1928), which merely lists specific behaviours that occur 
at different ages (e.g. the infant is found to crawl at such and 
such an age and to walk at another, and to run at another, etc.). 
The difference is that Gesell's stages are a list of empirical 
phenomena, and Piaget's are a theoretical taxonomy. In Piaget's 
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theory, different behaviour patterns merely point to the underlying 
cognitive restructurings which are involved in a movement between 
two stages. As we have already said (page 30), in our consideration 
of attempts to align theories of the development of religious thinking 
to Piaget's stage development theory, there has as yet been little 
consideration of fundamental cognitive restructurings, that might 
produce different types of religious thought. This means that much 
of the evidence that has been collected is more in support of a 
'Gesell stage' type of theory, which is in fact just a convenient 
way of grouping together behaviour patterns that happen to occur 
around about the same time, rather than a fundamental cognitive 
theory of development. At this point we must once again call into 
question the idea that there is any real evidence at the present 
time, for taking a stage development view of religious thinking 
that uses the Piagetian conception of a stage development theory. 
Another point, which we touched upon briefly in our introduction 
in Chapter One, was the issue of the differing roles of maturation 
and learning. There are two extreme positions in this controversy. 
First, there is that of the extreme predeterminist and then there 
is that of the extreme environmentalist. Gesell (1945) typified 
the extreme predeterminist, in the way he described different types 
of behaviour unfolding with the increasing age of the child, and 
also in his approach to the development of thought. It was his 
view that all behaviour patterns are determined by an innate 
process of growth, which he called maturation. Watson (1913) 
occupied the other extreme position, that of the environmentalist. 
It was the belief of the 'behaviourist school', of which Watson 
was probably the founder, that ~ behaviour is learned, and 
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furthermore that learning will always occur by the association of 
a stimulus with a response. It was also stated by them that a 
response will recur if it is positively reinforced, and be inhibited 
if it is negatively reinforced. Thus, as a developmental theory, 
this results in the view that the child's development will depend 
entirely upon the environment and his own particular experience of 
the environment. 
Piaget himself comes somewhere in the middle of these two extreme 
positions. Like Watson, he emphasised the importance of the effect 
of the environment, but he considered this interaction from the 
point of view of the child actively discovering things from his 
manipulation of the environment. However, Piaget differs from 
Watson in that he also considered maturation as an important factor 
in development. He did not, however, go to the same extreme in 
this direction as had Gesell. Piaget's position is one of an 
'interactionist', who views intellectual development as resulting 
from an interplay between internal and external factors. 
Because of this 'interactionist' approach, Piaget's theory stood 
apart from those of the 'Learning Theorists' or 'Behaviourists' 
(e.g. Watson) and the 'Maturationa1ists' (e.g. Gesell), as it 
also did from the psychoanalytical school of Sigmund Freud. 
Freud (1905) viewed child development from a psychosexual view-
point, in which he concentrated on instinctual drives and 
emotional conditions related to them, as being the basis of 
development of normal or neurotic personalities. Although Piaget 
started out from a partly psychoanalytical position, and even 
occasionally described his observations in Freudian terms in the 
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early days (e.g. Piaget, 1929), he gradually moved further and 
further away from this kind of explanation, as his theory was 
developed. He, for instance, gradually became dissatisfied 
with the Freudian clinical method, which was used widely at the 
time, and feeling that it relied too heavily on language, he 
sought to use partially non-verbal tests when studying children's 
thinking. In his theory also, the emotions which are of such 
importance to Freudians, are relegated to an insignificant position. 
Unfortunately Piaget, unlike Freud (see page 18), never really 
considered the development of religious thinking in his studies 
of child development. He mentions children's religious explan-
ations of natural phenomena in his works on the child's concep-
tion of the world (Piaget, 1929) and in his work on physical 
causality (Piaget, 1930), but even here he, like others who have 
come after him, may have allowed his own feelings about religion 
to bias his analysis of these statements. For instance, the 
following quotation from The Child's Conception of the World 
appears to imply more than the normal Piagetian experimental 
observations: 
"The child's real religion, at any rate during the first 
years, is quite definitely anything but the over-
elaborated religion with which he is plied." 
(Piaget, 1929, p354). 
The way in which he continues in this same passage suggests that 
this is one of the points, which we mentioned earlier, where 
Piaget was still using Freudian explanations for behaviour he 
could not otherwise explain: 
" ••• our results entirely support the thesis of M. Bovet, 
according to which the child spontaneously attributes to 
his parents the perfections and attributes which he will 
later transfer to God, if his religious education gives 
him the opportunity." 
(Piaget, 1929, p354). 
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Although Piaget himself does not directly apply his theory to the 
development of religious thinking, it is natural that others should 
try to do so, in the light of the fact that Piaget is now so widely 
thought of as the leading theorist in the field of development of 
children's thinking. Peatling and Goldman, certainly, have sought 
in Piaget's theories guidelines for their studies although, as we 
have already argued, they may not have done Piaget justice in the 
way they have used his theory. The debt owed to Piaget is indeed 
very large, and the only way in which it can start to be repayed 
is by viewing his theory in the way in which he intended that it 
should be viewed; that is, as a building block for future research 
and development of theories. 
Psychological theories of the development of thought in children 
have had an increasing proximity to theories of language develop-
ment and word meaning acquisition in children, and it is to these 
areas that we will now turn. It is sometimes argued that the 
development of certain kinds of concepts can be viewed as depen-
ding on certain cognitive processes that are quite independent of 
language. However, since we are limiting our investigations to a 
consideration of religious concepts, it is difficult to see how we 
can avoid the issue of language. Before considering directly 
theories of language development and word meaning, we must turn 
briefly to consider an issue that involves the relationship of 
language and thought. 
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2.4 Are Thought and Language Independent? 
In addressing a question such as the one we are addressing in 
this thesis; it seems fundamental to consider how much a child's 
religious thinking will be limited by his religious language, 
as it exists at any given time. It is widely observable, on one 
hand, that children are sometimes capable of producing statements 
in religious language, the meaning of which they do not understand. 
On the other hand, they may, at the same time, have religious 
thoughts and experiences that they cannot verbalise. 
What, then, are the developmental aspects of religious thinking? 
Is it more dependent upon religious language development than it 
is upon cognitive development, and can cognitive development be 
thought of, at all, in isolation from language development? This 
is part of a broader controversy which has attracted considerable 
attention throughout the development of modern day psychology; 
that is, the relationship between language and thought. 
Throughout the history of psychology, fluctuations have occurred 
between the view that thought depends on language and that language 
is not necessary for thought. In fact, as early as 1890, William 
James was of the opinion that thinking was not dependent on language. 
One of the things that James used in defence of this position was 
evidence from a deaf-mute, who he showed was as capable of "a system 
of thought quite as effective and rational as that of a word user". 
Later controlled experiments with deaf subjects have added even 
more weight to the view that thought does not necessarily depend 
upon language (Furth, 1966; Piaget, 1970b, and 1970c; and Piaget 
50 
and Inhelder, 1966). However, one theory which opposed that of 
William James, and which came to be known as the Sapir-Wherf 
hypothesis, was developed in the 1920's. The view of Edward Sapir 
and Benjamin Whorf (see Mandelbaum, 1961 and Carroll, 1956) was 
that we are all constrained, in the way in which we think about 
things, by the language we speak. This argument, in essence, 
states that the way language provides individuals with words to 
differentiate between objects will govern the way that they think 
about these objects. For instance, in English we have two terms, 
yellow and orange, to describe a particular range of c~lours, and 
we usually think about colour in this range as being either yellow 
or orange. However, in the Zuni language they only have one term 
to describe the whole range of yellows and oranges, and as a result 
Lenneberg and Roberts (1956) have demonstrated in an experiment on 
colour memory that it i~ much more difficult for Zuni speakers to 
remember particular colours in this range than it is for English 
speakers: The idea that this demonstrates that thinking is neces-
sarily determined by our language, is somewhat modified by Roger 
Brown (1956), whose view it is that language merely predisposes 
people to think in a particular way. For example, concepts which 
are not defined by a single word. in a particular language can 
often be defined by several words, ,if need be, and this may mean 
that they are less likely to be defined in the thinking of the 
people who speak that particular language, but not that they are 
unable to think about such concepts. This view has been termed 
the weak form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. 
Support for the view that language determines thought also came 
from the behaviourist tradition of psychology which we discussed 
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briefly in the last section. As we mentioned before, behaviourists 
take an extreme environmental position in assuming that the infant's 
mind is like a blank slate upon which experience inscribes its 
lessons. Also, their approach was in terms of observable phenomena, 
and this meant that language was always seen as the vital input to 
the child and language was thought to be acquired by the child 
through selective reinforcement of his imitations of this speech 
input. Thought, being a non-observable phenomena, was considered 
as merely being internal vocalisations of the language that had 
been learned. This view of language acquisition has met with 
severe criticisms (e.g. Chomsky, N., 1959), but has been upheld 
by those working from within the 'behaviourist' tradition for a 
considerable period of time. We will discuss this issue of language 
acquisition in more detail in due course, but it is sufficient to 
note that at the present time the evidence (e.g. McNeill, 1966, 
1970a, 1970b; and Slobin, 1971) is loaded heavily against this 
theory of language acquisition, and hence this particular argument 
for the dependence of thought upon language. 
Bernstein (1961) is a further supporter of the view that language 
determines thinking, and he proposes this as the reason why 
children from working class backgrounds, who are assumed to have 
a restricted language code (this fact alone has been questioned 
by Houston, 1970), often do not reach the same levels of intelli-
gence as children from middle-class backgrounds. Cromer (1974), 
in a recent review of these positions, comments that even if this 
is true it is unclear which is the causative factor; i.e. does 
the restricted language code cause lower intelligence, or does 
lower intelligence cause the restricted language code? There are 
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also a number of objections to Bernstein's position. For example, 
the very nature of the way that intelligence is tested is often 
highly loaded towards linguistic ability, and can hardly be 
equated directly to plain thinking. 
The complete opposite of the view that thought depends upon 
language, is the view that language depends upon thought, and 
this is very close to the view taken by Piaget. In Piaget's 
theory, the child spends the first 18 months of life in a period 
of 'sensori-motor intelligence', during which time, by the process 
of interaction with the environment, which we have already discussed, 
the child is developing certain cognitive attainments (e.g. object 
permanence), which are the rudiments of 'pre-linguistic thought', 
and the building blocks of the later development of language. 
However, even accepting that this is so, some people (e.g. Bruner, 
1964) have suggested that more developed levels of thinking, e.g. 
formal and concrete operational thought in Piaget's terms, are still 
dependent upon language rather than vice versa. In fact, Bruner 
even goes to the length of suggesting that language is the prime 
factor which, at this stage, enables the child to climb up to a 
new plane of symbolic manipulation. Piaget counters this argument 
by pointing to his studies (Piaget, 1970b an? 1970c; Piaget and 
Inhelder, 1966) which giv~ evidence to suggest that deaf subjects 
are just as capable of operational thought as those who have 
normal language, even though it typically takes a little longer 
to develop. Although this is not conclusive evidence, some later 
studies by Sinclair (1971) on non-handicapped children help to give 
strong support to his case. 
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Hermine Sinclair, like Piaget, claimed that language acquisition 
was dependent upon certain cognitive processes already having been 
attained by the child, and this view directly conflicts with that 
of Chomsky, who postulates that there are innate linguistic mechan-
isms which make up a language-acquisition device, and which make it 
possible for the child to learn any language to which it is exposed. 
Sinclair (1971) proposed some actual sensori-motor schemes, which 
she felt could be observed as cognitive attainments towards language 
acquisition, e.g. the child's ability to relate objects and actions 
to one another could be the basis for subject-object grammatical 
relations. Further support for this viewpoint comes from Lyons 
(1966), who comes to the same conclusion from a different direction 
and talks in terms of pre-linguistic learning in the first 18 months 
of development. 
A further study by Ferreiro and Sinclair (1971), which looked at 
the ability of pre-operational children to reverse linguistically 
the order of two events in time, suggests that children are cog-
nitively capable of solving a task such as this before they are 
linguistically capable of a temporal reversal. The task, in this 
case, was to talk about some actions, which had been carried out 
by two dolls, in the reverse order to that in which they had been 
carried out. When questioned, children at a certain stage knew in 
which order the events had occurred, but could not reverse them 
linguistically. This study again lends support to the view of 
Piaget, that cognitive development precedes linguistic development. 
It is generally the case that, in the light of recent evidence such 
as this, few people now hold the view that thought depends on 
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language. The main question now seems to be whether language and 
thought develop independently of each other, or whether language 
development depends on cognition. Cromer (1974) comes out in 
favour of the former view, mentioning also that this was the 
basis of Vygotsky's (1962) classic work Thought and Language, and 
commenting that in the end both Piaget and Chomsky may be right as 
well: 
Without wholly committing ourselves to the Vygotskian position of 
the independence of language and thought development, it would 
seem necessary to approach the problem of studying the development 
of religious thinking both from a linguistic and from a cognitive 
viewpoint, given that this approach to the development of thinking 
is the most favoured one in developmental psychology at the present 
time. Even if language development is eventually proven to be 
totally dependent upon cognitive development, we will have lost 
nothing, which would not be the case if we were to disregard 
language development and the opposite were found to be true. 
It is at this point that our approach to this problem is probably 
beginning to take on a character that is particularly new to the 
study of religious thinking in children. For this reason we will 
find it necessary to examine the literature yet a little further, 
to consider previous studies of the development of word meaning in 
children. 
It would seem to us that the past studies of the development of 
religious thinking in children have concentrated almost entirely 
upon trying to map out a sequence of stages which will fit in with 
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the Piagetian tradition. This could be one of the reasons why 
these stage theories, once developed, have lacked understanding 
of the theoretical assumptions underlying a cognitive stage develop-
ment theory. The concentration on the purely cognitive aspects of 
the development of religious thinking would seem unfortunate, in 
view of the importance which is being placed on language development 
as a possible independent process~ 
2The distinction that is being drawn between concentrating on cogn~t~ve, 
as opposed to cognitive and linguistic, aspects of the development of 
religious thinking may confuse those who take the term cognitive to 
include linguistic acts. In this context we are distinguishing 
between an approach which seeks to explore language development itself, 
in addition to other aspects of cognitive development, rather than 
assuming that all linguistic acts are necessarily representing under-
lying cognitive competence. 
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2.5 The Development of Word Meaning in Children 
In the last section we touched upon some of the current theories 
concerning the acquisition of language in children. Now we will 
go on to look at a sub-section of the study of language acquisition 
which is concerned with the development of word mean~ng in children. 
This, in a sense, is of prime importance to our particular consider-
ation, in this thesis, as children in this age range (6 to 11 years 
old) have for the most part acquired many of the basic rudiments of 
language, but the development of word meaning is still an extremely 
active process for them. Also, the understanding of any religious 
concept is going to entail a degree of religious word meaning 
acquisition, and the teaching of religion will almost inevitably 
involve the use of a considerable amount of 'religious language'. 
Eve Clark (1973) in the paper in which she first proposed her 
Semantic Feature Hypothesis, as an explanation of the process by 
which children acquire word meaning, also reviewed three other 
alternative theo~ies. These were the 'Grammatical Relations 
Hypothesis', the 'Generalisation Hypothesis' and the 'Universal 
Primitives Hypothesis', and we shall now look briefly at each of 
these along with Eve Clark's 'Semantic Feature Hypothesis'. 
'The Grammatical Relations Hypothesis' of McNeill (1970b) is based 
upon his view that children start to acquire language by learning 
the meaning of particular sentences, and 'word-meaning' only becomes 
a consideration later on when the child begins to use rules for con-
structing sentences. At this later stage of language acquisition, 
McNeill postulates two ways in which the child's lexicon of word 
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meanings may grow. The first is termed 'horizontal growth', and this 
represents a word entering the 'lexicon' (the child's 'dictionary') 
with only some of its semantic features, i.e. with only part of its 
normal adult meaning. This kind of 'dictionary entry' may be com-
pleted by the gradual addition of the other features. The other 
form of lexical growth is 'vertical development', and this describes 
a situation where a word enters the child's lexicon with all its 
semantic features, all at the one time. The only qualification here 
is that, at first, dictionary entries are 'separated', which means 
that the same semantic features are not always seen as being the same 
in different entries within the lexicon. It is unclear whether these 
two forms of growth are supposed to be alternative theories, or 
complementary theories. Certainly, if the former is the case, it 
would seem hard to hold by the 'vertical development' view in the 
light of data showing that children's word meanings develop with age 
(Eve Clark points this out, and we will be providing evidence on this 
ourselves in Chapter Four) • 
Eve Clark's (1973) main contentions with this theory are in terms of 
the idea that children can be at a stage where they can use words 
grammatically without knowing anything of the referential properties 
of the words and, because of its lack of consideration, of how semantic 
features are acquired and where they come from. 
'The Generalization Hypothesis' of Anglin (1970) suggests a develop-
ment from specific concrete relationships between individual words 
to more and more generalized relationships between groups of words. 
In terms of lexical development Anglin suggests a hierarchical 
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growth, with superordinate lexical items forming the higher categories 
in the hierarchy, and being acquired later on. For example, at an 
early stage, the child might have in his lexicon the words: Mummy, 
Daddy, Dog and Cat. Then, later, he may group together Mummy and 
Daddy as Parents, and Dog and Cat as Animals, and then at an even 
later stage, Parents and Animals might be grouped together as 
living things. 
Anglin's data in support of this theory was drawn mainly from a 
series of experiments in which he looked at the relationship between 
twenty words. He applied sorting tasks, free recall, structural 
recall and a sentence frame completion task. From these tasks he 
drew up hierarchies of classification for these words. His approach 
is strongly criticised by Eve Clark (1973), in that she claims that 
he was not studying word meaning at all, but merely studying the 
knowledge of form-class membership of a group of words. She also 
criticised him for limiting his idea of a semantic feature to being 
merely the equivalent of a word. 
" ... a feature is a complex verbal concept rich in properties just 
as a word is" (Anglin, 1970, p95). 
The final crushing criticism that Clark levels at Anglin's generalisa-
tion hypothesis is that most of the data reported elsewhere in the 
literature runs contrary to its predictions (e.g. Brown, 1958; and 
Clark E.V., 1971). 
The third theory which Clark (1973) considers is the 'Universal 
Primitives Hypothesis' of Postal (1966) and Bierwisch (1967). This 
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theory proposes that underlying any language there is a set of 
universal semantic primitives, along with some rules for the combin-
ation of these primitives into lexical items. The rules will vary 
from one language to the next, and therefore languages will differ 
in the way that they develop the semantic primitives into lexical 
items. This theory obviously depends upon biologically transmitted 
language universals (like that of Chomsky, N. (1957) on language 
acquisition), and Clark, E.V. (1973) merely goes as far as to point 
out that at the present time, although it is a very plausible idea, 
it is extemely difficult to either prove or disprove such an idea. 
Clark, E.V. (1973), in developing her own 'Semantic Feature Hypothesis' 
to some extent builds on both the 'Universal Primitives Hypothesis' 
of Postal (1966) and Bierwisch (1967), and the idea of 'horizontal 
lexical development' in the 'Grammatical Relations Hypothesis' of 
McNeill (1970b). She states that: 
" ••• when the child first begins to use identifiable words, he 
does not know their full (adult) meaning: He only has partial 
entries for them in his lexicon, such that these partial entries 
correspond in some way to some of the features or components 
of meaning that would be present in the entries for the same 
words in the adult's lexicon. Thus, the child will begin by 
identifying the meaning of a word with only one or two features 
rather than with the whole combination of meaning components 
or features (qua Postal) that are used criterially by the adult. 
The acquisition of semantic knowledge then, will consist of 
adding more features of meaning to the lexical entry of the 
word until the child's combination of features in the entry 
for that word corresponds to the adult's. The hypothesis 
therefore assumes that the child's use and interpretation of 
words may differ considerably from the adult's in the early 
stages of the language-acquisition process, but, over time, 
will come to correspond to the adult model. 
Although the child does not know the full meaning of some word, 
there is nothing to tell him this fact and he will, therefore, 
use the word. As soon as he has attached some feature(s) of 
meaning to it, it simply has that meaning for him. The child 
will use those one or two features criterially in deciding 
when to apply the word and when not. Since he has only a 
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partial characterization of the word's meaning set up, his 
referential categories may often differ considerably from the 
adult's for the same words. The child will make referential 
errors because he does not yet know the combination of features 
that will allow him to delimit his categories differently. The 
principal difference between child and adult categories at this 
stage will be that the child's are generally larger since he 
will use only one or two features criterially instead of a 
whole combination of features." 
(Clark, E.V., 1973, p.72). 
The example which Clark, E.V. (1973) uses to describe this type of 
acquisition looks at the features which might at different stages 
be applied by a child to the word "dog". It might start out as 
meaning "four-legged". Then, as other four-legged things are added 
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to the child's lexicon, other features will become necessary, e.g. 
sound - barking, size - relatively small (in comparison to cows, 
zebras, etc.), until eventually an adult-like collection of features 
will be added to it. 
One area from which Clark, E.V. (1973) draws much of her evidence 
is that of occurrence of overextension in the meaning given to 
particular words by children at certain stages of their development. 
She quotes, for instance, the Donaldson and Wales (1970) finding 
that a group of children aged 3.5 to 4.1 years responded in an 
identical way to comments containing "same" and "different" (e.g. 
give me an object that is "the same as"/"different to" that one). 
In this case she argues that these results could be explained by 
the fact that the initial semantic features acquired by a pair of 
antonyms could be exactly the same, and until the child acquires 
the 'feature' of positive/negative polarity then there may well 
be confusion. 
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Other findings which she explains in this way are those of Donaldson 
and Balfour (1968), on the confusion of "more" and "less" in a group 
of 3-year-old children, and those of Donaldson and Wales (1970), on 
the confusion of "tall" and "short" in the 3.5 to 4.1 year-old 
children. She also uses evidence from Wales and Campbell (1970) on 
other pairs of dimensional adjectives (e.g. big-wee) as further 
support along the same lines. 
Clark (1973) also uses an enormous quantity of data from diary studies 
of child language development, to demonstrate the universal over-
extension of the use of certain words by children learning to speak 
many different languages. Here she is arguing that the children's 
categories are obviously delimited differently from adult's, and by 
her theory at this stage they would be expected to use these words 
correctly some times but incorrectly (by the adult categorisation) 
at other times. 
A third kind of overextension that Clark refers to in support of her 
theory is that of a similar nature to the first kind we mentioned. 
In this case Clark argues that the child's incomplete lexical entry 
leads him to treat certain words synonymously (e.g. tell and ask, 
boy and brother) until he learns some of the semantic features which 
differentiate them. The data used here are taken mainly from 
Chomsky, C. (1969) and Piaget (1928), and again the 'Semantic Feature 
Hypothesis' seems to give an adequate explanation for what has been 
observed in studies on children ranging in age from 5.0 to 12.0 
years old. 
62 
Clark, E.V. (1973) also extends her theory to discuss possible ways 
in which semantic features may be acquired, which is an area which 
the earlier theories did not touch upon. We shall not however go 
any further into the Semantic Feature Hypothesis, here. (The 
reader who wishes to know more will find a well laid out account of 
the theory in Clark, E.V. 1973). 
Whether or not Eve Clark's Semantic Feature Hypothesis continues to 
gather support or not, it gives us a good insight into some of the 
processes by which children may acquire the meaning of words. Let 
us briefly rev~e~.;r some of the main points which this hypothesis 
raises, in particular, for studies of children's thinking. Firstly, 
a traditional interview approach when used on its own could provide 
some very misleading results. For example if the child's language 
is at a particular stage of development that is markedly different 
from that of the adult, or even slightly different with respect to 
a crucial factor, then the child may well understand something quite 
different, by what is said by himself and by what is said by the 
experimenter, than the experimenter or any other adult would. Thus, 
even if the child "appears to understand the question" or "appears 
to understand the instructions" or "appears to understand the stor/', 
this understanding may be quite different from what is intended. 
It does seem that if children do acquire the meaning of words in the 
way suggested by Clark (i.e. by gradually adding features), and they 
do overextend the use of ~.;rords, while the full meaning is being 
acquired, then any study of cognitive development or language develop-
ment which disregards the state of the semantic development of the 
child will almost certainly be missing out important factors. 
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As a result of this consideration we will spend some time in this 
thesis addressing problems to do with the semantic development of 
certain words that might be central to the development of religious 
understanding and religious thinking in the child. In this way we 
hope to add a further dimension to the more traditional studies 
that have been done in the past. This will be done in addition to 
some interview-type studies in which we hope to explore further 
the effects of cognitive development on religious understanding. 
To re-state what we are now suggesting, it is in our view not enough 
to question the child on his understanding of religious concepts and 
religious stories, as has been done in the past. We must go to the 
roots of his developing language to try to discover what he means 
by the words he is using, and what he understands by the words we 
are using. Thus we should now re-state our objective (see p.9) and 
say that we now plan to investigate various cognitive and semantic 
factors affecting the development of religious thinking in children 
aged from 6 to 11 years old. 
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2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
We have now spanned a larger area of literature than is usual in a 
review of this kind, but we feel that this was most necessary to 
explain the rationale for what follows. In the past, as can be 
seen from our review, studies of the development of religious 
thinking in children have lacked cohesion and direction, and have 
also been done mainly in isolation from work on other aspects of 
child development. A good summary evaluation is given by Strommen 
(1971) in the introduction to the book he edited, which is an 
extremely comprehensive review of the religious development 
literature of the past four decades: 
"Three words can be used to describe the bulk of the research 
reviewed by the authors. They are the words used by Brayfield 
in 1964 to characterize the results of 2S years of research 
in vocational guidance: sporadic, fortuitous and unsystematic. 
Of the thousands of studies which were located, few build on 
previous research to yield systematic results. Many of the 
studies appeared to be one-shot or chance-circumstance efforts. 
Further, only a few were guided by a theory or set of hypo-
theses, resulting often in data of little meaning or question-
able value. The best label that can be given to much of what 
was found is "exploratory research"." 
(Strommen, M. 1971, p.XVIII) 
The reader may be reminded here of an earlier quotation by James 
Dittes (see p.lS) on the whole state of research on the psychology 
of religion, and this we would suggest demonstrates that research 
on the development of religious thinking in children, far from 
being an exception, is typical of the field, in that it has 
characterized all that has been lacking in studies of the psychology 
of religion in the past. 
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We feel that the new movements in the study of cognitive development 
and language acquisition, which we have also reviewed, are more 
encouraging, and it is for this reason that we feel that the greatest 
hope for future studies of religious development, is to seek new 
direction, methodologies and theoretical standpoints from these areas. 
As a first move in this direction we intend to approach the problem 
of the development of religious thinking in children, aged from 6 to 
11 years old, from a related cognitive and semantic development 
perspective. 
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CHAPTER T H R E E 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERSTANDING OF PARABLES 
3.1 Introduction 
A consideration of the development of religious thinking in 
children as a cognitive process depends to an extent on locating 
cognitive factors which are of central importance to this develop-
ment. One such factor which has been related to religious thinking, 
in the past, is the development of the ability to think or reason 
abstractly. However, as we mentioned earlier (see page 32) there 
has been a certain amount of controversy over whether the kind of 
abstract thinking, which Piaget claims occurs only after his 
adolescent stage of formal operational thinking has been reached, 
is in fact necessary for abstract religious thinking. Piaget, 
when he refers to abstract thinking, as Prince (1970) has pointed 
out, is meaning the ability of the child to reverse his thinking 
so that a hypothetical proposition can be considered. This would 
seem to be a quite different use of the word from when it is used 
to refer to religious ideas, and it has the general sense of 
immaterial. In Piaget's terms 'abstract thinking' is the capacity 
for logical propositional thought, which can be, and often is in 
the physical sciences, applied to concrete entities and experiences. 
This type of abstract thinking can, of course, be applied in a 
similar way to religious concepts and ideas; however, the confusion 
here arises from the fact that these concepts and ideas may them-
selves, in the general sense, be termed 'abstract'. Prince summarises 
the problem by stating that "It does not follow logically that because 
children cannot yet think abstractly (in the psychological sense) 
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they cannot appreciate some abstract (in the general sense) element 
of religious thinking and experience" (Prince, 1970, p97). 
Unfortunately, the issue of abstract thinking in relation to 
religious material is even more complicated than this confusion 
between the abstractness of the thinking and the abstractness of 
the concepts and ideas. There is a related theological controversy 
over how abstractly or concretely it is appropriate for individuals 
to think about religious ideas. In theological terms, it is quite 
conceivable for a mature and intellectually developed adult to 
think concretely about certain religious concepts or ideas. This 
can be seen to present problems when certain approaches are taken 
to studying the development of religious thinking, as an aspect of 
children's overall cognitive development. 
One approach, which has been used to study the development of the 
children's understanding of abstract religious ideas, has been to 
present them with biblical stories and then test their understanding 
of these, either by means of a semi-structured interview (e.g. 
Goldman, 1964b and Beechick, 1974) or by the use of a mUltiple-choice 
type of questionnaire (e.g. Ainsworth, 1961 and Peatling, 1973) •. 
All of these studies have been used in their own way in support of 
stage development theories of religious thinking but, as we saw 
earlier, differences in the methodology used often seemed to produce 
differences in the findings. 
A major criticism of the work of Goldman and Peatling has been 
that they equated mature religious thinking with an abstract 
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symbolic understanding of the stories which they used. This is 
clearly a point of conflict for those who hold the view that a 
literal or historical interpretation of biblical stories need 
not necessarily be inconsistent with mature religious thinking. 
This problem has, to a great extent, been avoided in the studies 
of Ainsworth (1961) and Beechick (1974), which dealt purely with 
the child's understanding of biblical parables. In the under-
standing of parables, there would seem to be much wider agreement 
about the degree of abstraction which is required to provide a 
fully developed understanding of their meaning. 
This, in itself, is one of the reasons why, in this chapter, 
we shall take parables as the basis of our study of cognitive 
developmental influences on religious story meaning. 
Ainsworth (1961) and Beechick (1974) apparently quite indepen-
dently came up with three fairly similar main levels of under-
standing of parables. These ranged from a level where the 
parable is understood at a purely literal level and the child 
understands it as a simple story, through an intermediate level, 
to a level where the child understands the allegorical meaning of 
the parable and can provide an appropriate application. 
In both of the studies mentioned, when the children's responses 
were categorised into these different levels of understanding, 
it appeared that there were developmental changes and that the 
allegorical meanings were only appreciated by older children. 
Also, there appeared to be a gradual development towards this 
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allegorical level of understanding, and in both cases it appeared 
to have been reached by most of the children by the time they were 
ten years old. In the years before that age, the children 
appeared to move from a stage where they could only appreciate 
the literal meaning of the parables, on to a stage where they 
started to make simple applications, which showed a partial under-
standing of the allegorical meaning of the parables. 
All of this raises certain fundamental questions for our interest 
in the role of cognitive factors in the development of religious 
understanding. For instance, have these studies located a single 
cognitive factor or a collection of factors, the development of 
which determines the understanding of parables and perhaps other 
religious stories? Also, are the findings dependent on the method-
ology used, or would different methods of testing the understanding 
of parables produce different results? 
Finally, can one assume that the difficulties that are encountered 
in understanding one parable are common to all parables, or will 
the rate of development of understanding of different parables vary? 
In the following series of experiments we propose to investigate 
these questions further, and in order to do this we will consider 
the influence of six factors on the development of understanding 
of parables in children. 
These six factors are as follows. 
(1) Age of the child presented with the parable. 
(2) Content of the parable. 
(3) Style of language which the parable is told in. 
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(4) Method used to test the child's understanding of the 
parable. 
(5) Sex of the child. 
(6) Social class of the child. 
These factors will be studied by telling different parables, in 
different styles of language, to children of different age, sex 
and social class, and then using different methods to test their 
understanding of the parables. 
The research design used will ensure that all of these factors 
are studied within a series of experiments, which will in turn 
look at the effect of individual factors or combinations of 
factors. 
Rather than presenting these experiments one by one, we will first 
of all introduce the general experimental procedure and then discuss 
the specific methodologies, materials and results 1 , as they reflect 
on each of the different factors. 
lA preliminary discussion of the results of these investigations 
has been reported by Murphy (1977a). 
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3.2 The Parables Experiments 
Method 
The children were interviewed individually on their understanding 
of four parables. Before these interviews started, as in all the 
other interviews reported in this thesis, the experimenter would 
always spend a few minutes building up rapport with each child 
before the actual experiment began. This usually entailed asking 
the child questions about activities he (or she) was interested 
in at school or at home. After this every child was asked if he, 
or she, knew what a parable was. If the child didn't know what a 
parable was, then this concept was established by explanation and 
example. This entailed an explanation of how a parable was a story 
which had a meaning to it and how it was told to teach something, 
beyond the literal interpretation of the story, to the people who 
heard it. This point was illustrated by explaining how the popular 
children's story about the shepherd boy, who used to cry out IIWo1f!", 
when there wasn't a wolf, and eventually got eaten by a wolf because 
no one came when he cried out for help, teaches that the telling of 
lies can have consequences. The child was then asked to explain 
to the experimenter, what the difference was between a parable and 
an ordinary story. Once the experimenter was satisfied by the 
child's explanation, the experiment commenced. 
Each child was then read a parable from a typed sheet of paper, 
which the child was allowed to follow while the parable was being 
read through. (Support for using this method of telling the 
parables to the children, rather than using tape recorded versions, 
can be found in Campbell and Campbell, 1976.) If, after this first 
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reading, or at a later stage, the child requested to hear the 
parable through again, or showed that he (or she) had forgotten 
it, then the parable was read through once again, in the same way, 
by the experimenter. After the parable had been read through, 
the child was asked a series of leading questions to try to 
establish what the child had understood the parable to mean. 
After this the child was asked to tell the parable back to the 
experimenter and the whole of this interview was recorded on a 
concealed tape recorder, ready for later analysis. This procedure 
was then repeated for the other three parables. 
In a later part of this series of experiments, some children 
were given a multiple-choice test in place of the semi-structured 
interview after two of the four parables which they had been told. 
This was administered verbally, and the children were required to 
justify their response choice after each question. The mUltiple-
choice test included the major leading questions from the semi-
structured interviews, and the mUltiple-choice responses to be 
chosen from were the responses that had most frequently been 
given by children previously tested on the parables, by the semi-
structured interview method. The three choices which were given 
each time also represented examples of responses cetagorised into 
the three levels of understanding that were used in the analysis 
of these interviews. 
The six biblical parables which were presented were:-
The Two Houses (Mt.7:24-27) 
The Good Samaritan (Lk.lO:25-37) 
The Pharisee and The Tax 
Collector (Lk.18:9-l4) 
The Rich Fool (Lk.12:l3-2l) 
The Sower (Mt .13: 1-9) 
The Lost Sheep (Lk.15:l-7). 
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These parables were largely taken from The Children's Bible (Edited 
by Shirley Steen, 1973), but modernised versions of three of them 
which were developed specially for this study (The Rich Fool, The 
Good Samaritan, The Pharisee and The Tax Collector) were also 
presented later on in the series of studies. The aim of these 
modernised versions was to translate culture bound factors in the 
parables into a cultural setting more familiar to the children. 
The different versions of the six parables and the questions used 
to test the children's understanding of them can be found in the 
Appendix (see page 241). 
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Sample 
The sample consisted in all of 200 children. This was made up 
of 50 children (ten at each age from 7 to 11 years old) from 
each of four different schools. The schools, which the children 
came from, varied in that one was an independent fee-paying 
private boys' boarding school, one was a Catholic school, and 
two drew their pupils almost exclusively from 'working class' 
housing schemes in Dundee. All of these four schools were 
situated in the East of Scotland. 
The sample of 50 from each school was randomly selected, using 
the method outlined on page 125, and in the three mixed schools 
the sample was made up by taking 5 boys and 5 girls from each 
particular age group. The groups of children represented the age 
spans, 7.0 to 7.11 years, 8.0 to 8.11 years, 9.0 to 9.11 years, 
10.0 to 10.11 years, and 11.0 to 11.11 years and the mean ages of 
the groups were 7.6, 8.6, 9.6, 10.6 and 11.6 years. 
Method Used in Analysing the Results 
Each individual interview was assessed by two independent judges, 
who were both well acquainted with the three categories of under-
standing which the responses were to be placed in. These levels 
of understanding were based upon those used by Beechick (1974) 
and Ainsworth (1961) and were as follows:-
Level One - The child could only repeat facts or elements of 
the parable, and showed no more than a literal 
understanding of the parable. 
Level Two 
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- The child could make an application from the 
parable, in a simple way, which showed a movement 
in the direction of understanding the allegorical 
meaning of the parable. 
Level Three - The child showed an understanding of the alle-
gorical meaning of the parable. 
In the majority of cases, the two independent judges agreed in 
their classification of the children's responses. In the remainder 
of the cases (between 5 and 10 per cent) agreement was reached by 
discussing and comparing the responses and, occasionally, by more 
closely defining the different levels of understanding used. 
In assessing the children's responses in the individual interviews, 
relating to each parable, the judges rated the overall level of under-
standing on the basis of the children's responses to the four questions 
considered collectively. In the case of the mUltiple choice assessment 
of the children's levels of understanding, a slightly different method 
was used. Their responses to each of the three questions were scored 
separately and their overall level of understanding was calculated on 
the following basis: 
1) If the child gave either two or three responses, at anyone level 
for a parable, then he was classified as being at that level of 
understanding for that parable. 
2) If the child gave one response at Level Two and one each at Levels 
One and Three, then the child was classified as being at Level Two 
for that parable. 
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3.3 Results of The Parables Experiments 
We will not present, all at one time, the results of the complete 
series of these experiments, as they involved a large number of 
children and several hundred interviews. We will, however, study 
each of the six variables which we are considering as having a 
possible effect on the children's understanding of these parables, 
in turn. This will involve us in presenting and analysing the 
results of those particular experiments which relate to the 
influence of each of these factors. This will eventually involve 
us in presenting the entire set of results, but only those sections 
relating to the influence of each individual variable will be con-
sidered at anyone time. 
(1) The Effect of Age 
Both Beechick (1974) and Ainsworth (1961) have previously demon-
strated the effect of age on the development of understanding of 
parables, with increasing age being related to an increasing 
tendency to understand parables at an allegorical level, instead 
of at a literal level. These two earlier studies suggested that, 
at around ten years of age, most children were capable of under-
standing the allegorical meaning of p~rables and this was, to a 
great extent, confirmed by our study. 
Figure 2 represents the results from all the 200 children included 
in our sample. It shows the levels of understanding demonstrated 
by them in all the semi-structured interviews, on the meaning of 
the six parables used. (This analysis excludes the data from the 
small number of multiple-choice type interviews, which will be 
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presented in a later section, but the trends in that data were 
also of a similar nature to the ones shown.) 
FIGURE 2 
No. of Responses 
at Level One 
(Out of 140) 
No. of Responses 
at Level Two 
(Out of 140) 
No. of Responses 
at Level Three 
(Out of 140) 
Number of Responses at Each Level by Age, in 
140 Semi-Structured Interviews on 6 Parables 
~ 
-
64 32 19 J 14 I 110 I 
7 8 9 10 11 
Age Groups (Group, N = 40) 
. 
-
-
51 67 64 49 52 
7 8 9 10 11 
Age Groups (Group, N = 40) 
-
,---
25 41 57 77 78 
7 8 9 10 11 
Age Groups (Group, N = 40) 
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The trends in the data at each level were tested for significance 
by using a Least Squares Regression Analysis. This entailed fitting 
a straight line (Y = « + SX) to the data, calculating the best 
estimate of the gradient of this line S(= LXLYL) and then testing 
LX· 2 ~ 
the Null Hypothesis that S = o. 
The statistical analysis of the data showed the number of Level 
One responses to have a significant negative trend (t = -3.82, 
with 3 degrees of freedom, significant at the .05 level); the 
number of Level Two responses to have no significant trend 
(t = -0.56, with 3 degrees of freedom, not significant), and the 
number of Level Three responses to have a significant positive 
trend (t = 7.93, with 3 degrees of freedom, significant at the 
.01 level). 
These results thus confirm the hypothesis that, as children increase 
in age within these limits, then they are more likely to produce 
Level Three responses when asked about the meaning of these parables 
and are less likely to produce Level One responses. The results 
also show that Level Two responses occur with about the same 
frequency throughout all three of the age groups tested. 
(2) The Effect of the Content of the Parable 
The second factor which we investigated in these experiments was 
the effect of the content of a parable on the level of under-
standing of children of different ages. 
In order to explore this factor, we will consider the results of 
an experiment which involved a group of 100 children, who were 
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tested on their understanding of the standard versions of The 
Rich Fool and The Good Samaritan parables. The results of this 
experiment are presented in Table 1, in terms of the number of 
children, in each age group, responding to the parables at each 
of the three levels of understanding. Tables 2, 3 and 4 provide 
Chi-Squared tests of significance for the effect of parable content 
on the level of performance of these children, at each of the three 
levels of understanding. It can be seen from these analyses that 
there is a significant difference (at the .01 level) between the 
performance of the children on these two parables at all three 
levels. 
It could be argued that these results are mainly produced by the 
criteria used in separating out the responses at the three different 
levels for each of the two parables. In other words, one might 
argue that the results do not show that The Rich Fool is a more 
difficult parable to understand than The Good Samaritan, but that 
they merely show that the criteria used in determining Level Three 
responses in the case of The Good Samaritan are easier to satisfy 
than are the criteria used in determining Level Three responses for 
The Rich Fool. 
We would argue very strongly against this, on the grounds that 
exactly the same general criteria were applied in both cases. The 
difference between a Level Two response and a Level Three response 
was always that one was an application, which showed little connec-
tion with the apparent meaning of the parable, whereas the other 
showed an understanding of the apparent meaning of the parable. 
TABLE 1 
No. of Level One Responses 
PARABLES 
---
THE RICH FOOL 
THE GOOD S~~TAN 
No. of Level Two Resuonses 
PARABLES 
THE RICH FOOL 
THE GOOD SAMARITAN 
No. of Level Three Responses 
PARABLES 
THE RICH FOOL 
THE GOOD SMWUTAN 
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A Comparison of the Response Levels 
of 100 children for The Rich Fool 
and The Good Samaritan parables. 
AGE GROUPS (GROUP, N=20) TOTALS 
, 
7 8 9 10 11 
12 4 2 1 1 20 
3 0 0 0 2 5 
AGE GROUPS (GROur, N=20) 'l'OTALS 
7 8 9 10 11 
8 13 10 12 13 56 
8 3 6 2 2 21 
AGE GROUPS (GROUP0, N=20 TOTALS 
7 8 9 10 11 
0 3 8 7 6 24 
9 17 14 18 16 74 
-
TABL:C:; 2 
PARABLE 
THE RICH FOOL 
THE GOOD Spj·UI1UT.AN 
Chi-Squared (with 1 d.f.) 
TABLE 3 
PARABLE 
THE RICH FOOL 
THE GOOD SAN.ARITA:N 
Chi-Squared (vrith 1 d.L) 
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Total Humber of Eesponses at level one v. 
levels tHO and three, for the Rich Fool and 
the Good Samaritan parables (N = 100) 
LEVEL OF UN])R'1.srr.Almn~G 
ONE (rHO AND THREE 
20 80 
5 95 
= 8.96 (Significant at the .01 level) 
= 
Tot?-l Number of Responses at level two_v. 
levels one and three, for the Hich Fool and 
the Good Samaritan parables (N = 100) 
LEVEL OF DlIDZi:1.ST.AHDli1G 
':r\{0 ON:;:; AND TlLr1.EE 
56 44 
21 79 
24.41 (Significant at tDe .01 level) 
Piu1ABL:C:; 
'J:M HICH JTOOL 
frEE GOOD Sjil'l!,-:rrJJ:J 
Chi-Squsred (Vlith 1 d.f.) = 
-
82 
Total Ihmber of l1.esponses at level three v. 
levels one and tv/a, for tpe ?~ich ~'ool anri 
the Good Sar!1sri tan ;Jarables (n = 1.09J 
.-
L~Vl!:;L OF UJ:m3:.t~)TJJ..:Tl)Ii:JG 
--
i'HREE ONE ;ijTl) 'rHO 
24 76 
74 26 
48.03 (Significant at the .01 level) 
--
2Separate analyses have been presented in Tables 2-4 for the number of 
responses at each level of understanding, in relation to the combined 
number of responses at the other two levels. This method of analysis 
was used in preference to an overall test of the number of responses 
at level one v level two v level three, in order to pinpoint the exact 
levels at which significant differences in understanding occurred. 
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However, this point might be seen to place a certain constraint 
on any claim, which we might make, that these two parables 
differed in terms of the degree to which children in this age 
range could understand them. 
We will, however, now consider data from another experiment 
which tested the understanding of 75 children on The Two Houses 
and The Good Samaritan parables. Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 show how 
a comparison of the children's understanding of these parables 
again yielded significant differences in performance at all three 
levels of understanding. Once again, it may be seen that the 
children were more likely to have reached a Level Three under-
standing of The Good Samaritan parable. This additional result 
would appear to reinforce the argument that we have put forward 
that different parables can present different levels of difficulty 
to children within this age range. 
Thus the first observation we made, that age affects the develop-
ment of understanding of parables, must now be qualified by saying 
that this factor interacts with the content of the parable factor 
in such a way that understanding of parables, at a certain age, 
will vary between parables, depending on the particular content of 
the parables. For example, at 8 years of age, most children in our 
sample were capable of understanding the allegorical meaning of The 
Good Samaritan parable, whereas they were mostly not able to under-
stand the allegorical meaning of The Rich Fool and The Two Houses 
parables. 
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TABL:c.; 5 A Comparison of the ResDonse Levels of 75 
children for The '1\10 Houses anCL.The Good 
Samaritan parables. 
Number of Level One Responses 
AGE GHOUlS (GRu1T, IJ = 15) 
PARABLES TOTil.LS 
7, 8 9 10 11 
-
THE T'.iO HOUS:2S 11 4 2 4 1 22 
THE GOO]) 0" Jv1'W.I'l1.AN 2 0 0 0 2 4 
Number of Level 'l'Iw Responses 
AGE GROUPS (GROUP, N = 15) 
P.ARABLES TOTALS 
7 8 9 10 11 
THE TViO HOUSES 4 7 7 5 8 31 
TUB GOO]) SANA.i.'i.IT.AlJ 5 1 6 2 2 16 
Number of Level Tr..ree Responses 
- --
AGE GROUPS (GROUP, N = 15) 
PA1.l.ilBLES 'rOTALS 
7 8 9 10 11 
'rHE THO HOUSES 0 4 6 6 6 22 
Tffij GOO]) S.,u'IA .... 'UT JilT 8 14 9 n 11 55 
I 
T • .'illLE 6 
PJlR.illLE 
TEE Tv/O HOUSES 
Tlli.iJ GOOD SAhJillITAl\f 
Chi-Squared (with 1 d.L) 
TABLE 7 
P1I.RAJ:3LE 
TIIE T1.J0 HOUSES 
THE GOO]) SAiYLlil.ITAN 
Chi-Squared (with 1 d.f.) 
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Total 11umoer of :les,?onses at level one v. 
levels tv/o and three, for ...:.the 'lwo House.s 
and the Good Sam8.ritan parables (N. = 72) 
LEVEL OJ}' UlilJ)Et1SV.lJDIHG 
OIlE TUO jlL1D THREE 
22 53 
4 71 
= 13.45 (Significant at the .01 level) 
= 
Total ~Tumber of Res}Jonses at level two v. 
levels one and three, for the ~10 Houses 
and the Good Samaritan parables (N = 75) 
LEVEL OF ffilIDERSTAlmUTG 
Tl,'iO OlJE 1'1..::1:J T:HREE 
31 44 
16 59 
6.07 (Significant at the .05 level) 
TiLB1:8 8 
p i~B.1illLE 
THE T\110 HOUSES 
rJlBE GOOD SiJ.l·LillITA1.'I 
Chi-Squared (with 1 d.L) 
86 
Total Number of Responses at level three v. 
l§vels one and tiw, for the rl'vIO Houses 
and the Good Samaritan parables iF = 75) 
L.8viJL 0C1 .l.' 1.J1ii.D~r.01'";';';-DI1'[G 
THREE 0.N:6 ii.lill THO 
22 53 
55 20 
= 27.32 (Significant at the .01 level) 
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These findings would seem to suggest that the development of under-
standing of parables does not depend on a simple cognitive develop-
mental change, but is dependent on a more complex pattern of changes 
which allow different parables to be understood at different ages. 
(3) The Effect of the Style in which the Parable was told 
Three of the parables used in this series of experiments were told 
in two different forms. One form of each of these parables was a 
standard version, which was told in a simple children's story form 
of language and the other was a modernised version, which was an 
attempt to transfer the story from the standard version into our 
present day culture. 
Again, we were interested in exploring whether there were more 
factors involved in the children's development of understanding 
of parables, and whether this understanding would be improved if 
the parable told related to the culture with which the children 
were more familiar. 
Tables 9, 11 and 12 compare the performance of two independent 
groups of children on the two versions of each of these three 
parables. Tables 10 and 13 are provided as a control on these 
independent groups to establish whether, in general, their under-
standing of the parables was significantly different. The pair 
of groups responsible for the results reported in Table 10 (Groups 
One and Two) are the same groups responsible for the results 
reported in Table 9. Likewise, the pair of groups responsible 
for the results reported in Tables 11 and 12 (Groups Three 
and Four), are compared with each other in Table 13. 
TABLE 9 
LEVEL OF 
UNnERSTA1T])ING 
ONE 
TWO 
TIffiEE 
TXBLE '10 
LEVEL OF 
UNJ)ERSTANDING 
ONE 
TWO 
THREE 
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Percentage of children at each Level of 
Understanding, out of those Kiven semi-
~.'uctured interviews on the Hodernised 
Versicn (Group On~N = 100) and the 
I 
Standard Version (Group Two,N = 50) of 
The Pharisee and the Tax Collector parable 
by Age Groups (with numbers divided equally 
between Age Groups) 
VERSION OF AGE GROUPS 
P ili'i.AJ3 LE 7 8 9 10 11 
MODERNISED 30 10 5 5 0 
STANDARD 20 60 20 0 0 
MODERNISED 40 45 30 25 15 
STANDARD 70 40 50 10 30 
MODERNISZD 30 45 65 70 85 
STANDARD 10 0 30 90 70 
Percentage of ohildren, from Groups One (N = 1002 
and Two (N = 50), at each Level of Understanding 
vlhen given semi-structured intervievrs on the 
Standard VersJon of r"he Tyro Houses parable 
GROUP 
No. 
ONE 
T'ltlO 
m1E 
TWO 
ONE 
TWO 
by Age Groups (with numbers divided eaually 
between Age Groups.) 
AGE GROUPS 
7 8 9 10 11 
75 20 30 35 25 
70 30 10 10 0 
15 65 45 30 30 
30 60 70 40 70 
10 15 25 35 45 
0 10 20 50 30 
TABLE 11 
LEVEL OF VERSION OF 
UNDERSTANDING PiLB.ABLE 
ONE MODERNISED 
STANDARD 
TWO 110DERNISEID 
ST.MIDARD 
THREE MODERNISED 
STANJ)ARD 
'lIABLE 1? 
LEVEL OF VERSION OF 
UNDERST AJlIDING PARABLE 
ONE MODERNISE]) 
STAlIDAPJ) 
I TWO Tl'IODERNISED 
i STANDARD I 
THREE Tl'IODEIDTISED 
STMl)ARD 
89 
Percentage of children at each Level of 
Understanding, out of those given semi-
structured interviews on the Modernised 
Version (Group Three, N = 50) and the 
Standard Version (Group Four, N = 100) 
of The Rich Fool parable, by Age yroups 
(with numbers divided equally between 
Age Groups) 
AGE GROUPS 
7 8 9 10 11 
30 0 0 0 0 
55 20 10 5 5 
70 100 90 90 80 
45 65 50 60 65 
0 0 10 10 20 
0 15 40 35 30 
Percentage of children at each Level of 
Understanding, out oK-these given semi-
structured interviews on the Modernised 
Version (Group Three, N = 50) and the 
?tandard Version (Group Four, N = 100) of 
The Good Samaritan uarable, by Age GrQups_ 
(with numbers d~vided eguall~ bet~en_~~ 
Group&.} 
j,GE GROUPS' 
7 8 9 10 11 
20 10 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 10 
10 10 10 0 10 
40 15 30 10 10 
70 80 90 100 90 
45 85 70 .90 80 
TABLE 13 
LEVEL OF GROUP 
UNJ)ERSTANDING No. 
ONE THREE 
FOUR 
TWO THREE 
FOUR 
THREE THREE 
.. 
FOUR 
90 
Percentage of children from Groups Three 
(N = 50) and Four (N = 100), at each Level 
of Understanding, when given semi-structured 
interviews on the Standard Version of The 
Two Houses parable by Age G-roups (\'lith nwnbers 
divided egually between Age Gro~ 
AGE GROUPS 
7 8 9 10 11 
60 10 10 30 10 
65 25 10 20 5 
20 60 50 40 40 
35 45 50 25 45 
20 30 40 30 50 
0 30 40 55 50 
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These results may be more easily assessed in the summary form in 
which they appear in Tables 14 to 18. Here the levels of under-
standing of all the children in each group are compared, on the 
basis of those who have understood the allegorical meaning of the 
parable (i.e. those judged to be at Level Three) as against those 
who have not (i.e. those judged to be at Levels One and Two). 
This analysis shows a significantly better performance (at the 
.05 level) on the Standard Version as opposed to the Modernised 
Version of The Rich Fool parable, and also on the Modernised 
Version, as opposed to the Standard Version of The Pharisee and 
The Tax Collector parable. These results take on added signifi-
cance in the light of the fact that in the control experiments 
(see Tables 15 and 18), there was found to be no significant 
difference in the performance of Groups One and Two, and Groups 
Three and Four, on The Two ,Houses parable. This finding suggests 
that any differences in Tables 14, 16 and 17 are caused by the 
two different versions of the parable being used, rather than by 
any intrinsic difference between the two groups of subjects. 
One surprising aspect of these results, is that The Rich Fool 
parable appears to have been easier to understand in the Standard 
Version than it was in our Modernised Version. This result may 
be used, along with the fact that there was no significant 
difference in the performance of the children on the two versions 
of The Good Samaritan parable, to highlight the problem of 
translating stories, such as these parables, into an easier 
form for children to understand. However, the result with The 
Pharisee and The Tax Collector parable, does suggest that parables 
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Total Number of Res~onses at Level Three v 
Levels One and Two, fpF the Moderniseq y~rsion 
v the Standard Version of The Pharisee and The 
VERSION OF 
PARABLE 
MOJ)ERNISED 
STANDARD 
Chi-Squared ('\'lith 1 d.L) 
TilliLE 15 
Tax Coll~ctor narable 
(Modernised Version (Group O~: N = 100 
Standard .Version Jgroup T,{o): N = 30..J 
----
UNEL~'OF UNJ)ERSTAN])ING 
TH?,EE ONE AN]) T\VO 
59 41 
20 30 
= 4 .. 05 (Significant at the .05 level) 
Total Number of Res~onses at L~vel Three v 
Levels One and THO! for Group One v Gro1!E. 
THO on The THo Houses :p'§,rable. 
(Grou~ One: N = 100 2 GrouE Ti<fO: N 
GROUP No. LZr:=L OF mmERSTA1'TDDTG 
THREE ONE AN]) TivO 
ONE 26 74 
TWO 11 39 , 
Chi-Squared (vri th 1 d.L) = 0.10 (N • S. ) 
3The analyses presented in Tables 14-18 all compare the number of 
responses at Level Three with the combined number of responses at 
the other two levels. 
50} 
Further analyses could have been conducted both between all three 
levels and for each of the other two levels separately. These were, 
however, deemed to be superfluous in the light of the significance 
of these results and also the critical nature of this particular 
comparison. 
TABLE 16 
VERSION OF 
PARAJ3LE 
MODERNISED 
STANDARD 
Chi-Squared 
TAJ3LE 17 
.. 
VERSION OF 
PARABLE 
MODEF.NISED 
STANDARD 
Chi-Squared 
93 
Total Number of Responses at Level Three v 
Levels One and Two, for the Modernised Version v 
the Standard Version of The Rich Fool parable. 
(r-Iodernised Version (Group Three): N = 50 
Standard Version (Group Four): N = 100) 
LEVEL OF 1JNI)ERSTANTIING 
THREE ONE AIill TWO 
4 46 
24 76 
(with 1 d.f.) = 4.56 (Significant at the .05 level) 
(with 1 
Total Number of Responses at Level Three v 
Levels One and Two, for the Modernised Version v 
the Standard Version of The Good Samaritan 
parable. 
(Modernised Version (Group Three): N = 50 
Standard Version (Group Four): N = 100) 
LEVEL OF mmEHST.!'2.ffiL,IG 
THREE ONE Atll) TWO 
43 7 
74 26 
d.L) = 2.15 (N.S.) 
- TABLE 18 
GROUP No. 
-
___ _ 1 
THREE 
FOUR 
Chi-Squared (with 
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Total Number of Responses at Level Three 
v Levels One and Two for Group Three v 
Group Four on The Two Houses parable. 
(Group ~ree- N = 50, Group Four: N = 100) 
LEVEL OF illIDERSTA1IDING 
THREE O:NE M"'J) TWO 
17 33 
35 65 
1d.f. ) = 0 (N. S. ) 
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can be understood better by children, at these ages, if they are 
translated into a suitable modernised form. 
If this hypothesis is, in fact, confirmed by later studies, it 
will stand alongside the earlier finding of differences between 
performance on different parables, in suggesting a variety of 
factors to do with style, content and language, which can be seen 
as determining children's levels of understanding of parables. 
This idea is in conflict with the views of Ainsworth (1961) and 
Beechick (1974), who proposed the development of understanding of 
parables as a simple cognitive developmental process, the develop-
ment of which would depend purely on the development of a certain 
ability to think abstractly. 
(4) The Effect of the Method used to Test the Children's 
Understandin~ 
The fourth factor which we investigated was the effect of the 
method of testing used to determine the child's level of under-
standing of parables. This involved testing two groups of 
children, all drawn from the same two schools, with either sem~­
structured interviews, as before, or with mUltiple choice tests, 
which were developed especially for use in these experiments 
(see page 241). Again, a control condition was run, which involved 
all the children being tested by a semi-structured interview on 
another parable (The Good Samaritan), to determine whether there 
were any basic differences between the performances of the two 
groups, caused by factors other than the method of testing. 
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Tables 20 and 22 show a significant difference in the pattern of 
responses for the interview and test methods, and this difference 
does not occur in the control condition, summarised in Table 24, 
where the same two groups of subjects were all given the same 
interview on The Good Samaritan parable. 
As with the previously reported effect of using modernised 
versions of parables, the effect of using different testing 
methods provides a shift in the levels of understanding in both 
directions. For The Two Houses parable, our mUltiple-choice 
method produced more Level Three responses and less Level One 
responses than the interview method whereas, with The Pharisee 
and The Tax Collector parable, our mUltiple-choice method 
produced more Level One responses and less Level Two responses 
than were obtained with the interview method. 
These differences could be explained in terms of the multiple-
choice test items chosen, which in one case may have been more 
appropriate than in the other. However, the main fact which is 
demonstrated by these results remains unchanged; i.e. the level 
of understanding of parables which children appear to have will 
depend, to a certain extent, on the method used to test this 
understanding. It would seem possible, from these studies, to 
develop methods of testing children's understanding of parables 
which would show a more developed understanding than the interview 
method, used previously, appeared to show. 
One possible explanation for the improved performance, when the 
multiple-choice method of testing was used, could be that the 
LEVEL OF 
mJ:DERSTANDIIifG 
ONE 
T\W 
T~E 
TABLE 20 
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A Comparison of the Re_sponse Levels 
of the hlO grOUpS of SO children, 
tested by different methods, on 
The TioJo Houses parable, by age 
AGE GROUPS (GROU}, 
TESTll'JG £!ISTROD 
USED 
7 S 9 10 
INTiliVT.8'.,j (GROUP 5) 9 2 2 S 
.---- -. 
NULTIPLE CHOICE (GROUP 6) 3 1 0 1 
INT.2..11VHM (GROlIP S) 1 5 3 4 
. 
hULTIPLE-CHOICE (GROUP 6) 5 4 S 1 
HJTERVIEVl (GROUP 5) 0 3 5 1 
.--
I'IULTIFLE-CHO I CE (GROlJP 6) () L. 5 5 8 
Total Number of Res·nonses at Levels 
N = 10) 
11 
2 
0 
3 
3 
5 
7 
One t ~,oJO and Three for the Intervie'.1 Lethod 
and the nul tiple Choice Iilethod of testin,Cj 
The TioJO Houses parable, using tl'T() • ..Erouns of 
50 chilciren 
--
LBV.2;1iS 0lJ' liiT:J~l.ST.:":',DE~G 
TESTDJG 1,IC;TlIO:J 
-UiJE]) 
O.NB T;:iO nlilliE 
DJTEBVI:SH (GROUP S) 20 16 14 
HULTE· LE-CEO ICE (GROur 6) 5 18 27 
-_.- -~ ..... ~ 
_a_ 
.. 
Chi-Squared (with 2 d.L) = 13.24 (Significant at the .01 level) 
TABLE 21 
lli""'VEL OF 
UN])ERS'I'jlJ:mIl~G 
ONE 
miG 
THREE 
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A COID-oarison of the Response Levels of 
TIITO Groups of 50 children." tested .PX 
different methods, on the Pharisee and 
The Tax Collector (I1odernised Version) 
parable, by age. 
(Interview Iiethod (Group Five): H = 50 
Hultiple-Choice Hethocl (Group 11 = 50) 
TESTING }JETHO]) AGE GROUPS (GHOUP, H = 10) 
USE]) 
7 8 9 10 11 
H1TERVIE;'i (GRUUP 5) 3 0 0 0 0 
J'lULTIPLE-CHOICE (GROUP 6) 3 4 2 0 2 
~TERVIE\Il (GJ.OUJ:' 5) 3 3 5 3 2 
NULTIPLE-CHOICE (GROUP 6) 6 0 0 0 0 
I~1TERVIE1il (GROUP 5) 4 7 5 7 8 
HULTIPLE-CHOICE (GROU"P 6) 1 I' 8 10 8 0 
TABLE 22 
TESTING I'IETHOD 
USED 
-
INTERVIEH (GROUJ? 5) 
llIDLT IPLE-CHO I CE (GROUP 6) 
Chi-SCluared (,vi th 2 d.L) 
TAJ3LE 23 
LEVEL OF 
ffilmERSTAI::-DIEG 
Ol:lE 
THO 
rr-lIllEE 
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Total Number of HesJ?onses at Levels One, 
1110 and Three for the Interviev, Eethod and 
the Nultiple Choice Lethod of testing 
1ne Pharisee and The Tax Collector 
(Hodernised Version) parable. 
(Interview hethod (Grou"!) Five): N = 50 
r'~ul tiple-Choice rIethod (Group Six): lJ = 50) 
LEVELS OF UNDEllSTAlTDIHG 
ONE THO THEEE 
3 16 31 
11 6 32 
---'-. 
= 9.'14 (Significant at the .05 level) 
A Comparis9n of the Respons~els of 
Group Five (N = 50) and Gro~~ Six 
(N = 59) "Then tested by semi-structured 
intervie"lS on The Good Sama,ri tan 
parable, by age. 
GROUP AGE GROUTS (GROUF, N = 10) 
lTo. 
I 7 8 9 10 11 
._-
-"" j 
FIVE 2 1 0 0 1 
SiX: 1 0 0 0 0 
FIVE 2 0 2 0 1 
SIX 3 3 0 0 1 
FIVE 6 a 8 10 8 
./ 
SIZ 6 7 10 10 9 
_. 
TA3LE 244 
GROUP 
1\10. 
:r'IYE 
SIX 
Chi-SCluared 
100 
Total Number of Responses at Levels 
Qne, T'·10 ano. Three f or Gr~ 
and Group Six z ,·rhen tes"t.:?d. b,y semi-
structured. intervieHs on The Good 
Samaritan -caraole. 
(Group Five: H = 50, GrOUD Six: 11 = 5..Q) 
LJ!;V:2;LS O? lYiJ:;Bi.1S'r 11m DIG 
CITE T1,.[O rrH3.2E 
--
4 5 41 
1 7 42 I 
-
.-
"i'lith levels one and t\oro 
combined ( \-lith 1 - f \ d. 0; :::: 
° 
(i\T r' \ 
• 1'; 0,:). ) 
~--~ .. . -
-
4It could be argued that the Good Samaritan parable was not an ideal 
choice for the control condition, because of the relative ease with 
which the children understood it. This fact only became apparent 
after this series of parables experiments had been completed and 
analysed. 
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children had a chance of guessing the higher level responses. 
This, however, was ruled out to a considerable extent by ensuring 
that the children recorded at least two out of three responses, 
at Level Three (see p75 ), before they were judged to have obtained 
that level of understanding for that parable. By guessing, 
therefore, a child could only expect to obtain less than 26% of 
responses at Level Three, and this would seem to exclude 
guessing as a possible explanation of the striking changes in 
the levels of understanding which we found, particularly with 
The Two Houses parable. In addition to this, there is an exten-
sive literature relating to the issue of guessing on multip1e-
choice tests (see, for example, Ebel, 1972; Slakter, 1968a, 1968b; 
Wood, 1977), and the general consensus of opinion is now that the 
phenomenon of random guessing on such tests is rare and that factors 
which are applied to correct scores to take account of guessing, in 
most cases, are unnecessary. 
Another criticism of multiple-choice testing, which is sometimes 
made, is that the correct choice either stands out too obviously 
or is too similar to the other choices given. We feel, however, 
that by choosing our mUltiple-choice answers from the responses 
given most frequently by children in previous experiments, using 
the interview method, we have protected ourselves also from this 
failing. 
In summary then, we can say that as well as the factors to do with 
the parables themselves, which we have already seen as being of 
importance, there is another factor which affects the child's 
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apparent level of understanding of a parable, and that is the 
method by which that understanding is tested. 
(5) The Effect of Sex Differences on the Results 
The fifth factor we shall look at is the sex of the children, to 
see whether there is any difference in the performance of boys 
and girls, at the different ages studied. 
This study involved 100 children (50 boys and 50 girls) all drawn 
from the same two schools, with each age group of 20 children 
containing 5 boys and 5 girls from each of the two schools. 
TABLE 25 
LEVEL OF 
A Comparison of the Response Levels of 50 Boys 
and 50 Girls, Tested on their Understanding of 
Four Biblical Parables, by Age. (Numbers 
Divided Equally Between Age Group2..') 
AGE GROUPS (GROUP, N=lO) 
UNDERSTANDING SEX 7 8 9 10 11 
Boys 23 10 10 6 4 
ONE 
Girls 18 11 4 4 2 
Boys 10 21 17 14 13 
TWO 
Girls 13 20 19 15 14 
Boys 7 9 13 20 23 
THREE 
Girls 9 9 17 21 24 
Overall Chi-Squared (with 2 d.f.) = 2.78 (N. S.) 
with age groups combined 
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Table 25 shows the number of boys and girls, in each age group, 
at each level of understanding of the parables, and an analysis 
of these results, which combined the children from the different 
age groups, yielded no significant differences in the number of 
boys and girls at each level of understanding. This result is 
in line with recent studies suggesting that there are few con-
sistent differences between the cognitive and intellectual 
abilities of the two sexes (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1975; Wittig 
and Petersen, 1979). On the other hand, there is some other 
evidence that religious education is more popular with girls 
than it is with boys and also that they obtain better examination 
grades in it (Murphy, 1979). It is, however, clear from the work 
of Hilton and Berglund (1974), in the field of mathematics, that 
sex differences in attainment levels vary considerably between 
different age groups, and as Murphy's (1979) results were based on 
the performance of girls and boys, aged 15 years and over, there 
is no particular reason why the findings of that study should hold 
with these much younger children. 
(6) The Effect of Social Class Differences on the Results 
The final factor which we investigated in this series of experiments 
was social class. This involved a study of children from two quite 
different schools. (One was an independent fee paying boys' pre-
paratory school, and the other was a state run primary school 
situated in the centre of a large area of local authority housing 
schemes.) The children from one school came from predominantly 
upper middle class homes, whereas the children from the other 
school came from mainly working class homes. There were 50 children 
in each group and they were all tested on their understanding of two 
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biblical parables (The Good Samaritan and The Rich Fool). The 
results are presented in Table 26, and again it can be seen that 
there are no significant differences between the performances of 
the two groups. 
Thus, we can conclude that the social class or the social back-
ground of the children is not a factor which appears to affect 
their understanding of parables. This finding is interesting in 
the light of the work of Bernstein (1961), which suggests that 
children from working class backgrounds have a lower level of 
intelligence, caused by their restricted language code. If 
either of these things, which Bernstein proposes, are true, then 
they do not seem to have affected the understanding which these 
.chi1dren appeared to have of the meaning of these two parables. 
T;L3L~ 26 
LEVELS OF SOCIAL 
UlTDERSTANDING CLASS 
BIDDLE 
ONE 
HORKING 
HIDDLE 
T\'lO 
'.IORKING 
fUDDLE 
THREE 
;:fOilKING 
Overall Chi-SQuared with age 
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A Comparison of the 3.eS1..lOnSe levels of 
two groups of cnild-ren from different 
social backgrounds, intervie'.led on their 
understanding of hro Biblical parables, 
by age. 
(Hiddle Class, Groul) N = 50, Horking Cla.§£, 
Group IT = 50) 
AGE GROm:S 
7 8 9 10 11 
9 2 1 0 1 
5 2 1 1 2 
7 8 12 8 7 
10 8 4 6 8 
4 10 7 12 12 
5 10 15 13 10 
-
groups combined (,vi th 2 d.L) = -1.26 (N.B.) 
,~ 
-. 
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3.4 Summary and Conclusion about the Development of Understanding 
of Parables in Children 
In this series of experiments we have looked at evidence suggesting 
that age, content and method of testing are all important factors 
in any consideration of the development of understanding of parables 
in children. We have also seen evidence to suggest that the cultural 
context of a parable may be another important factor, although the 
children's sex and social class were seen not to be of importance. 
In the past, the development of understanding of parables, like 
various other types of developing religious thinking, has been 
closely linked to simple patterns of cognitive development. We 
have argued that this approach is mistaken, and that the develop-
mental changes taking place in individual children are much more 
complex than those normally attributed to them by those who widely 
apply simplistic theories of cognitive development to such areas 
of thinking. 
Gallagher (1978), in a recent discussion of the relationship between 
the child's understanding of metaphors and analogies and cognitive 
developmental theories, stresses the mapping skills which are 
involved in seeing how the parts of a metaphor or an analogy 
correspond to the thing which they are describing. This skill has 
also been compared to Piaget's system of correspondences by Cohen 
(1974), in an article in which he emphasises the complex mental 
operations involved both in generating and understanding metaphors. 
Both Gallagher and Cohen discuss the understanding of metaphors and 
analogies as though the skills involved fall firmly within Piaget's 
stage of formal operations. Lunzer (1978) goes even further than 
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this in claiming that acceptance of lack of closure, the skill of 
moving flexibly among possible correspondence hypotheses, is the 
hallmark of formal thought. Despite this, both Gardner (1973) 
and our own study appear to have provided some evidence of under-
standing of analogies and parables amongst pre-adolescent children. 
Gardner's study was, in fact, concerned with the artistic develop-
ment of children and their appreciation of various art forms, but 
it is interesting to note that Gardner concluded that: 
"Formal operations may even at times serve to hinder 
artistic development, since the tendency to focus on 
underlying content, to abstract out meaning, to be 
sensitive to the explicit demands of a task, to 
proceed in a systematic and exhaustic manner and, 
above all, to translate problems and questions in 
logical propositional terms, may all militate against 
the sensitivity to detail and nuance and the faith-
fulness to the particular properties of object and medium 
that are vital for the artist". (Gardner, 1973, p308.) 
• 
This evidence has to be balanced against a large number of studies 
which suggest that an increase in the complexity of the construction 
and appreciation of analogies and metaphors occurs in early adoles-
cence (Billow, 1975; Gardner et al, 1975; Lunzer, 1965; Orlando, 1971). 
The studies presented in this chapter have provided evidence that 
children in the 7-11 year old age range show differing levels of 
understanding of a variety of different biblical parables presented 
in different forms. One possible explanation for this finding is 
that the children had, in fact, been taught the meaning of these 
parables and what were being revealed were varying levels of 
retention of learned facts. The validity of this explanation is 
difficult to determine because of the virtual impossibility of 
controlling for learning effects; however, it was the intention that 
the variations in the presentation format of the parables and in the 
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way in which the children's understanding of them was tested would 
mitigate against learned responses dominating the results. An 
alternative explanation. in terms of a theory of fitting the under-
standing of parables into a strict model of stage related cognitive 
development, would be that we were observing examples of horizontal 
decalage. This is the expression used by Piaget to describe lapses 
in performance when a child has moved into a new stage of cognitive 
development but does not demonstrate the operation characteristics 
of the new stage in all tasks. 
There are two major objections to this second possible explanation 
of the findings. Firstly, if we are to place the skills necessary 
for understanding parables within the stage of formal operations 
and explain the majority of failures to understand these parables 
~ 
as examples of horizontal decalage, then we would be assuming that 
the majority of these children (who were all between 7 and 11 years 
old) had reached the stage of formal operational thinking. Even 
within the loosest interpretation of the relationship between ages 
and stages, this would appear to be an unlikely state of affairs. 
Secondly, we would stand along with Brown and Desforges (1977) in 
being unwilling to accept, as support for a stage-development theory, 
a set of data which shows more evidence of heterogeneity than homo-
geneity amongst the performances of children on a group of tasks, 
supposedly presenting similar cognitive demands. One has to recognise, 
in this context, that if the concept of horizontal d~calage is allowed 
to be used to explain away all contradictory evidence, then a stage 
development hypothesis can never be adequately tested. 
A final explanation of these findings, which is the one we would 
favour, is that the results demonstrate an inter-relationship between 
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the different demands of the parables, as they were presented in 
their various forms, and individual differences between the children 
tested. In addition, it is likely that some of these individual 
differences between the children could be explained by a general, 
but not necessarily a stage related, theory of intellectual 
development. Francis (1979b) has made a general critique of studies 
of children's understanding of parables, on the grounds that they 
have not recognised the distinct differences in the various types 
of parable. In addition to this, Francis argues that different 
parables are based on different forms of language, which present 
the listener with different cognitive demands. Francis goes on by 
following Linneman (1966) in classifying the generic term parable 
into four different types: the allegory, the illustration, the 
similitude and the parable proper. Francis uses the example of 
studies into children's understanding of parables as part of a 
general argument about the need to link very closely the study of 
different types of religious language and the study of children's 
developing understanding of religious discourse. This argument is 
clearly very much in line with our own view, expressed in Chapter Two, 
that the problem of studying the child's developing understanding of 
religion needs to be viewed as a semantic and linguistic problem ~s 
well as a purely cognitive problem. 
Thus, the great amount of variation in the results of the children, 
of different ages, on the different versions of various parables 
would appear to suggest that much more than a simple stage related 
cognitive developmental explanation is required. The explanation 
which is preferred is one which regards both the different versions 
of the various parables and the different modes of testing the 
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children's understanding of the parables as presenting the children 
with a variety of cognitive, linguistic and semantic demands. The 
fact that there was a degree of homogeneity within the responses 
of the children within individual age groups, throughout the series 
of experiments, suggests that there were general factors influencing 
the development of all of these children. As they grow older 
children become more able to cope with intellectual demands, but 
the nature of the process by which these developments take place 
will only be understood in the light of further work by those who 
seek to understand the development of cognitive processes and the 
development of language use and comprehension in children. The 
understanding of cognitive processes is clearly beginning to receive 
much attention from those interested in individual differences and 
intellectual development (see, for example, Sternberg, 1979 and 
Snow, 1979) and child language is already a rich area of enquiry, 
as was pointed out in the literature review in Chapter Two. 
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C HAP T E R F 0 U R 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS WORD MEANING 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Two, it was noted that the study of word meaning develop-
ment has been largely neglected by those interested in studying the 
development of religious thinking in children. One study by 
Deconchy, J.P. (1964) used the word-association method, to investi-
gate the development of the child's concept of God. The procedure 
he used was to present individual stimulus words to a group of 
children who were each required to write down five words, which 
they associated with each of the stimulus words. One of the six 
stimulus words he used was God, and the other five were "words of 
secular or religious tonality". This is really the only study that 
goes any way towards attempting to study the development of religious 
word meaning, and it has obvious shortcomings in that it only deals 
with one word of any great religious significance (i.e. God), and 
also because the association method, which was so popu+ar with those 
who took a psychoanalytical approach to psychology, is not now widely 
regarded as a very reliable method for collecting data in studies of 
this kind. 
In the experiments to be reported in this chapter, two different 
approaches were used to study the word meaning development of a 
variety of terms of religious importance. The first of these 
studies applied the opposites test, as used by Eve Clark (1971), 
to a set of twelve pairs of opposites, which were made up of one 
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group of largely abstract words, and a second group of words 
which are commonly used in religious/moral teaching. In a series 
of subsequent studies the triadic comparisons technique of Levelt 
(1970a) was employed to compare the related meanings of several 
groups of words, which were made up mainly of words of religious 
significance. This technique was derived from the Repertory Grid 
Technique, as used in Personal Construct Theory by Kelly (1955), 
and involves presenting words in groups of three, and asking 
individual children to put together those two words that "go 
together best" or that "mean about the same". The children were 
also required to justify their choices verbally, and these justi-
fications are used in the final analysis of the results. The main 
analysis of the triadic comparison choices is represented by 
Johnson's (1967) hierarchical clustering analysis, which clusters 
together those words which are most strongly related by the children's 
choices. The application of this form. of analysis to studies 
analysing language data has been recommended by Levelt (1970a), 
and has also been successfully used both by himself (Levelt, 1969) 
and by Miller, G.A. (1969). Also Fillenbaum and Rapoport (1971), 
in a study of nine semantic domains of word meaning, employed this 
technique, and in support of their use of it they quote Miller (1967) 
as saying that it "seems to offer more promise for semantic theory 
than any of the other techniques psychologists have used to probe 
the structure of the semantic lexicon". 
Fillenbaum and Rapoport (1971), like Miller (1967, 1969) V1ew the 
hierarchical clusters as actual quantitative psycholinguistic 
models, and this is a point we will be discussing further in the 
introduction to the series of experiments. 
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First of all, however, the findings of our preliminary experiment, 
using Eve Clark's (1971) opposites test, will be reported. 
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4.2 The Opposites Test Experiment 
Eve Clark (1971, 1972) has used the opposites test in studying the 
acquisition of pairs of antonyms. She has discussed her results 
in terms of the polarity of the different pairs, and has developed 
theories which attribute to pairs a positive and a negative member, 
and this is seen as a major factor affecting their order of acqui-
sition of meaning. 
In this study the test was used merely to see whether certain 
pairs of opposites had been acquired by children in the age range, 
6.0 to 9.0 years old. Our investigation was limited to answering 
the question, "Have children in this age range acquired an under-
standing of these words as pairs of opposites?" The application 
of this question to our wider interests is in terms of the use of 
these terms in religious teaching and religious stories, and the 
limitations that will be imposed upon children in this age range 
if they have not acquired these pairs as opposites in their semantic 
development. 
At the start of the test, each child was asked if he knew what an 
opposite was. If he said that he did, then he was tested on a few 
easy examples such as Yes and No, Soft and Hard, etc., to make sure 
that he really did know. On the other hand, if he said that he did 
not know what an opposite was, then this concept was described to 
him, using examples, and then he was tested on the same easy examples 
as the other group to ensure that he now understood. At this point 
it was assumed that all the children knew what an opposite was and 
the actual testing began. 
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The test consisted of presenting verbally, in a random order, a 
complete set of individual words from two sets of pairs of words, 
asking the child each time for the opposite of the word presented. 
The only constraint on the order of presentation of words was that 
each member of a particular pair came in a position earlier in the 
list than the other member of the pair in exactly half the trials. 
Subjects 
Forty children in the age range 6.0 to 9.0 years old were tested, 
and for the purpose of the analysis they were divided up into two 
groups of twenty. The first group consisted of twenty children, 
aged between 6.0 and 7.11 years (Mean Age = 7.0 years), and the 
second group consisted of twenty children aged between 8.0 and 
8.11 years (Mean Age = 8.6 years). 
Materials 
The pairs of words used were: 
Group One (Moral/Religious) 
Good - Bad 
True - False 
Right - Wrong 
Love - Hate 
Innocent - Guilty 
Natural - Supernatural 
Results 
Group Two (Abstract) 
Light - Dark 
Day - Night 
Summer - Winter 
Life - Death 
North - South 
East - West 
The results were tabulated in terms of correct and incorrect 
responses, in order to see which pairs were best understood (see 
Table 27), and also to see the type of incorrect responses which 
were given (see Tables 28 and 29). 
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TABLE 27 - Levels of Correct Performance on Opposites Test 
Levels of 6, 7 Year 01ds 8 Year 01ds Correct 
Performance (N=20) (N=20) 
I ~75% Good-Bad (90%) Good-Bad (100%) 
Light-Dark (82.5%) Light-Dark (90%) 
Day-Night (80%) Summer-Winter (85%) 
East-West (77.5%) Right-Wrong (85%) 
Right-Wrong (75%) Day-Night (80%) 
~50% Summer-Winter (72.5%) East-West (65%) 
Love-Hate (52.5%) True-False/Untrue (53%) 
Life-Death (53%) 
North-South (50%) 
Love-Hate (50%) 
~25% True-False/Untrue (45%) Natura1-Supernatura1/ 
Unnatural (33%) 
Life-Death (27.5%) 
North-South (27.5%) 
<25% Innocent-Guilty (2.5%) Innocent-Guilty (15%) 
Natura1-Supernatura1/ 
Unnatural (0%) 
TABLE 28 - Opposites Test Responses (6, 7 Year 01ds, N=20) 
STIMULUS WORDS RESPONSE WORDS (WITH FREQUENCY) 
RELIGIOUS/MORAL 
Good Bad (18) Unkind (1) Not good(1) 
Bad Good (18) Happy (1) Horrid (1) 
True False (6) Not true (5) Lies (2) 
False True (8) Real (1) Teeth (1) 
Right Wrong (11) Left (5) Draw (2) 
Wrong Right (19) 
Love Hate (12) Smile (1) Un10ve (1) 
Hate Love (9) Like (7) Friend (1) 
Innocent Uninnocent(2) Guilty (1) 
Guilty Unguilty (3) Not guilty(2) Truth (1) 
Natural Unnatural (4) 
Supernatural 
ABSTRACT 
Light Dark (15) Night (1) Un1ight (1) 
Dark Light (18) Morning (1) Undark (1) 
Day Night (19) Winter Day(l) 
Night Day (13) Morning (5) Midday (1) 
Sunnner Winter (14) Spring (4) Autumn (1) 
Winter Sunnner (15) Autumn (2) Sunny (1) 
Life Death (8) Dead (1) Die (1) 
Death Alive (5) Life (3) Die (1) 
North West (8) South (5) East (4) 
South West (10) North (6) East (1) 
East West (18) North (2) 
West East (13) North (2) South (3) 
t Other = Other responses given than those already listed. 
* N.R. = No response given. 
--
Othert(2) 
Other (1) 
Other (1) 
Other (1) 
Other (1) 
Other (3) 
- -_._-
N.R.*(5) 
N.R.(10) 
N.R. (1) 
N.R. (1) 
N.R. (6) 
N.R. (3) 
N.R.(17) 
N.R. (14) 
N.R.(16) 
N.R. (20) 
N.R. (2) 
N.R. (1) 
N.R. (1) 
N.R. (1) 
N.R. (9) 
N .R. (8) 
N .R. (3) 
N.R. (3) 
N.R. (2) 
t-' 
t-' 
...... 
TABLE 29 - Opposites Test Responses (8 Year 01ds, N=20) 
STIMULUS WORDS RESPONSE WORDS (WITH FREQUENCY) 
RELIGIOUS/MORAL 
Good Bad (20) 
Bad Good (20) 
True Untrue (6) False (5) Not true (5) Othert(4) 
False True (11) Unfa1se (2) Real (2) 
Right Wrong (14) Left (3) Draw (1) Other (2) 
Wrong Right (20) 
Love Hate (10) Un10ve (5) Not love (1) Other (2) 
Hate Life (10) Love (7) 
Innocent Uninnocent (5) Guilty (4) Liar (1) Other (2) 
Guilty Not guilty (7) Unguilty (8) Innocent (2) Other (1) 
Natural Unnatural (10) Not natura1(2) 
Supernatural Unsupernatura1 (3) Natural (1) 
ABSTRACT 
Light Dark (18) Night (1) Heavy· (1) 
Dark Light (18) Daylight (1) Cart (1) 
Day Night (18) Afternoon (1) Night-time (1) 
Night Day (14) Morning (4) Light (2) 
Sunnner Winter (16) Autumn (2) Not sunnner (1) 
Winter Sunnner (18) Autumn (2) 
Life Death (12) Dead (2) Killed (1) 
Death Life (10) Alive (5) Life (1) Other (2) 
North South (9) West (6) East (4) 
South West (11) North (5) East (2) 
East West (17) North (1) South (1) Other (1) 
West East (9) South (5) North (3) 
-
_ .. --
--- -- --... --------- - -----------~ 
t Other = Other responses given than those already listed. 
* N.R. No response given. 
N.R.*(5) 
N.R. (2) 
N .R. (3) 
N.R. (8) 
N.R. (2) 
N.R. (8) 
N.R. (16) 
N .R. (1) 
N .R. (5) 
N.R. (2) 
N.R. (1) 
N.R. (2) 
N.R. (3) 
I 
I 
t-' 
t-' 
00 
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When scoring the responses it was found that there were a few 
alternative correct responses which could be given as opposites 
to some of the words. For the purpose of our analysis, "untrue" 
and "false" were both accepted as the opposite of "true", and 
"unnatural" and "supernatural" were both accepted as the opposite 
of "natural". However, because of their different meanings, "left" 
(instead of "wrong") was not scored as a correct response to "right", 
and "heavy" (instead of "dark") was not scored as a correct response 
to "light". (These were of course quite valid responses, in one 
sense, and it was unfortunate that this ambiguity in the stimulus 
words existed.) Also, negations (e.g. "not bad") were not counted as 
valid opposites. 
There were a very few isolated occurrences of free association 
(e.g. "teeth" as a response to "false"), but these were very rare 
and on the whole the children seemed to understand what was being 
required of them. 
Discussion 
It is clear from the results that some pairs of opposites are known 
better than others, by children in this age range. Also, children 
in the 8 year old group performed significantly better overall on 
the task than did the children in the 6,7 year old group (X 2 = 8.44, 
with 1 degree of freedom, significant at the .01 level). Also, 
performance on the moral/religious pairs of opposites was not as 
good as it was on the abstract pairs. 
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Another -interesting observation was that children in the older age 
group had a much greater tendency to use negations (e.g. IInot love", 
"unlove") than did the children in the younger group (75 occurrences 
as opposed to 25 in the 6,7 year old group). In contrast to this, 
children in the younger group were more likely to give no response 
at all to a word than were the children in the older group (123 
occurrences as opposed to 58). 
Two somewhat surprising features of the results were the much better 
level of performance of both groups on East-West than on North-South, 
and also the fact that the younger group performed even better on 
East-West than the older group did. 
The main finding of this experiment, however, was that children 
within this age range were shown not to have completely acquired 
certain pairs of opposites which are often used in religious/moral 
teaching (e.g. true-false, innocent-guilty, and natural-supernatural). 
This conclusion does not say that the children have not acquired 
any meaning for the individual words making up these pairs, but it 
does suggest that in Eve Clark's (1973) terms, the "semantic feature" 
of polar opposition had not, in these cases, as yet been fully 
acquired by these children. 
We will go on now to use another experimental technique, which 
should allow us to investigate a variety of features of word meaning, 
among several groups of words, mainly of religious significance. 
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4.3 The First Series of the Triads Experiments 
One way of investigating the meaning of individual words is to 
explore their relatedness to other individual words and to groups 
of words. Miller (1969), for example, used a sorting task on a 
set of 48 common nouns, where the subjects were required to sort 
the words into groups on the basis of similarity of meaning. 
Miller was here testing the assumption that when items are 
clustered this reflects a decision to ignore particular concep-
tual features which would normally distinguish these items. In 
the analysis of his data, Miller used hierarchical clustering 
techniques, and the justification here was that "hierarchical 
(taxonomic) organisation based on relations of class inclusion is 
a pervasive feature of the subjective lexicon" (Miller, 1969). 
Anglin's (1970) studies, which we have already mentioned in 
Section 2.5, were also along these lines and were used in support 
of the view that lexical information about word meaning may be 
stored in terms of a hierarchical classificatfon of words. 
The series of studies that we will be reporting in this section 
are of a similar nature to those of Anglin (1970) and Miller (1969), 
in that they employ a technique that seeks to observe the way in 
which groups of words are partitioned or clustered in relation to 
one another. However, in place of the sorting method used in these 
studies, we will be employing a triadic comparisons technique, the 
inspiration for which, as has already been mentioned in Section 4.1, 
was found in the Repertory Grid Technique used in Personal Construct 
Theory. When this technique is used in Personal Construct Theory, 
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the task normally involves first of all getting subjects to name 
twenty or thirty people whom they know. They are then presented 
with the names of three of these people and are asked to choose 
two, saying in what way these two people are alike and are different 
from the third person. By repeating this procedure with different 
combinations of names, a whole matrix of judgments (or constructs, 
as they are called) is collected, and these are then analysed to 
see to what extent the person is using a variety of constructs to 
partition this group of people. (For further details of this use 
of the triadic comparisons method see Kelly, 1955.) 
The way in which this technique will be used here for studying 
word meaning, is by replacing the people with a group of words. 
The relationship of this group of words can then be studied, by 
presenting them in sets of three to the subject, and asking him 
to put together the two "which mean about the same" or "go together 
best" and explain why these two have been put together, relative 
to the third word in the set. By these justifications of triadic 
selections, aspects of the features of the word meaning, which 
are being used for partitioning these groups of words, may be 
studied. Also by analysing the grouping of words .together, using 
Johnson's hierarchical clustering technique, it will be possible 
to study the degree of relatedness of different subsets (or 
clusters) of words out of the original groups. The closer that 
words are clustered together, the more related they are within the 
context of the group. 
It is important to realise that, although this experimental approach 
has features in common with the sorting tasks of Miller (1969) and 
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Anglin (1970), especially because of the fact that they too employed 
hierarchical clustering analyses, our studies are being interpreted 
from a totally different standpoint. That is, we are in no way 
intending to set up hierarchical psycholinguistic models in support 
of the Generalisation Hypothesis, but are purely using hierarchies 
to illustrate the degree of communality of meaning that some words 
have relative to other words within the context of an overall group. 
In fact, we will be demonstrating in the second series of these 
studies that the structure and underlying justifications for these 
hierarchies can be changed quite radically by slightly changing the 
context of the overall groups. 
Our aim is primarily to study the word meaning development of several 
groups. of words, many of which are relevant to the development of 
religious thinking, and for this purpose we are seeking to use tech-
niques that have been proven by their previous use elsewhere. The 
discussion of our results in terms of issues that are concerned with 
the merits of various current overall theoretical views of word meaning 
will be a secondary consideration. 
We will now outline the experimental procedure which will be used 
throughout the two series of experiments. 
Method 
The groups of words studied always contained five words, and these 
words were presented on pieces of card, three at a time. The child 
was asked to look at the card as it was presented, and the three 
words on the card were then read out by the experimenter. The child 
was then asked, "Which two out of these three words go together best?" 
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and also, as a subsequent prompt, "Which two words mean about the 
same?". When the child had chosen two words out of the three, he 
was then asked, "Why do those two go together best?" and, "Why are 
those two different from that word?" (pointing to the one that had 
been left out). All of the children's selections and justifications 
for their choices were recorded by the experimenter, and the stimulus 
words were presented in all the possible sets of three (that is, 
each group of five words was represented by ten presentations of 
three words, covering all the possible combinations). In each of 
the experiments three groups of words were tested concurrently, in 
such a way that the order of presentations of sets of three words 
was randomised among the groups. In other words, each trial could 
equally well be a set of three words, all from anyone of the three 
different groups of five words. This randomisation was employed as 
an attempt to counteract any effect that one trial might have on a 
subsequent trial if the words were drawn from the same group. 
Subjects 
In each of the two series of experiments, there was a group of 69 
children, who were the subjects, and this group was made up of three 
sub-groups of 23 children, aged 6, 8 and 10 years old. The groups 
used in the two experiments were made up of different children, 
although the ages used were the same, and they were taken from the 
same classes in the same school. The groups of children represented 
the age spans 6.0 to 6.11 years, 8.0 to 8.11 years and 10.0 to 10.11 
years and the mean ages of the groups were 6.6, 8.6 and 10.6 years 
old. 
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The method of selection of subjects for this and all the other 
experiments, which are reported here, was for the experimenter to 
randomly select names from the school registers. The only constraint 
was that the children were of the correct age for any particular 
group. Occasionally children chosen in this way were not included 
in the sample, on the advice of either the class teacher or the 
head teacher of the school. This happened very rarely, and was 
usually only done if the child had been officially classified as 
educationally subnormal. It was felt that in these cases the experi-
mental tasks might be over-demanding for the children, and that their 
responses might bias the sample in an uncontrollable way. 
It should be noted that a few children appeared not to understand 
the task, or were not able to provide answers to the questions. 
There were only a few of these, and they were replaced by additional 
children of the same age. 
Materials 
In the first series of the Triads Experiments, the three groups of 
words studied were as follows. 
Group One Group ~o Group Three 
Good H~ God 
Bad Church Jesus 
True Bible Angel 
Evil Cathedral Devil 
Wrong Prayer Man 
Group One consisted of words of a moral/religious nature, some of 
which were studied in the opposites test, previously reported. 
Group ~o involved religious objects or acts, and Group Three 
involved people or beings of religious significance. 
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4.4 Method for Presenting the Results of the Triads Experiments 
The results of this series of experiments will initially be 
presented in three different forms. Firstly, they will be given 
in the form of a matrix, showing the number of times each pair 
of words was put together by the children in anyone age group. 
The second type of presentation of the results is a hierarchical 
clustering analysis, and the technique used is that of Johnson 
(1967). Levelt (1970a) gives a detailed account of how this 
analysis can be applied to language data. Basically what happens 
is that the matrix data, which represents similarity (or related-
ness) measures for all the pairs of words from the original group 
of words, are transformed into a hierarchical clustering scheme 
(H.C.S.) by systematically putting together the most highly related 
pair of words (in terms of the similarity measures) and then re-
computing the similarity matrix, considering words which have 
already been clustered together as one unit in the matrix. This 
re-computing of the data matrix may be either done by the minimum 
(or diameter) method or by the maximum (or connectedness) method. 
The essential difference here is that if two words have been 
clustered together and there is a choice involved in deciding 
which of their individual relatedness measures to take, to deter-
mine the relatedness of the pair to another word, then one decides 
on the basis of taking either the higher measure (in the connected-
ness method) or the lower measure (in the diameter method). 
Obviously these two different methods might well, in some cases, 
yield quite different hierarchical structures and the choice 
between the two methods has to be made on the basis of whether, 
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in any particular set of data, the similarity (or relatedness) 
measure s(x,i) is a better estimate of s«x,y)i) than s(y,i), 
where x and yare the two words which have already been clustered 
together and i is the word they are being related to. The decision 
between the two methods rests on taking either the greater or 
lesser value out of s(x,i) and s(y,i). In some cases it seems 
appropriate to apply both methods, if there is no way of choosing 
between them, but in others (e.g. Levelt, 1970b) there seem to be 
good grounds for using the connectedness method. For example, 
Levelt (1970b) was using the method to provide relatedness 
estimations for all pairs of words from test sentences (e.g. "the 
boy has lost a dollar"). Having ascertained that "a" and "dollar" 
are strongly related, and when deciding the relatedness of "a 
dollar" with the other words, it would seem most appropriate for 
Levelt to take the maximum relatedness value of either of the two 
words, on the grounds that one of them (dollar) is probably the 
key member of the pair and will better represent the relatedness 
of "a dollar" to the other words than will "a" on its own. This 
argument rests on the assumption that "dollar" will have a higher 
relatedness value to other words than will "a", and the .fact that 
this is the case in the data (in all apart from one case ("the"), 
where the difference is extremely small) adds very strong support 
to this approach. 
It is debatable whether this same argument could be applied to our 
data. For instance, having clustered together God, Jesus and Angel 
because of their strong relatedness, can we assume that whichever 
of them is most strongly related to Devil, best represents the 
cluster? We would argue that this probably is the best way of 
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performing the analysis, but this argument is not essential as, 
in almost all cases with our data, both methods yield identical 
solutions, apart from the value of the weakest hierarchical 
relationships. Thus both methods will, in almost all cases, 
cluster the words together into the same hierarchically organised 
groups, and the only differences will be in terms of the weakest 
relatedness values (at the top of the hierarchies, as we have 
drawn them). As these values are largely irrelevant to our 
interests and do not vary much between the two methods anyway, 
we will not compute the hierarchies by both methods but will 
remain with our preferred method, which is the connectedness 
method. However, the very fact that both methods do in almost 
all cases give the same topological structure, is in itself 
extremely good evidence that there are latent hierarchical 
structures in the data and that they have not just arisen as 
an artifact of the particular method chosen. This point is made 
by Levelt (1970a) in support of doing both methods of the analysis 
in cases where this is of interest: 
"It has been argued that in the ideal case, where there 
is no experimental error and where the data structure 
is fully hierarchical, the diameter and connectedness 
methods give identical solutions, both topologically 
and numerically ••. It can be shown that if the two 
solutions are topologically identical, i.e. give the 
same clusters and subclusters, the data do not violate 
the ultrametric inequality. This can be taken as 
evidence for the existence of a latent hierarchical 
structure". (Levelt, 1970a, pl06.) 
The third form in which the results of these two series of experi-
ments will be presented is in terms of a classification of the 
justifications used by the children to support the pairing together 
of particular words or groups of words. These justifications have 
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been grouped together into sets of similar types of justifications, 
where this seemed to be appropriate, and these are only presented 
in the cases where they are of importance for interpreting the 
clusters of words, to which they refer. 
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4.5 The Results of the First Series of the Triads Exueriments 
TAl3LE 30 Rele"tedness Matrix for Group One ',lords (N=23. 6 Year Olds) 
Good :Bad True Evil "\'lrong 
Good 0 19 51 8 -19 
:Bad 0 15 30 35 
True 0 9 19 
Evil 0 19 
\<Trang 0 
(rorax F'ossible Relatedness Score = 69) 
'l:.A:i3LE 31 Relatedness l'.catrix. for group One Hords (N=23, 8 Year Olds) 
Good :Bad True Evil l,Irong 
Good 0 24 50 10 14 
:Bad 0 11 36 42 
True 0 4 16 
Evil 0 23 
Vlrong 0 
(1m F'ossible Relatedness Score = 69) 
R~la.tedness Natrix for Group One Hords (1'T::::23 , 10 Year Olds) 
Good :Bad True Evil Hrong 
Good 0 15 58 2 5 
:Bad 0 2 50 48 
True 0 1 7 
Evil 0 42 
1,'Trong 0 
(I·tax F'ossible 3elatedness Score = 69) 
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FIG1L:-1E 3 H. c. S. Solution Connectedness method for Grouu One \/orcls 
1N=23 , 6 Year Olds 
Degree of 10 
Relatedness 
(Nax Possible=69) 20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
69 
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Bad 
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35 
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True 
E.C.B. Solution Connectedness method for Grou-p One ~!iords 
"(N=23, 8 Year Olds 
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Relatedness 
(r1ax Possible=69) 20 
FIGURE 5 H.C.S. 
N=23, 
30 
40 
50 
60 
69 
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Bad 
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iiTrong EVil Good True 
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15 
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-'--
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TABLE 33 Classification of Justifications, for Three Age Groups, 
Pairing Selected Group One Words 
a. Justifications given for putting Good and True together, and frequency 
of occurrence 
6 Year aIds 
Good/Both Good/Gooder/ 
Goodest/Better/Good 
8 Year 01ds 
Good/Both Good/ 
10 Year 01ds 
Good/Both Good/ 
Nice/Not Wrong/ 
to tell Truth 39 
Not Bad/Not Wrong/ 
Both Nice/Good to 36 
tell Truth 
More Good/Not Bad/ 40 
Not Wicked 
Right/True/Truthful 11 
Various Other 
Justifications 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 
12 
51 
b. Justifications ~iven for 
of occurrence 
6 Year 01ds 
. 
Both Bad/Bad/Bad Men/ 
Unkind/Wicked and Bad 
Like Each Other 
Various Other 
Jus ti fica tions 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 
28 
2 
a 
30 
14 
50 
putting Bad and Evil tosether 2 and frequency 
8 Year 01ds 10 Year 01ds 
Both Bad/Bad/ Both Bad/Bad/ 
Horrible/Not Good/ 28 Horrible/Not Nice/ 
Not Nice/More Bad/ Not Good/Wrong/ 
Horrible Wicked 
8 
36 
c. Justifications given for putting Bad and Wrong together, and frequency 
of occurrence 
6 Year 01ds 8 Year 01ds 10 Year 01ds 
Both Bad/Bad/More Bad/ Both Bad/Wrong/Bad/ Not Nice/Wrong/Bad/ 
Worse/Bad Things 27 Not Nice/Not Good 30 Not Good/Less Bad 
Not Right/Mistakes 3 Not Right/Shouldn't 4 Not Right/Shouldn't 
Be Do 
Various Other 
Justifications 5 8 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 35 42 
7 
58 
50 
a 
50 
38 
6 
4 
48 
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TABLE 33 (cont.) 
d. Justifications given for putting Evil and Wrong together, and frequency 
of occurrence 
6 Year Olds 
Very Bad/Both Bad/ 
Wicked/Wicked and Bad/ 16 
Wrong 
Various Other 
Justifications 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 
9 
25 
8 Year Olds 
Both Bad/Both Wrong/ 
Bad Things/Not Good 19 
4 
23 
10 Year 01ds 
Both Bad/Bad/Wrong 
Both Wrong/Not Nice 32 
Doing Bad Things 
Not Right 5 
5 
42 
Hymn 
Church 
Bible 
Cathedral 
Prayer 
TIWLE 35 
Hymn 
Church 
Bible 
Cathedral 
Prayer 
TilJ31l1 36 
Hyrrm 
Church 
Bible 
Cathedral 
Prayer 
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Hyrrm Church Bible Cathedral Prayer 
0 23 37 r 34 0 
0 29 27 25 
0 9 34 
0 6 
0 
(1m Possible Relatedness Score = 69) 
Relatedness Hatrix for Groun T\vo 1:1ords (N=23 , 8 Year Olds) 
Hymn Church Bible Cathedral Frayer 
0 18 48 1 43 
0 19 42 20 
0 1 35 
0 ;; 
0 
(Hax Possible Relatedness Score = 69) 
Relatedness I,Iatrix for Groun THo 'dor(ls (N=23 , 10 Year Olds) 
Hyrrm 
o 
Church Bible Cathedral Frayer 
10 42 ~~ 50 
0 18 51 11 
0 4 42 
0 0 
0 
(l'·Iax Possible Relatedness Score = 69) 
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FIGURE 6 H.C.S. Solution (Connectedness method) for Group ~vo words 
(N=23. 6 ~ear Olds) 
Degree of 10 
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FIGURE 7 3. C. S. Solution Connectedness method for GrOUD ~ofO Hords ~23. 8 Y-ear Olds 
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Classification of Justification~for Three Age Groups, . 
Pairing Selected Grou-c T",o '.fords 
a. Justifications i?;iven for puttin,5;' Church Hi th Hynn, Bible or Preyer, 
and frequency of occurrence 
6 Year Olds 8 Year Olds 10 Year 01ds 
Do/Say/Sing/Read in 
Church 
Do/Say/Sing/Read Do/Say/Sing/Read 
Various Other 
Justifications 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 
70 
7 
II 
in Church 
To do I'Ti th 
42 in Church 
God 5 About Jesus(or God) 
10 
b. Justificaticns given for nutting HYmn and Frayer to~~her, and freque~ 
of occurrence 
6 Year Olds 
Say or Sing 
Songs 
Various Other 
Justifications 
Total :0Tumber of 
Justifications 
Given 
25 
4 
5 
8 Year Olds 
Say or Sing 
In Bible/In Hymn-
book 
Not Buildings 
To Jesus/God 
15 
8 
10 Year Olds 
Say or Sing 
To do 1/Ti th Church 
or God 
7 Actions/Require 
Action 
4 Not Buildings 
In Books 
Not Books 
9 
26 
7 
6 
14 
6 
5 
5 
4 
3 
13 
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TABLE 37 (cont.) 
c. Justifications given for nutting Church ani Cathedral tog'ether, and 
frecuency of occurrence 
6 Year Olds 
Churches 
Go to on Sunday 
Look alike 
Various other 
Justifications 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 
8 Year Olds 
16 Buildings/Buil t 
3 Places 
2 Have Graves 
6 
10 Year Olds 
29 Buildings/Buil t/ 
Hade of Bricks 
4 Churches 
3 Preach in them 
6 
d. Justifications Riven for "'Putting' Bible and Hymn tOR,'ethel", and freauency 
of occurrence 
6 Year Olds 8 Year Olds 10 Year Olds 
You get hymns in the You get hymns in the 
26 
" 0 
3 
14 
You get hymns in the 
Bible 25 Bible 10 Bible 15 
Say or TIo in the Church 
About Jesus (or God) 
Read/Sing 
Various Other 
J'ustifications 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 
4 Not Buildings 7 
4 About Jesus (or God) 4 
3 Books 6 
Read/Sing 4 
1 
Books 8 
Read/Sing 7 
Both in Church 4 
Not Buildings 4 
4 
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'I'iillLE 37 (c.Q!li.) 
e. Justifications given for nutting' Bible and Frayer to.qether, and 
freauency of occurrence 
6 Year Olds 
You get Prayers in the 
Bible 18 
Say or Sing Both 9 
To God 2 
Various Other 
Justifications 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 
5 
8 Year Olds 
You get Fr,;wers 
Bible 
Read/Can Read 
Not Buildings 
To do with Jesus 
(or God) 
10 year Olds 
in the You get Prayers 
9 Bible 
5 Read/ralk/Say 
4 Not Buildings 
To do with Jesus 
4 (or God) 
13 
in the 
11 
~ 
.-
( 
... 
TABLE 38 
God 
Jesus 
Angel 
Devil 
1iIan 
TABLE 32 
God 
Jesus 
Angel 
Devil 
riIan 
TA.13LL<J 40 
God 
Jesus 
Angel 
Devil 
Han 
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Relatedness Hatrix for Group Three ~1ords (N=23 t. 6 Year Olds) 
God Jesus .iffisel Devil r1an 
0 55 45 7 19 
0 37 8 26 
0 8 20 
0 ) 
0 
(Hax Possible Relatedness Score = 69) 
Relatedness Eatrix for GrouD Three \lords (P.=23 , 8 Ye.8.: . .r Olds) 
God Jesus Angel Devil J·Tan 
0 66 37 9 20 
0 33 10 27 
0 8 6 
0 14 
0 
(Hax Fossible Relatedness Score = 69) 
Relatedness Eatrix for GrOlrD ':Phree Hords (:;:'T=22, 10 Year Olds) 
God Jesus J\.ngel Devil l1an 
0 60 36 6 30 
0 31 10 29 
0 11 " 14 
0 3 
0 
(Hax Possible Relatedness Score = 69) 
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FIGURE 9 H.C.S. Solution (Connectedness method) for Group Three \Vords 
(N=23 , 6 Year Olds) 
Degree of 
Relatedness (r.m Possible=69 ) 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
69 
8 
26 
45 
j 
55 
Devil IVlan .Angel God Jesus 
FIGURE 10 H.C.S. Solution (Connectedness method) for GrouD Three words 
(N=23, 8 Year Olds) 
Degree of 10 
Relatedness 
(~~ Possible=69) 20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
69 
14 
27 
I 37 
I I 
66 
Devil lmgel God Jesus 
FIGURE 11 H!C.S. Solution (Co!L1'1ectedness method) fQ£.. yrouD Three Hords 
(N=23. 10 Year oids) 
Degree of 10 
Relatedness 
(Max Fossible=69) 20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
69 
11 
I 30 
36 
60 
Devil Angel God Jesus 
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Classifica tion of Justifications, for Three i1ge Grouns, 
Pairing Selected Group Three Hords 
a. Justifications giyen for Dutting' God and Jesus to,crether, and fr?~I)...sy of 
occurrence 
6 Year aIds 
Good/Gooder/Kind/Nice 
Hore Good 
In Heaven/In the Sky 
Same Thing 
Hen/Not Ladies 
Various Other 
Justifications 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 
8 Year aIds 
Good people/Good/ 
17 Good IvIen 
9 Relations/Jesus is 
Son of God/God is 
Jesus' Father 
7 Same Thing/Like 
Each Other/Nearly 
the Same 
2 
2.0 
Both Nen 
In Heaven/In the 
Sky 
10 Year Ulds 
Relations/Jesus is 
12 Son of God/God is 
Jesus' Father 
13 
8 
7 
7 
19 
Kind/Nice/Good/ 
Not \'Ticked 
S8JJ1e Thing 
In Eeaven 
Both Hen 
b. Justifications given for putting Angel with God or Jesus, and frequenc~ 
of occurrence 
6 Y-ear aIds 8 Year aIds 10 Year aIds 
Good/Gooder/Better/Kind 38 Good/Kind/Good 
People/not Hickeal 
Nice :teople/'0Tot 
Not 'viicked/Not 
Good/Nice 
Bad/ 
Bad 27 
Live in 3ky(or Heaven) 21 In Heaven/Up High/ Live in Heaven (or 
Up There/In the Sky 25 the Sky)/Up in Heaven 
(or the Sky) 
Lived at the same time/ Dead people 4 Angels are helpers 
Did things together 6 (or servants) of 
God and Jesus 
Nearly the same/ Not seen/Don't Help people 
Like each other 6 normally see them 3 
Various other 
Justifications 11 11 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 82 lQ 
25 
7 
5 
4 
7 
12. 
60 
27 
9 
9 
" 
./ 
19 
!iL 
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4.6 Discussion of the Results of the First Series of Triads Experiments 
When one takes an overall view of the results of these experiments, 
there are several things which immediately stand out: 
1. There is good evidence for the fact that within the groups of 
words, which were selected, there was a degree of clustering into 
sub-groups of words with high degrees of relatedness. 
2. These clusterings often appear within all three age groups, 
although there is a tendency for them to become more strongly defined 
as the groups get older in age. 
3. When these related clusters of words are analysed in terms of 
the justifications used to relate them, then it is clear that in 
certain cases there are much more clearly defined age changes. In 
other words, a group of words that are related to each other in just 
the same way by the different age groups, may be being related to 
each other because of quite different features of their meanings, by 
individual age groups. This fact only becomes evident when the hier-
archical clustering analyses are studied along with the analysis of 
the justifications, for the main pairings and clusters within the 
H.C.S. solutions. 
We will now consider separately the results for each of the three 
groups of words. 
The Group One Words 
The Group One Words give a good demonstration of the first two 
general observations which were mentioned in the last section, i.e. 
they form two distinct clusters, and although these two clusters 
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appear in all three age groups, there is a tendency for relatedness 
within the clusters to increase with age (see Figures 3, 4 and 5). 
On the other hand, the justifications tend to suggest a partitioning 
of these words mainly in terms of them being either "good" or "bad", 
in all three age groups, and so the third general observation (of 
age changes in justifications given) is not demonstrated at all in 
this group. 
It has already been demonstrated in the Opposites Test, reported 
earlier in this chapter, that "good" and "bad" are a pair of 
opposites, the meaning of which is generally known to 6 and 7 year 
olds. Now these results take us beyond that, and we can suggest 
that they are also a pair of opposites which have a tendency to be 
used to define the meaning of terms such as True, Evil and Wrong, 
by children between the ages of 6 and 10. 
The Group Two Words 
The Group Two Words also cluster into two distinct sub-groups, but 
only for the 8 and 10 year olds. By contrast, the 6 year olds 
appear not to relate any of these words to each other in any par-
ticular way, and for this age group the pattern of results is very 
similar to that which would be expected if the pairs of words had 
been chosen together completely at random. 
The main factor which arises in the 8 and 10 year old groups is 
the clustering together of Church and Cathedral, as opposed to 
Hymn, Bible and Prayer, and this is usually justified in terms of 
their being "buildings". On the other hand, when the 6 year olds 
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get Church and Cathedral together in a triad (with either Bible, 
Hymn or Prayer), they tend to put Bible, Hymn and Prayer with 
Church, on the grounds that they are "said, sung, read or done in 
Church". 
One partial explanation of these results could be that Cathedral 
is not a well-known word for the 6 year olds and that they there-
fore always tend to avoid it when it appears in a triad, and take 
the remaining two words together (see Tables 34, 35 and 36). 
The Group Three Words 
It is clear from the results of the Group Three Words that God 
and Jesus are closely associated by all three age groups, and also 
that Devil, Man and Angel are related more to God and Jesus, than 
they are to each other. 
In the classification of the justifications for this group, there 
is a good example of the general observation which we mentioned 
earlier, concerning the relating of the same pairs of words, by 
different age groups, for different reasons. God and Jesus are 
paired together for a number of different reasons by the 6 year 
, 
olds (see Table 41), the main one being that they are "both good", 
or that "they live in Heaven (or in the Sky)". However, in the 
10 year old group they are paired mainly because of their father -
son relationship (i.e. "Jesus is the Son of God", or "God is the 
Father of Jesus"). The justifications of the 8 year old group fall 
somewhere between these two positions, and could be viewed as a 
kind of transition stage. 
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This observation would appear to greatly emphasise the importance 
of using justifications in the interpretation of these clusterings, 
in that as the meanings of words develop they may be paired together 
in the same way but for quite different reasons. 
Summary 
From this first series of results it would appear that this method 
could well produce valuable insights into the developing meaning of 
groups of words, especially when the results are interpreted using 
analyses of the justifications used. One factor which still needs 
to be investigated is the question of how much influence these 
particular groups of words had on the individual pairings. Before 
discussing the results in any more detail we will investigate this 
question in a further set of experiments, using three groups of 
words, which are modified forms of the three groups which we have 
already studied. 
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4.7 The Second Series of the Triads Experiments 
Materials 
In the second series of the Triads experiments, the three groups 
of words studied were as follows: 
Group Four Group Five Group Six 
Good H~ God 
True Prayer Jesus 
Bible Song Minister 
Storybook Poem Father 
Fairy tales Reading Policeman 
Each group contained one pair of words which had already been 
shown to be closely related in the first series of experiments. 
This time, however, they were placed within groups which were 
designed partly to test out the strength of their relatedness 
within the context of a different group of words. 
Method and Subjects 
Exactly the same method was used as with the first series of 
experiments, and the same numbers of subjects in the same age 
groups were also used. The subjects selected for this second 
series of Triads experiments were drawn from the same classes in 
the same schools as the subjects who participated in the first 
series. No subject who was included in the previous sample was 
included for a second time, but apart from this constraint the 
groups were chosen on the same basis as before. 
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4.8 Results of the Second Series of the Triads Experiments 
The results of this second series of experiments will be presented 
in the same way as were those for the first series. 
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TABLE 42 Relatedness Hatrix: for Group Four Hords (N==23 , 6 Year Olds) 
Good True Bible storybook Fairy tales 
Good 0 20 17 13 11 
True 0 46 19 19 
Bible 0 27 14 
Storybook 0 44 
Fairytales o 
(~~ Possible Relatedness Score = 69) 
TABLE 43 Relatedness Natrix for GrouTl Four Hords (1:1=23, .8 Year Olds) 
Good True Bible Storybook Fairy tales 
Good 0 36 19 12 14 
True 0 34 9 12-
Bible 0 23 14 
Storybook 0 57 
Fairy tales 0 
(}fux Possible Relatedness Score = 69) 
TiWLE 44 Relatedness l'~trix for GrOUl) Four \'lords (U=23! 10 Year Olds) 
Good True Bible Storybook Fairy tales 
Good 0 35 27 6 8 
True 0 48 11 7 
Bible 0 24 9 
Storybook 0 55 
Fairy tales 0 
(rlJax }ossible Relatedness Score == 69) 
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FIGURE 12 H. C. S. Solution iQonnectedness method) for Group Four \'lords 
(:[1=23, 6 Year 01d.~) 
Degree of 10 
Relatedness 
(r1ax Possible=69) 20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
I 
44 
Fairy tales Sto~Jbook Bible 
20 
27 
46 
True Good 
FIGUHE 13 ~s. Solution (Connectedness method) for Group Four \fords 
(N=23, 8 Year Olds) 
Degree of 10 
Relatedness 
(~illx Possible=69) 20 
FIGTJR.E 14 
Degree of 
Relatedness 
(T1ax Possible=69) 
, 
30 
40 
50 
60 
I 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
69 
23 
I 34 
I 36 
57 
Fairy tales Storybook :Bible Good True 
Solution (Connectedness method) for Group Four l,'lords 
10 Year Olds) 
~ 
I 
24 
35 
,1 
55 
--
L_ 
Fairy tales Storybook Good Bible True 
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Classification of Justification§J-for Three Age Groups, 
Pairing Selected Group J?our \'i~ 
a. Justifications given for Butting Fairy tales and Storybook together, and 
freguency of occurrence 
6 Year Olds 
Fairy tales must be in 
Storybook/Fairy tales in 
Storybook usually 15 
You can read both 7 
8 Year Olds 
You get Fairy tales in 
Storybooks 18 
Books 12 
10 Year Olds 
Hake believe/Hade 
up/Not true/Usually 
not true 
You get Fairy tales 
in Storybooks 
Books 6 Both sto~Jbooks/ Stories 
Not True 
Various other 
Justifications 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 
5 
11 
Both have stories in 11 
You read both 
j\'Iade up/IVIay be not 
true 
11 
2 
3 
"'21. 
Books 
You can read them 
b. Justifications given for putting Bible and True together, and freauency 
of occurrence 
6 Year Olds 
Bible is true/Bible vias 
true/nible can be true 
Various Other 
Justifications 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 
39 
7 
.4§.< •. 
8 Year Olds 
BDble is true/Bible is 
supposed to be true/ 
Bible is nearly true 
It tells you to be 
true in the Bible 
10 Year Olds 
Bible is true/Host 
things in the Bible 
28 are true 
3 Both true/Both right 
3 
34 
20 
15 
8 
6 
4 
2 
41 
5 
2 
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C.I:.bJ3L.8 45 (cont.) 
c. Justifications given for Duttin~ Good and True together, and frequency 
of occurrence 
6 Year Olds 
Good is true 
Both Good 
TL'"IJ to be both 
Various other 
Justific2.tions 
Total Nu..'1lber of 
Justifications 
Given 
d. Justifications 
7 
4 
3 
6 
given for 
freauenc;y: of occurrence 
6 Year Clds 
Books/In books 12 
Can read both 6 
The Bible is a story-
book/The Bible is out 
Qf a .storybook 4 
Various other· 
Justifications 5 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given n 
8 Year Olds 10 Year Olds 
Good is true 10 Both good 
Can be both 4' Both true 
Both good 3 Telling truth is 
good 
Good manners 3 Being kind/being 
helpful 
16 
putting- Bible and Sto:qrbook tOR'ether, and 
8 Year Olds 10 :tear Olds 
Books 12 Books/Both books 
Read them/Can read Read them 
them 7 
Tell stories 3 Can be good 
True 
1 
n. 
9 
6 
3 
3 
14 
9 
8 
2 
2 
j 
?1_ 
Hymn 
Prayer 
Song 
Poem 
Reading 
TABLE 47 
Hymn 
Prayer 
Song 
Poem 
Reading 
Hymn 
P-.cayer 
Song 
Poem 
Reading 
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Relatedness Hatrix for GrouD Five :':oY'ds (H=23, 6 Ye2,Y' Olds) 
Hymn Prayer Song l?oem Read::.ng 
0 30 42 8 4 
0 23 19 26 
0 20 14 
0 44 
0 
(l!Iax Possible Relatedness Score = 69) 
Relatedness liIatrix for Groun 1i'ive 1.'Iords (?J=23, 8 Year Olds) 
Hymn 
0 
Hymn 
o 
Prc;,yer Song Poem Reading 
34 60 9 7 
0 18 28 16 
0 18 4 
0 36 
o 
(T'lax Possible Relatedness Score = 69) 
-:=telatedness Natrix for GrouD Five 'dords (N=2~ 10 Yea.:!' 01c1~ 
Prayer 
33 
o 
Song 
56 
15 
o 
Poem 
13 
31 
15 
o 
Reading 
8 
20 
38 
o 
(H2-X ?ossible nelaiedness Score = 69) 
}?IGU'::E 15 
Degree of 
Relatedness 
(l'Iax Possible=69) 
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H. C. S. Solution k~ctedness meV1od) for Groul] Five \-iords 
(H=23 , 6 Year Olds) 
10 
20 
I 26 30 30 
40 42 44 
50 
60 
69 
Frayer Hymn Song Poem Reading 
FIG1JRE 16 fl.C.S. Solution (Connectedness method) f6r Groul) Five l,'iords 
~23t 8 Year Olds) 
Degree of 10 
Relatedness 
(filax Possible=69) 20 
FIGDi\E~ H.C.S. 
Degree of 
Relatedness 
(rr-lax Fossible=69) 
(1-1=23 ! 
30 
40 
50 
60 
~ ________________________ ~28 
...---_"----1-----, 34 l 
~--+---160 
36 
69~ __ ~ ________ ~ ______ ~ ______ ~ ______ ~ __ _ 
Frayer 
Solution (Connectedness 
10 Year Olds) 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
Frayer Hymn 
Song Poem 3.er,ding 
method) for Group Five idords 
\ 
31 
33 I 
38 
56 
Song F oem Reading 
TXBLE £1.9. 
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Classification of Justifications, for Three A~e Groups, 
Pail"ing Selected GrouD Five Hords 
a. ~fications given for putting Hymn and Son~ together, and freauency oT 
occurrence 
6 Year Olds 
Sing both/Songs 
Read Both 
Various Other 
Justifications 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 
40 
2 
o 
8 Year Olds 10 Y"ear Olds 
Sing both/Songs 60 Sing both/Songs 
To do with music/ 
Have t1mes 
0 
b. Justifications ~iven for puttin.g; Poem and Readin~ toc;ether, and freouency 
of occurrence 
6 Year Olds 
Read a Poem/Both are 
read 
Talk in both/Say both 
Don I t sing them 
Various other 
Justifications 
Total r-lumber of 
Justifications 
Given 
33 
3 
2 
6 
8 Y..ear.Olds 
Can read/Read both/ 
Read a Poem 28 
Say aloud/Say them 5 
Hrite and rea)). 2 
1 
10 Year Olds 
Read both/Read a 
poem/Just read/ 
Have to read 
Not singing/Donlt 
say 
Speak both 
51 
4 
1 
29 
5 
2 
2 
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T1LBLE 49 (cant.) 
c. Justifications given for puttinp, HYF~ and Prayer together, and freouency 
of occurrence 
6 Year . .9lds 
Sayar Sing Them 
Both talking to Jesus/ 
Both to God/God likes 
to hear 
Do in Church/Do at 
services/Do at Sunday 
School 
Do together 
Various other 
Justifications 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 
8 Year Olds 
8 Do in church/to do 
with church 
Do together 
6 
To do with Jesus/ 
About Jesus/T~J to 
5 speak to Jesus 
3 Say or Sing them 
8 
11 
7 
5 
4 
7 
10 Year Olds 
Praise to God/To 
God/To do with God 
or Jesus 
Do these in Church/ 
To do vrith Church 
Sing both/Songs 
To do 'Iii th each 
other 
d. Justifications given for putting Frayer and Foem together, and frequency 
of occurrence 
6 Year Olds 
Say both/Talk in both 
Read both 
Various Other 
Justifications 
Total Humber of 
Justifications 
Given 
9 
2 
8 
8 Year Olds 
Speak both/Say both 
Can read both 
Out of book 
10 Year Olds 
16 S2vY both/Speak both/ 
Do out loud 
5 Re2,d both 
2 Not singing 
5 
28 
16 
6 
4 
2 
5 
12 
7 
'"' L 
10 
T.ABLZ 50 
God 
Jesus 
Hinister 
Father 
Policeman 
God 
Jesus 
jVlinister 
Father 
God 
o 
God 
o 
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Relatedness Natrix for Gf'OUp Six '.fords (N=23, 6 Year o~ cIs..) 
Jesus I'·1inister Father Policeman 
50 29 19 6 
0 32 19 8 
0 20 23 
0 24 
0 
(11a..'C Possible Relatedness Score = 69) 
2elatedness l'le.trix fof' GrOUT) Six 1,'Iords (H-23, 8 Year Clds) 
Jesus I'1inister Father Policeman 
63 38 21 2 
0 36 20 2 
0 15 7 
0 26 
Policeman 0 
TiillL:2 52 
God 
Jesus 
Hinister 
Father 
God 
0 
(Eax Possible Relcttedness Score = 69) 
B.elatedness Hatrix for Group Six "fords (1~23.LJiL.Year 
Jesus l''linister Father Policeman 
65 40 13 5 
0 42 14 4 
0 13 8 
0 26 
Policeman 0 
(l~x Possible Relatedness Score = 69) 
Olds,) 
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FIGT.J;.i.E 18 H.C.S. Solution (Connectedness method) for Group Six ~.iords 
(N=23 , 6 Y,ear Olds) 
Degree of 10 
Relatedness 
(I'1a.x Possible=69) 20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
69 
24 
Father Policeman Minister 
23 
32 
50 
-
God Jesus 
FIGU1ill....:!2. H.C.S. Solution (Connectedness method) for Groul) S.ix :.'Iords. 
(i1=23t 8'Year Olds) 
Degree of 
Relatedness 
(:fiIax Possible=69) 
FIGURE 20 
Degree of 
Relatedness 
(I"'Ia,x Possible=69) 
- -
10 
20 21 
I 
30 26 
40 38 
50 
60 
69 J .. __ 1 
Father Policeman rlinister God Jesus 
'I.C.S. Solution--.lConnectedness method) for Grou-~· Six 'l'iords 
01=/3 2 10 Year Glds) - -
10 
20 I 14 
30 26 
40 42 
50 
60 
65 
6('; 
'" 
J I 
}'ather Policeman fi,inister God Jesus 
T~"GLB 53 
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Classification of JustificationsJ for Three Age 
Grou-ps, Pairing Selected Groun Six Hords 
a. Justifications given for nutting God and Jesus together, and freouency 
of oc6l..1rrence 
6 Year Olds 8 Year Olds 10 Year Olds 
Help you/Help people/Both Related/Father and Jesus is the Son 
are kind 11 Son/Jesus is God's God/God is the 
Son 24 Father of Jesus 
Jesus is God's Son 10 T d 1 /G d ,.In :peo:p~e 00 ::le ligious men/ 
of 
people/Both do ~ood 9 Holy/Both religious 
God kn01ils J esus/ 
Jesus knows God 3 
Jesus came from God 6 In the Bible 3 To do vlith the 
Bible 
Live in Heaven/Both in Both Spirits 3 In Heaven 
Heaven 6 
Various Other 
Justifications 17 21 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 2Q §l 
b. Justifications given fo~~nuttin~ Father and Policeman together, and 
fregu~ncy of occurrence 
6 Year Olds 
Father is a PoliQeman/ 
Policeman is a Father/ 
Father can be a F'oliceman 15 
8 Year Olds 10 Year Olds 
Policeman could be a Both men/People 
Father/Father could be 
a Policeman 13 
Both men 5 Both help you 3 Father could be a 
.Foliceman 
liIight have children 
Various Other 
Justifications 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given 
3 Not to do 1ITi th church 
1 
24 
Father could tell 
Policeman something 
3 Both work 
Not to do '\vi th church/ 
3 Jiot relig'ious 
4 
22 
13 
7 
4 
19 
22 
7 
5 
4 
3 
7 
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TJD3LE 53 (cont.) 
c. Justifications given for -putting Ninister i-lith God or Jesus, and 
frequency of occurrence 
6 Year Olds 
hinister is interested 
in God (Jesus)/Hinister 
speaks about God 
t1ihister is in the 
church and God (Jesus) 
is in the sky 
I-linister prays to Goel 
Various other 
Justifications 
Total Number of 
Justifications 
Given ' 
34 
5 
4 
18 
8 Year Olds 
Hinister knOivs about 
God (Jesms)/Ninister 
speaks about God 
(Jesus)/Hinister sings 
about God (Jesus) 41 
To do with church 13 
Both Holy 4 
16 
.. 
10 Year Olds 
Hinister tells about 
God (Jesus)/Hinister 
has something to do 
i'lith God ( Jesus) 
lvIinister prays to 
God (Jesus)jHinister 
tali{s to God (Jesus)/ 
!Ilinister helps you 
pray to God (Jesus) 
Both religious 
To do Hi th ch1..ITch 
27 
13 
12 
11 
19 
82 
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4.9 Discussion of the Results of the Second Series of the Triads Experiments 
The three main general observations which were made about the first 
series of the Triads experiments (see Section 4.6) were again observed 
in these experiments, i.e. clustering of the groups of words into 
sub~groups; similarities in the clusters of different age groups; and 
differences in justifications given by different age groups for similar 
c1usterings. There is, however, one additional important observation, 
which can be made by comparing the results of this series of experiments 
with the first series. This has to do with the influence of the other 
words in a group on particular word pairings, and may be seen by 
comparing the three pairings which occur in both series of experiments 
(i.e. God and Jesus, Hymn and Prayer, and Good and True). The influence 
of the other words may be seen in some cases to affect the strength of 
the word pairings, (cf. Figures 3, 4 and 5 with Figures 12, 13 and 
14) and in others to affect the justifications given for pairing the 
words (cf. Tables 41 and 53). 
To illustrate this point more fully, we will now consider each of 
the three groups of words separately. At the same time, we shall 
attempt to determine what additional information about word-meaning 
development may be obtained from these results, both on their own 
and in comparison with the results of the first series of experiments. 
The Group Four Words 
In all three age groups there was a strong pairing of Fairy tales 
with Storybook, as opposed to Bible, True and Good. Also, it is 
interesting to note that even in the 6 year old age group, Bible 
was much more strongly associated with True than it was with 
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Storybook or Fairy tales. This pairing of Bible with True appears 
in all three age groups, and only in the 8 year old age group was 
the relationship of Good with True stronger. This is a major change 
around from the first series of experiments (see Section 4.5), and 
is the first demonstration of the general observation which we 
mentioned previously concerning the effect of group context on the 
strength of specific word pairings, i.e. Good and True in the Group 
Four context of Fairy tales, Storybook and Bible are not nearly as 
strongly related as they were in the first series of experiments, 
in the Group One context of Bad, Wrong and Evil. In fact, in Group 
Four, Good and True were only put together 91 times out of a possible 
207, whereas in Group One they were put together 159 times out of a 
possible 207. There is clearly a significant difference between the 
relatedness of these two words in the different contexts of the two 
groups (X 2 = 45.3, with 1 degree of freedom, significant at the .01 
level). 
These results can also be seen to suggest that whatever the 6 year 
old children's conception of the Bible is, it does not have much in 
common with Storybook or Fairy tales. In fact, it is most strongly 
related to True, whereas Storybook and Fairy tales are not. In 
relation to this it is also interesting to note, from the analysis 
of the justifications (see Table 45), that in the 10 year old group 
the strongest justification for putting Fairy tales with Storybook 
was that they are "made up" or "not true". 
Group Five Words 
The Group Five Words, like the Group Four Words, fall into two 
fairly well defined clusters for all three age groups. These two 
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c1usterings were based upon Hymn and Song going together fairly 
strongly throughout, and having Prayer associated with them, as 
opposed to Poem and Reading, which constituted the other cluster 
throughout. 
Again in this group it was clear that the context of a new grouping 
affected the relationship of the pair of words (i.e. Hymn and 
Prayer), which were closely associated in the first series of 
experiments. Not only was the strength of their relationship 
considerably reduced (cf. Figures 6-8 and 15-17), but also the 
justifications used for putting them together tend to be of a 
different type (cf. Tables 37 and 49). In Group Two in the context 
of Bible, Church and Cathedral, Hymn and Prayer were usually put 
together because they were "said" or "sung", whereas in Group Five, 
in the context of Poem, Reading and Song, they were more often put 
together because they had "to do with Jesus or God or Church". 
Thus to the significant change in the degree of relatedness, from 
127 (out of 207) to 97 (out of 207), (X2 = 8.2 with 1 degree of 
freedom, significant at the .01 level), we must add the significant 
change in justifications used for putting Hymn and Prayer together. 
In Group Two "said" or "sung" were used 54 times (out of 127) as 
justifications for putting this pair together, as opposed to 16 
times (out of 97) in Group Five (X2 = 19.9 with 1 degree of freedom, 
significant at the ,01 level). Also "to do with God, Jesus or Church" 
was used as the justification for putting this pair together 49 times 
(out of 97) in Group Five, as opposed to only 10 times (out of 127) 
in Group Two (X2 = 38.3 with 1 degree of freedom, significant at the 
.01 level). 
163 
This result would seem to indicate that if one is interested in 
exploring the development of meaning of words by this method, then 
the make-up of the group of words chosen is of great importance. 
In order to explore the meaning of individual words or the related-
ness of pairs of words, it may thus be necessary to test them in 
the context of different groups of other words, to get a fuller 
impression of the way in which they relate to other words. 
Group Six Words 
The strong degree of relatedness of God and Jesus remained virtually 
unchanged in the context of Minister, Father and Policeman in Group 
Six and, once again, this could be seen in all three age groups as 
by far the strongest clustering. After that, Minister was clustered 
with God and Jesus, as opposed to Father and Policeman, who constituted 
the second cluster. 
Amongst the justifications used for clustering the words together 
in this way, it was notable that the 10 year olds used a consider-
able number of justifications along the lines of "religious" as 
against "not religious". When this is taken along with observation 
in Group Five of Hymn and Prayer being put together because "they 
have to do with God, Jesus or Church", it gives a certain amount of 
evidence for the fact that children at these ages are using secular 
versus religious (or some similar distinction) as one way of con-
ceptua1ising these words. This is another additional piece of 
information which was demonstrated by the particular groups of 
words chosen for use in the second series of experiments. 
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Again in this group God and Jesus were justified as going together 
increasingly because of their father-son relationship as the groups 
got older. There were, however, more of these justifications in 
the younger groups than there were in the context of the Group Three 
words used in the first series of experiments. 
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4.10 The Triads Experiments - Summary and Conclusions 
Throughout both ser~es of experiments, the Triadic comparisons 
technique has provided us with a considerable amount of information 
about the word meaning development of the words tested, particularly 
in relation to the other words in the groups within which they were 
tested. 
In all but one group of words, even the 6 year old children were 
able to relate the words to each other in such a way as to form 
distinct clusters. Also, by studying these clusters along with 
the justifications given by the children, we were able to get consider-
able insight into the features of the meaning of the words which the 
children were using in order to relate them to one another. 
Developmental changes were observed, both in terms of the strength 
of the relatedness of different groups (or clusters) of words and 
in terms of the features of word meaning which were used by different 
age groups in justifying the relatedness of particular pairs or 
clusters of words. 
On the whole, these findings would seem to suggest that even at 6 
years of age the groups of words tested had sufficient meaning for 
the children to relate them to one another, and at 8 and 10 years 
of age there seemed to be a development in the features of meaning 
which were used to relate the words, as well as in the degree to 
which particular groups (or clusters) of words were related to each 
other. 
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This method should hold much promise for future studies of the 
development of religious word meaning, particularly where it is 
applied to well chosen groups of words which best display developing 
features of meaning of individual or clusters of words. 
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4.11 Conclusions about the Development of Religious Word Meaning 
in Children 
In concluding this chapter it is fair to say that the studies which 
we have reported lend support to the idea that the words of religious 
significance, which were studied, were developing in the meaning 
which they had for the children we tested. 
In the Opposites test experiment we saw pairs of opposites of a 
religious/moral nature, whose meaning had been better acquired by 
children aged 8 years old than it had by children of 6 and 7 years 
old. We also saw pairs which were hardly known by either group. 
In the Triads experiments we studied the relatedness of the meanings 
of different words in groups, and we saw how the strength of related-
ness of similar words could increase with age, and how this related-
ness was often justified in a more developed (or adult-like) way 
by the older children. We interpreted these findings mainly in 
terms of a development of word meaning in the particular words 
involved in these related groupings. 
During the course of the two series of Triads experiments, we noted 
certain methodological issues, particularly to do with the effect 
of group context upon the results. This was not necessarily seen 
as a weakness in the method, but more as an indication that 
different aspects of the meaning of certain words could be studied 
by manipulating the group context within which they were studied. 
On the whole, the triadic comparisons technique seems to have lived 
up to earlier expectations, and on the basis of these results could 
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offer much to future studies of the development of religious thinking 
(Murphy, 1978b). 
Our own results have clearly provided evidence to indicate the useful-
ness of the Triads technique, but a much larger investigation would 
be required to comprehensively investigate children's developing 
religious vocabulary. Even children in the 6 to 10 year old age 
range appear to have a fairly extensive vocabulary of words which 
have either a religious meaning or have particular relevance for 
religious discourse. It would be an extremely valuable exercise 
to exhaustively investigate the relatedness of such a group of words 
amongst children within this age range, but because of the time 
consuming nature of the task and the detailed analysis which is 
necessary to collate and interpret the results, it could only 
realistically be carried out as part of a major research programme 
conducted by a team of researchers, over a number of years. 
If it is indeed the case, as these studies have suggested, that 
words of such central importance to religious thinking as God, 
Jesus, Church, Hymn, Prayer, Bible, Good, Bad, and True are still 
developing in meaning for children in this age range, then much 
of what we said earlier has been confirmed. It would seem, on 
these grounds, essential to consider the development of religious 
thinking in children both as a problem of religious word meaning 
development and as a problem of cognitive development. 
We will now turn to an approach to the problem which may involve 
us more in a consideration of cognitive developmental factors, 
although the issues concerning religious word meaning which have 
been discussed in this chapter will not be forgotten. 
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CHAPTER F I V E 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORICAL TIME 
AND THE ABILITY TO SEQUENTIALLY ORDER EVENTS IN TIME 
5.1 Introduction 
In the two preceding chapters, an attempt was made to open up some 
different aspects of the development of religious thinking in 
children aged from six to eleven years, by employing a variety of 
research methodologies, and by approaching this process from two 
quite different directions. In this chapter this same developmental 
process will be considered from a third quite different direction; 
and it is indicative of the complex nature of this area of child 
development, that each of these three different research approaches 
can bring to light quite different aspects of the process. Also, 
it is noticeable that the further one researches into this develop-
mental process, the more one becomes aware of other important 
considerations and directions, from which further studies could be 
made. 
In the course of our consideration of the cognitive developmental 
aspects of the child's development of religious thinking, we became 
aware of one particular aspect which, although it would seem to be 
of obvious importance and had been mentioned on more than one 
occasion in discussions of this problem, had received little con-
sideration in religious thinking research studies. This is children's 
development of understanding of the concept of time, with particular 
reference to historical time. 
. .. / 
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The importance of this concept in relation to religious thinking 
has been mentioned by Goldman (1965b), 
"Awareness of time itself moves from an immature idea 
to more mature concepts as children grow older. In 
terms of a span of time, young children appear to have 
no notion of how long an hour or a day is. It is only 
gradually that they acquire both a time sense and a 
time-reading skill. As their span of comprehended time 
increases, so does their idea of sequence in time. For 
the young child time appears to be disjointed, having 
no coherent sequence. What we loosely call a historical 
time sense is still relatively undeveloped by the time 
pupils move up into secondary schools. We should reflect 
upon these facts when we consider the historical sequences 
assumed in many current religious syllabuses for children 
in the primary school". (Goldman, 1965b, p35.) 
and also by O'Neil and Donovan (1970). 
"Perhaps the broadest concept of all is the notion of 
salvation history. It is a fact that history as such 
is not taught in the primary grades, for a very simple 
and important reason. Young children do not possess a 
sense of history. Although a child can memorise sets of 
historical facts, the notions of temporal dimension, of 
causality, of social forces, and of personal motivations 
are beyond his grasp. Hence he cannot understand history, 
only historical facts. Furthermore, it can legitimately 
be questioned whether he can even really understand an 
historical fact, since isolated data of history have no 
significance apart from an interpretation of their context. 
So we have a strange anomaly: we do not teach American 
history in the fourth grade, but we attempt to teach 
Hebrew history. We do not expect a young child to grasp 
the dilemma of Lincoln, but we present him with the dilemma 
of Abraham." (O'Neil and Donovan, 1970, p83.) 
Clearly, these two writers are writing from within the different 
contexts of British and American schools, but the point they are 
making is very much the same. Much religious teaching is based on 
events which happened a long time ago, and an appreciation of many 
religions depends very much on understanding the relationship and 
sequential ordering of various events which happened at different 
points of time in history. Children, in being taught about 
Christianity, for instance, need not only to be able to appreciate 
the significance now, of events which occurred thousands of years 
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ago, but also need to be able to relate different events which 
occurred at different points of time, within this time span, to 
one another. Quite apart from developing an understanding of the 
concept of historical time, which will allow a consideration of 
historical events to be meaningful, children also require the 
ability to sequentially order events in time in order that their 
relationship, one to the other, may be appreciated. 
These considerations of being able to sequentially order events 
and understanding the concept of historical time, may also be 
related to the problem of children's understanding of religious 
stories, and in this context one may go on to ask two fundamental 
questions. Firstly, might children's understanding of certain 
religious stories be limited by their lack of a concept of historical 
time, within which to place the events of these stories, and thus 
appreciate their significance? Secondly, might children's under-
standing of these stories also be limited by their lack of ability 
to sequentially order the events of the stories in a way which will 
allow them to appreciate their relationship one to the other, and 
thus understand the overall significance of the stories? 
We will return to these two questions later, but first we shall 
consider previous research work which has been done to investigate 
children's developing understanding of the concept of time and their 
ability to sequentially order events within different time spans. 
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5.2 A Review of the Relevant Literature 
There are clearly many aspects to the development of a concept of 
time, and the development of a concept of historical time is only 
one of them. Many of the studies, which have investigated children's 
understanding of time, have concentrated on their knowledge of time 
words, or their ability to tell the time by clocks, and historical 
time has rarely been touched upon. There is, of course, an important 
interrelationship between the different aspects of the time concept, 
and many researchers (e.g. Friedman, 1944, and Flickinger and Rehage, 
1949) have attempted to trace children's development in terms of their 
mastery of the different aspects at different ages. It is noticeable 
in these, and other schemes, that the concepts of historical and 
universal time are usually the last to be acquired and are quoted by 
Flickinger and Rehage, for instance, as not being fully acquired until 
children are approximately 16 years of age. 
The difficulties, which younger children have in conceiving historical 
time, are understandable. This is particularly true when one realises 
that even adults struggle in their construction of mental time schemes. 
This has been shown by studies where adults have been asked to use 
their knowledge of events, which have happened at different dates in 
history, as a basis for such a scheme (Vikainen, 1961). It is 
probably because of the fact that it is such a difficult concept for 
younger children, that there are so few studies which have investigated 
it. The difficulties experienced by the children may also explain some 
of the methodological problems, which appear to have been experienced 
by those who have tried to experiment in this area. 
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A classic study is that of Sturt (1925), in which she studied about 
200 children, aged from 4 to 13. In this study she investigated 
different aspects of the time concept. In one part of this study, 
Sturt attempted to explore the historical time aspect by using items 
that dealt with 'B.C. dates', and others which required temporal 
ordering of historical characters. An example of the materials that 
she used is the 'John - Mary' test. In this test children were given 
the following information: 
"John was born in 1898. 
Mary was born in 1901. 
Who is the older?" 
They were then given the following instruction: 
"I want you to write down just one name, either John or 
Mary, whoever is older." 
Based on the results of this and similar tests, Sturt concluded that 
children only begin to acquire some of the time concepts necessary 
for a study of history, when they are about 10 years of age. 
Several of Sturt's tests were replicated by Bradley (1948), in a 
study in which he actually touched upon the problem of the relation-
ship between children's understanding of the concept of historical 
time and their religious understanding. The following two items are 
abstracted from Bradley's 'Questions' test, which was given as a group 
test to children aged from 8 to 13 years and as an individual test to 
children aged from 5 to 7 years. 
Q.16 "Do you all know who Robin Hood "Tas?" 
(If the answer was a chorus of "No" a few explanatory 
remarks were made about him, such as, "He was a robber 
and lived in the forest in England".) 
Then: "He lived in the year eleven hundred and eighty 
seven (1187)". 
(a) "Was your mother alive then?" 
(b) "Was your grandmother alive then?" 
Q.17 "Was Jesus alive on earth then?" (Bradley, 1948, p68.) 
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Bradley took 75% or more children, at anyone age, answering the 
question correctly, as his criterion for success. He reported 
that 80% of his 7 year olds answered 16(a) correctly, and 83% of 
his 9 year olds answered 16(b) correctly. However, with Question 
17, even the 13 year olds were only able to answer correctly 67% 
of the time so that, for this question, the criterion for success 
was not met by any age group. 
It may, however, be possible that the replies to Question 17 were 
in fact biased by factors other than a lack of understanding of 
historical time. Bradley comments: 
"Question 17 was so designed as to forestall replies based 
on theological dogma, but this seems to have influenced 
most children in view of the low score even for the 13 
year olds. It is possible that many children believe 
Jesus to be alive on earth now; e.g. the writer was told 
of a small girl, who asked, 'Does Jesus live up on the 
hills or down on the flat?'" (Bradley, 1948, p73.) 
Bradley's overall conclusion is of a gradual development of 
understanding different aspects of time between 5 and 13 years 
of age. He suggests that this may begin with an understanding 
of the day "and thereafter succeeds knowledge of progressively 
shorter and longer periods". (Bradley, 1948, p77.) Finally, 
he concludes that: 
"In general, the capacity to understand the conventional 
time-scheme and to use particular time-words correctly 
is later in developing than is usually believed, and 
this is of major significance, particularly in relation 
to the teaching of history. In particular, Oakden and 
Sturt's (1922) conclusion that there is a sudden access 
of time-knowledge between the ages of 10 and 11 is not 
confirmed, and the process is seen to be essentially 
gradual, even and continuous". (Bradley, 1948, p77.) 
The reader may be surprised at this point to have been taken 
through a review of work on the child's conception of time, with 
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no mention of the classic studies of Piaget (1946, 1955). The 
reason for this is that Piaget's studies were almost entirely 
limited to studying the child's appreciation of time in experimental 
situations, which had just taken place. For instance, in a typical 
experiment, two dolls are raced on a table in front of the child. 
The race is started with a click, and because one doll moves faster 
than the other, she is noticeably ahead when the two dolls are 
simultaneously stopped a few seconds later. 
In general, Piaget found that up to 6 years of age, children 
admitted that the dolls started at the same time, but denied both 
that they stopped at the same time and that they were running for 
the same length of time. The children also tended to claim that 
the faster moving doll took longer and stopped later. Then, between 
6 and 7 years of age, the children usually agreed that the dolls 
started and stopped at the same time, but insisted that the faster 
moving doll still took longer. It was not until 7 to 8 years of 
age that the period of movement for each doll was accepted by the 
children as being the same. 
On the basis of the results from experiments such as this one, 
Piaget concluded that up until about 7 or 8 years of age, children's 
concepts of time and space are indistinguishable and that their 
idea of time is intermingled with their ideas of space and spatial 
changes. 
Although Piaget's experiments in this area are exploring aspects of 
children's conception of time, which we are not directly interested 
in at present, his conclusions do suggest a possible explanation for 
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the fact that historical time appears to be such a difficult concept 
for younger children to cope with. If children at these young ages 
rely heavily on cues such as space and spatial changes, on which to 
base time judgments, then they are clearly going to be disadvantaged 
when the periods of time run into years or even centuries! 
Perhaps we can conclude this brief review of the literature on the 
child's conception of time by saying that, although the research in 
this area has lacked an element of experimental rigour, it is 
suggestive of the fact that children even up to the age of 13 or so 
experience considerable difficulties in appreciating the concept of 
historical time. This must, we feel, necessitate a further look at 
the effect this factor has upon the child's religious understanding. 
In our own experiments, we propose to investigate the understanding 
which children in the 6 to 8 year old range have of historical time, 
and then try to relate this understanding to certain problems which 
these children may have with religious materials. We will do this 
in preference to studying historical time from the point of view of 
discovering at what age children fully understand this concept, as 
we consider that an unhelpful and often misleading approach. Before 
children fully understand things, they can often have considerable 
understanding, and even adults spend most of their time dealing with 
concepts which they only partially understand. Thus, to sharpen 
the question to be addressed in this chapter, we shall be looking at 
whether there is any interaction between the partial understanding of 
time, which children aged from 6 to 8 years have, and the problems 
which they may encounter with certain religious materials. 
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5.3 Some Exploratory Experiments 
At the start of this part of the investigation, we were only too 
aware of the problems of designing experiments which would be at an 
appropriate level of difficulty for children in this age range and 
which would provide meaningful results concerning their developing 
understanding of the concept of time. We therefore decided, as a 
first step, to tryout on a limited basis, various materials which 
we felt might be useful in providing information about children's 
understanding of time and also their ability to order events in 
time. 
These exploratory experiments were made up of five short tests, 
which were all administered to groups of 6 year olds (5 boys,S 
girls), 7 year olds (5 boys, 5 girls) and 8 year olds (5 boys,S 
girls). They were administered in a random order from one subject 
to the next, but the series of tests was always preceded by a short 
time of discussion between the child and the experimenter in order 
that a certain amount of rapport might be established. We shall 
now give a brief description of each of the five tests: 
1. The Meals Test 
In this test the children were asked three questions: 
a. Tell me what the different meals are that you have 
during the day? 
b. What order do they come in? 
c. At what time do you have them? 
In section a. a certain amount of prompting was used in order to 
steer the children away from specific dishes (e.g. meat and potatoes, 
baked beans on toast, etc.) to general names (e.g. breakfast, lunch, 
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tea, dinner, etc.). The other two questions appeared to be under-
stood fairly well. 
2. The Seasons of the Year Test 
In this test the children were asked two questions. 
a. What are the different seasons of the year? 
b. What order do they come in? 
Again, prompting was used in~. to ensure the child knew the correct 
names before being asked ~. 
3. The Faces Test 
This test is derived from, and is similar to, Bradley's (1948) 
'Picture Arrangement' test. The children were presented with a 
set of five photographs of a baby boy, a boy, a youth, a middle-
aged man and an old man and were told that they were all pictures 
of people which "were taken one day recently". They were then 
asked the following: 
a. Put them in order, from the youngest to the oldest. 
b. Who would have been born the longest time ago? 
c. When E (the youth) was born, which of the others 
would have been alive then? 
4. The Universality of Time Test 
This test was, again, a slightly modified version of one used by 
Sturt (1925) and Bradley (1948). Its aim was to test whether the 
children's conception of time encompassed the idea of time being 
the same everywhere. 
First each child was asked: 
a. What is the time now? 
If they were unable to respond correctly to this first question, 
then they were prompted with the correct time by the experimenter. 
Next, they were asked: 
b.1 What is the time in Dundee now? 
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If b.l failed to elicit a response, a subsidiary prompt question 
b.2 was used. 
b.2 If you were in Dundee now and you looked at a clock, 
what time would it say? 
(Dundee was a local town which was well known to all the children, 
as it was the main shopping centre for the area.) 
5. The Historical Time and the Bible Test 
This last series of questions was designed specifically to explore 
the children's understanding of historical time, and also attempted 
to relate this to their knowledge of biblical events. 
The series of questions proceeded as follows: 
a.l What is the longest time ago that you know anything 
about? 
If the children limited their responses to events within their own 
personal lifetime, this question was followed by a subsidiary prompt 
question: 
a.2 Do you know about things that happened a long time ago, 
even before you were born? 
b. How long ago did the stories in the Bible happen? 
c. How long ago was it that Jesus lived on the earth? 
The wording of £. was designed to try to avoid responses referring 
to the present day spiritual life of Jesus (e.g. 'Jesus is alive 
today'). The intention was to test the child's understanding of the 
time lag between the physical life of Jesus recorded in the Gospel 
narratives and the present time. 
d. Is there anyone alive now who was alive then? 
Prior to e. each child was asked to name a character from the Old 
Testament of the Bible. The name of this character was then used in 
the following question: 
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e. Did he/she live before, after, or at the same time 
as Jesus? 
Clearly these questions were of an exploratory nature, and to respond 
correctly in some cases the children needed a small amount of biblical 
knowledge. However, the school timetable did include regular religious 
education classes as well as worship sessions and so it seemed a 
reasonable assumption to make, that the children would all have had 
the necessary opportunity to master the historical sequencing of these 
events, assuming that their conception of historical time and their 
ability to sequentially order events in time allowed for this. 
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5.4 Results of the Exploratory Experiments 
Because of the small samples used in these exploratory experiments, 
any conclusions drawn from the results can only be of a tentative 
nature. For this reason we will not present a formal analysis of 
the data, but we will however discuss it in summary form, both in 
terms of the success of the individual tests in eliciting information 
about the children's concepts of time and their ability to sequentially 
order events in time, and in terms of any indications of developmental 
changes which were observed. 
In the 'Meals Test' all of the children were able to name and order 
correctly the main meals of the day. However, the final question 
about the timing of these meals was only answered completely 
correctly by all ten of the 8 year olds and eight of the ten 7 year 
olds, and four of the ten 6 year olds. 
The 'Seasons of the Year Test' was answered correctly by about two-
thirds of the children (8 x 10 year olds, 6 x 7 year olds and 6 x 6 
year olds). The fact that many of the children were able to order 
the meals sequentially and not the seasons, suggests that these two 
tests were partly tests of memory or rote learning rather than tests 
of the ability to order sequentially events in time. 
The 'Faces Test' was done almost perfectly by all the children (only 
two 6 year olds gave the wrong order). In fact, the children seemed 
to find this test particularly easy and some were even amused at 
being asked to do something which seemed so simple. Again, one could 
validly question how much the children needed to understand the 
concept of historical time to be able to perform this task correctly. 
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The 'Universality of Time Test' was answered correctly by about two-
thirds of the children (8 x 8 year olds, 6 x 7 year olds and 6 x 6 
year olds). Many commented that although the time was the same in 
Dundee, it was not everywhere in the world. America and Australia 
were frequently mentioned as places where the time would be different. 
The 'Historical Time and the Bible Test' was probably the most 
productive and was also probably the nearest to testing the aspects 
of the concept of historical time, which we were most interested in. 
In response to question ~., the majority of the children gave details 
of events which had happened within their own experience a year or 
two previously. Even when they were given the extra prompt question, 
~.2, quite a few could not improve upon this, and most of the others 
responded with "hundreds of years ago" or "centuries and centuries 
ago". A few mentioned events which had happened before they were 
born. (The Second World War, for instance.) One rather precocious 
8 year old said that he wasn't sure if he could put an exact date to 
the creation! 
The responses to questions ~. and~. were even more vague. The 
majority of the children seemed to have no idea at all where to place 
the Bible stories on any sort of time scale, and those that did respond 
named any number of years from "last year" to "millions of years ago". 
Only one child out of the thirty (the same one that could not put a 
date to creation) gave an estimate of how long ago Jesus lived on the 
Earth, which was anywhere in the region of 2,000 years ago. 
All of this may sound somewhat anecdotal, but it does seem to go some 
way towards confirming our suspicion that children in this age range 
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will have great difficulty in appreciating the historical time aspect 
of the religious events about which they are taught. 
The responses to question~. provided even more evidence along these 
lines. All thirty children were able to name an Old Testament 
character (usually Adam, Eve, Noah or Moses), although a few needed 
a little prompting or correction. However, when asked whether this 
character lived before, after, or at the same time as Jesus, their 
responses revealed considerable confusion. Only three 6 year olds, 
three 7 year olds and four 8 year olds got this right, which is no 
higher success rate than could have been obtained by chance. Thus, 
on the basis of this limited evidence, one is led to suppose that 
few, if any, of these children had any understanding of the temporal 
relationship between the life of Jesus and the events recorded in 
the Old Testament of the Bible. Amongst a group of children who did 
appear to have a certain amount of knowledge about the Bible, this 
observation does seem to be of some importance. 
Thus, these exploratory experiments do confirm our suspicions about 
the influence of the children's continuing developing concept of 
historical time on their ability to appreciate the relationship 
between various religious events. However, those tests which were 
designed to test the children's ability to sequentially order events 
may have been less successful. By working with events which were 
well known to the children (e.g. 'Daily Meals'), it seems as though 
we may have been purely testing rote learning. Thus, the next series 
of experiments was designed to test sequential ordering ability in 
more depth. 
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5.5 The Sequential Ordering Experiments 
The problem of sequential ordering can be reduced to the level of 
three events, say A, Band C, which have happened in a particular 
order at different points in time. The question is to what extent 
can the child conceive of this sequential ordering and thus relate 
these events one to the other. One way of exploring this is to 
ask the child questions, the answers to which depend on an under-
standing of the correct sequential ordering of these events. 
Subjects 
The subjects used in all of the experiments to be reported in the 
remainder of this chapter were the same two groups of 16 x 6 year 
olds (8 boys and 8 girls) and 16 x 8 year olds (8 boys and 8 girls). 
The group of 6 year olds had a mean age of 6 years 6 months and 
were all between 6 years 4 months and 6 years 8 months. The group 
of 8 year olds had a mean age of 8 years 6 months and were all between 
8 years 2 months and 8 years 9 months. 
In order to minimise any effect caused by the order of the presen-
tation of the different experiments, these were presented in a 
random order to each individual child. These experiments have been 
divided up into two groups and the details of the experiments within 
each group will now be described, along with the presentation of 
their results. 
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5.6 The Races Tests 
The 'Races Tests' involved presenting each child with the results 
of several different races between four children. This was done 
by showing each child a card with some results written on it and 
then reading these out to that child, allowing the child to follow 
on the card while the results were being read out. After the 
results had been read out, each child was asked a series of three 
questions, which were designed to test whether the child had grasped 
the sequential ordering of the results of that particular race. The 
children were perfectly free to refer back to the results card while 
answering these questions. 
There were two sets of questions, which could be asked after each 
set of results, and half of the children were asked one set of 
questions and the other half the other set. The children were 
allocated to the different sets of questions in a random way. The 
only constraint being that half of each age group were given one 
set, and the other half the other set. 
1. Race One 
In a race: Peter came before John 
and John came before Neil 
and Neil came before Keith. 
Questions (Set A) 
la. Who won between Keith and John? 
lb. Did Neil finish before Peter? 
lc. Did John finish before Neil? 
Questions (Set B) 
la. Who won between John and Keith? 
lb. Did Peter finish before Neil? 
lc. Did Neil finish before John? 
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It can be seen that the difference between the two sets of questions 
was purely one of reversing the names used in each question. The aim 
of this was firstly, to control against children who might tend to 
guess either the first or second name as the correct answer and 
secondly, to see if this affected the difficulty of the questions 
asked. 
2. Race Two 
In a race: Jane came after Linda 
and Linda came after Mary 
and Mary came after Susan. 
Questions (Set A) 
2a. Who won between Linda and Susan? 
2b. Did Mary finish before Jane? 
2c. Did Linda finish before Mary? 
Questions (Set B) 
2a. Who won between Susan and Linda? 
2b. Did Jane finish before Mary? 
2c. Did Mary finish before Linda? 
It can be seen that the main difference between Race One and Race 
Two, apart from the use of girls' names instead of boys' names, was 
the use of 'after' in the presentation of the results rather than 
'before'. Also, Race Two differs from the other two races by the 
fact that the b. and c. questions are asked in terms of 'before', 
whereas the results are given in terms of 'after'. 
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3. Race Three 
In a race: Jill came after Wendy 
and Fiona came after Jill 
and Anne came after Fiona. 
Questions (Set A) 
3a. Who won between Fiona and Wendy? 
3b. Did Wendy finish after Anne? 
3c. Did Fiona finish before Jill? 
Questions (Set B) 
3a. Who won between Wendy and Fiona? 
3b. Did Anne finish after Wendy? 
3c. Did Jill finish before Fiona? 
Race three differs from Races One and Two in the order in which 
the names are presented in the results.. In Races One and Two, 
the names were presented in the same order in which they finished, 
going from first to last in Race One and last to first in Race Two. 
In Race Three, the names have to be rearranged to give the correct 
order. 
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5.7 Results of the Races Tests 
TABLE 54 Number of Correct Responses From 6 and 8 Year Olds 
To Set A and Set B Questions About the Three Races 
6 year olds (N=16) 8 year olds (N=16) 
Set A Set B Set A Set B TOTALS Questions Questions Questions Questions 
Race One 15* 16 21 17 69 
Race Two 6 12 8 9 35 
Race Three 16 10 20 21 67 
TOTALS 37 38 49 47 171 
(* Each cell is out of a maximum of 24) 
Discussion of the Results 
There are four major observations which may be made about the 
results of these experiments: 
1. There was no significant difference between the number of correct 
responses given to the Set A and the Set B questions. (X 2 = 0, with 
1 degree of freedom, not significant.) 
2. The number of correct responses given to the questions asked 
about the results of Race Two was significantly less than the .number 
of correct responses given to the questions asked about Races One 
and Three (X 2 = 31.0, with 1 degree of freedom, significant at the 
.01 level). 
3. Overall, the 8 year olds gave a greater number of correct responses 
than could have been expected by chance (probability of 96 or more 
correct, by chance, out of 144 <.01 by the normal approximation 
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to the Binomial Distribution), whereas the 6 year olds did not 
(probability of 75 or more correct out of 144 by chance = 0.32, 
by the normal approximation to the Binomial Distribution). 
4. Overall, the 8 year olds gave a significantly higher number of 
correct responses than did the 6 year olds (X2 = 5.76, with 1 degree 
of freedom, significant at the .05 level). 
Thus, it would seem as though even these apparently quite simple 
sequential ordering tasks were generally beyond the ability of the 
6 year olds and were only beginning to be mastered by the 8 year 
old children. These results confirm the suspicion which we had in 
discussing the results of the previous series of exploratory 
experiments. It does now appear likely that the high levels of 
performance that were recorded in the previous experiments might 
have been the result of rote learning. By using novel situations 
in this series of experiments, we have been able to demonstrate the 
difficulties which young children can have with sequential ordering 
tasks. 
One other interesting aspect of the results of this series of experi-
ments, was the difference that there was between the levels of correct 
performance on the three different tests. This was based on the fact 
that the children in both age groups appeared to find Race Two con-
siderably harder to order than Races One and Three. As the questions 
asked in all three cases were of a similar nature, this difference 
must have been a consequence of the way in which the results of the 
three races were differently presented. Intuitively, one might have 
expected the results of Race One to have been easier to order than 
the results of the other two races, because of the fact that the 
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names were actually given in the correct order. (Peter came before 
John, John came before Neil, etc.) However, there was clearly more 
to the difference than this. Race Three, which was apparently 
ordered just as successfully as Race One, only differed from Race Two 
in that its results started with the first and second finishers in 
the race, whereas the Race Two results started with the finishers, 
who had come last and next to last. This must lead us to conclude 
that although the children did not appear to have any trouble coping 
with individual pairs of results, which were reversed (e.g. John came 
after Peter, instead of Peter came before John), their performance 
was seriously affected when both the individual pairs of results and 
the order of presentation of the individual pairs were reversed (i.e. 
gave later finishers before previous finishers). 
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5.8 The Biblical Events Tests 
The 'Biblical Events Tests' involved presenting each child with a 
sequence of biblical events. These were mainly lists of names of 
people who lived at different times during biblical history, although 
in one case actual events were used. Again, the children were shown 
a card, this time with the order of events written on it, and then, 
after they had read these, they were asked three questions to determine 
whether or not they had acquired the sequential order of the events. 
As before, the children were free to refer back to the card while 
answering the questions. 
Once again, there were two sets of questions which were used, and 
half of the children answered one set and the other half the other 
set. The children were allocated to the two different sets of 
questions in the same random way as before. 
1. Biblical Events Test One 
In the Bible, it says that: 
Adam lived hundreds of years before Noah 
and Noah lived hundreds of years before Moses 
and Moses lived hundreds of years before Paul. 
Questions (Set A) 
lao Who lived first, Paul or Noah? 
lb. Did Moses live before Adam? 
lc. Did Noah live after Moses? 
Questions (Set B) 
lao Who lived first, Noah or Paul? 
lb. Did Adam live before Moses? 
lc. Did Moses live after Noah? 
192 
As in the Races Tests, the purpose of the two different sets of 
questions was merely to change around the order in which the names 
were given in the questions. Again, the aim of this was to control 
against those who might tend to always guess the first or second name 
as the correct answer, and also to see if this change affected the 
difficulty of the questions asked in any way. It was also possible 
in this test to introduce the concept of an actual time span (i.e. 
hundreds of years). 
2. Biblical Events Test Two 
In the Bible, it says that: 
Rachel lived hundreds of years after Eve 
and Ruth lived hundreds of years after Rachel 
and Mary lived hundreds of years after Ruth. 
Questions (Set A) 
2a. Who lived first, Rachel or Mary? 
2b. Did Ruth live after Eve? 
2c. Did Rachel live before Ruth? 
Questions (Set B) 
2a. Who lived first, Mary or Rachel? 
2b. Did Eve live after Ruth? 
2c. Did Ruth live before Rachel? 
Apart from the different set of names, Test Two is different from 
Test One in that it employs "after" instead of "before" in the 
sequential order. 
193 
3. Biblical Events Test Three 
In the Bible, it says that: 
Jacob died before Samson was born 
and Samson died before David was born 
and David died before Peter was born. 
Questions (Set A) 
3a. Who lived first, Peter or Samson? 
3b. Did David live before Jacob? 
3c. Did Samson live before David? 
Questions (Set B) 
3a. Who lived first, Samson or Peter? 
3b. Did Jacob live before David? 
3c. Did David live before Samson? 
Test Three introduces a sequential order in terms of 'dying' and 
'being born'. Thus, the major difference between this and Test One 
is that the biblical characters are placed in a sequential order by 
this method rather than by living 'hundreds of years' apart • 
. 4. Biblical Events Test Four 
In the Bible it says that: 
Benjamin was born after Cain died 
and Saul was born after Benjamin died 
and James was born after Saul died. 
Questions (Set A) 
4a. Who lived first, James or Cain? 
4b. Did Benjamin live before Saul? 
4c. Did James live before Saul? 
Questions (Set B) 
4a. Who lived first, Cain or James? 
4b. Did Saul live before Benjamin? 
4c. Did Saul live before James? 
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Test Four is a variation on Test Three in that it still orders 
the biblical characters in terms of 'dying' and 'being born', but 
this time it does this by the use of 'after' rather than 'before'. 
It therefore has the same relationship to Test Three as Test Two 
had to Test One. 
5. Biblical Events Test Five 
A long time ago Joseph was put in prison in Egypt. 
Hundreds of years after that the walls of Jericho 
fell down. 
Hundreds of years after that David fought Goliath. 
Hundreds of years after that Daniel was put in the 
Lions' Den. 
Questions (Set A and B) 
Sa. Could Daniel have been at Jericho when the 
walls fell down? 
Sb. Was Joseph put in prison before Daniel was 
put in the Lions' Den? 
Sc. Could Joseph have seen David fighting Goliath? 
This time, the sequential order consists of four isolated biblical 
events. Again, they are ordered in terms of being 'hundreds of 
years' after each other. Thus, there is a close similarity between 
this test and Test Two. However, the questions asked on this 
occasion are of a somewhat different nature. As these questions 
could not be reversed in the same way in which the others were, 
they were used in exactly the same form in Set A and in Set B. 
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5.9 Results of the Biblical Events Tests 
TABLE 55 Number of Correct Responses From 6 and 8 Year Olds 
To Set A and Set B Questions About the Biblical Events 
6 year olds (N=16) 8 year olds (N=16) 
Set A Set B Set A Set B TOTALS Questions Questions Questions Questions 
Test One 16* 18 20 24 78 
Test Two 15 13 20 18 66 
Test Three 12 17 21 23 73 
Test Four 16 15 21 22 74 
Test Five 15 17 18 21 71 
TOTALS 74 80 100 108 362 
(* Each cell is out of a maximum of 24) 
Discussion of the Results 
Once again, there are four major observations which can be made 
about the results of these experiments: 
1. There was no significant difference between the number of correct 
responses given to the Set A and the Set B questions (X2 = 1.90, with 
1 degree of freedom, not significant). 
2. There was no significant difference between the number of correct 
responses given to each of the five tests (X2 = 4.35, with 4 degrees 
of freedom, not significant). 
3. Overall, the 8 year olds gave a greater number of correct responses 
than could have been expected by chance (probability of 208 or more 
correct, by chance, out of 240 <.01 by the normal approximation to the 
Binomial Distribution). However, this time the 6 year olds also gave 
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a greater number of correct responses than could have been expected 
by chance (probability of 154 or more correct, by chance, out of 
240 <.01 by the normal approximation to the Binomial Distribution). 
4. The number of correct responses given by the 8 year olds was 
significantly greater than the number given by the 6 year olds 
(X2 = 4.64, with 1 degree of freedom, significant at the .05 level). 
Although the two groups of 6 and 8 year old children produced 
significantly more correct responses to the questions concerning 
the Biblical Events Tests than would be expected by chance, it is 
noticeable that the 8 year olds performed significantly better than 
the 6 year olds and also that the 6 year olds generally made quite 
a large number of incorrect responses. In considering the perfor-
mance of the 6 year olds on these tests, one inevitably must ask 
what aspect of the task was difficult for them. In a similar set 
of developmental experiments known as the transitive inference 
experiments (where the child is given information of the type A>B 
and B>C and has to infer that A>C) , there has been much discussion 
over why children fail to give the correct responses (Braine, 1964; 
Smedslund, 1965; Bryant and Trabasso, 1971; Halford and Galloway, 
1977). One of the major issues in this controversy is whether or 
not the children can actually remember the information which they 
are given at the time when they are asked the questions. Bryant and 
Trabasso (1971) claimed that as long as 4 and 5 year old children 
could remember the information given to them, then they would be 
capable of transitive inference. Support for this view was found 
in the work of Roodin and Gruen (1970), who used a procedure similar 
to our own, in which they made the given information visible to the 
children at the time when they were asked questions about it. This 
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procedure did seem to improve the performance of very young children 
on the task, but whether or not memory is the crucial problem which 
children have with this task is still very much under question 
(de Boysson-Bardies and O'Regan, 1973; Harris and Bassett, 1975; and 
Halford and Galloway, 1977). 
Throughout developmental psychology there are problems of diagnosis. 
At one level one attempts to determine whether a child has or has 
not acquired a certain cognitive ability, and at a higher level 
(Smedslund, 1969) one attempts to determine what the mental processes 
are that are involved in successfully solving the task. Flavell (1977) 
describes this later problem as the gap between problem presentation 
and subject's response. In respect to transitive inference, Trabasso 
(1975) has made some steps towards describing these intermediate 
mental processes. He has proposed that transitive inference problems 
are usually solved by the subject constructing an internal image-like 
representation of the entire array of relationships. Thus, if the 
subject is told that A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E (A, B, C, D and E would 
commonly be five differently coloured sticks), then he would construct 
an image-like representation of the entire array A>B>C>D>E. When 
subsequently questioned about any relationship between members of 
this array, the subject would then be able to successfully read the 
correct response off his internal representation. Unfortunately, 
this process is not a complete description of the way that all 
people solve transitive inference problems; however, it does provide 
a useful model by which we might expect children to attempt to solve 
the Biblical Events Tests and the Races Tests. It also serves as an 
explanation of how a concept of historical time might be constructed 
by the child. Without such an internal representation, it is easy to 
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see how correct solutions to sequential ordering tests and also 
tests requiring a historical time concept are infrequently obtained 
from young children. 
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5.10 Summary and Conclusions about Historical Time and Sequential 
Ordering 
In this chapter we have studied the results of a series of experi-
ments relating to children's understanding of historical time and 
also their ability to sequentially order events in time. In these 
studies we have seen how 6 year old and, to some extent, 8 year old 
children had difficulties with some fairly simple experimental 
situations which required them to have acquired certain basic cogni-
tive abilities. Although not all of these tests were directly related 
to the children's understanding of religious concepts and the general 
development of their religious thinking, we would argue that without 
these abilities the children's understanding of any religion based on 
historical events must be severely limited. It would also seem that 
these children would have difficulty understanding s~ories (religious 
Q 
or otherwise) if the structure of the stories was such as to require 
them to construct a sequential order of events in order to understand 
the overall meaning of the story. Recent support for this latter 
conclusion can be found in the work of Botvin and Sutton Smith (1977), 
who have identified the retention of sequence as a crucial problem 
affecting children's understanding of fantasy narratives. 
It would therefore seem as though we have identified a basic cognitive 1 
ability, which is an important constituent of the overall cognitive 
development which allows mature religious thinking to take place. 
Without the ability to sequentially order events and place them within 
a continuum of historical time, children have to rely on a type of 
rote learning of the order and relationship between events, and this 
must be a real obstacle in the way of their developing understanding 
of religion. 
lThe extent to which this apparent cogn1tLve ability may depend upon 
linguistic factors remains an open question. 
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This finding can be seen as adding considerable support to the 
general approach which has been taken throughout the studies 
reported in this thesis. Brown and Desforges (1977) in an article, 
which was critical of Piaget's attempt to create a content-free 
theory of cognitive development, have suggested that the most 
fruitful way forward is to study the particular cognitive skills 
and procedures which are deployed in particular settings. They 
cite Bruner (1973), Klahr and Wallace (1973), and Schaeffer et al 
(1974) as examples of this approach and our own study can also be 
viewed within this context. What we appear to have identified are 
a set of skills, to do with sequential ordering and appreciating 
the concept of historical time, which are most influential in 
determining children's level of understanding of religious ideas, 
concepts and stories. We are not claiming that these skills are not 
relevant to other areas of children's thinking, but they will clearly 
be much more important in some areas than in other areas. Their 
central importance in the field of religious thinking would make us 
want to agree with the conclusion of'Brown and Desforges " ••• that 
initially we must abandon the search for general structures and set 
about producing taxonomies of behaviour for specific areas of the 
curriculum. In the long term, when sufficient taxonomies have been 
established, we may look again for general structures, but to start, 
as Piaget does, with a search for such generality has proved to be 
inappropriate." (Brown and Desforges, 1977, p16). 
What is needed in the study of the development of religious thinking 
in children is not further attempts to explain observations solely 
in terms of Piaget's general theory of cognitive development. A 
much more fruitful approach, at this stage, would be one which built 
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on the findings reported in this and the earlier chapters, in an 
attempt to construct a taxonomy of the skills involved with and 
appropriate to the specific area of the development of the religious 
thinking in children. Only then will we be in a position to see how 
much overlap there is between these skills and the ones that are 
relevant to other areas of children's thinking. 
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C HAP T E R S I X 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Summar~ 
In a review of the existing literature on the development of 
religious thinking in children, in Chapter Two, criticisms were 
levelled at the existing theoretical models and at the research 
methodologies upon which they were constructed. Elsewhere 
(Murphy, 1977b and 1978a) it has been suggested that the 
deficiencies in the existing theoretical models may largely be 
the result of a very restricted methodological approach to this 
problem. It has also been proposed that the implementation of 
new research approaches might be a profitable way of moving 
towards a greater theoretical understanding of these develop-
mental processes. 
Taking a broader view of this general area of psychological 
research, it was observed that the psychology of religion as a 
whole had received scant attention in the past, in comparison 
with other areas of psychology. Although this clearly has some-
thing to do with the problems which are particular to work in 
this area, it does seem as though this branch of research could 
do with being brought into line with current developments in 
other areas of psychology, rather than lagging behind them as 
seems to have been the tendency in the past. Scobie (1977) and 
Francis (1978) have recently debated about whether a rev~val was 
on the way, in the field of the psychology of religion. It could 
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be argued that such a thing will depend primarily upon researchers 
in this area catching up with and utilising developments in other 
areas of psychology. In the studies presented in the preceding 
chapters, it has certainly been the intention to utilise knowledge 
and research methodologies developed in other areas, and the debts 
owed in this respect have been acknowledged where this was appropriate. 
In the review of previous research into the development of religious 
thinking in children, it was noted that many of the studies were 
based on a methodology of asking children open-ended questions, and, 
in most cases, these questions related to biblical stories, which 
the children had just been told. Although it was clear that this 
general approach could produce interesting results, it did seem as 
though the use of this rather restricted methodology might have led 
to a somewhat restricted understanding of this area of children's 
development. 
In the series of experiments reported in Chapter Three, this widely 
used stories and questions methodology was employed, and by varying 
a number of factors a test was made of the robustness of the 
previously reported results. Many earlier researchers in this 
area (e.g. Beechick, 1974; Goldman, 1962; and Peatling, 1973) had 
suggested that underlying children's responses to questions about 
biblical stories were certain fundamental cognitive developmental 
factors. Furthermore, they had suggested that the type of response 
which could be expected from children in these situations would 
depend almost entirely upon the particular stage of cognitive 
development, which the children had reached at that particular time. 
Our own results went some way towards confirming our suspicion that 
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this may be an over simplified view of this developmental process. 
In fact, our own results tended to show that there were a variety 
of factors which affected the way that the children responded to 
the questions which we asked concerning the particular set of 
biblical parables which we used. The parable itself, the form of 
language it was narrated in, and the way in which the children's 
understanding of it was tested, all appeared to be extremely 
important factors in this respect. Also, the great amount of 
variability which could be produced in the results by varying any 
of these factors suggested that the results were not merely 
dependent on stage-related cognitive developmental factors. 
The recently reported child development work of Donaldson (1978) 
and her associates in Edinburgh, carries a similar message to our 
own findings in respect of the fact that they, too, showed how 
important the actual structure of the experimental situation is in 
determining the outcome of developmental studies. Donaldson levels 
some very telling criticisms 'at many of the classic Piagetian 
developmental tests, showing, for example, that a slight change in 
the standard type of class inclusion question - "Are there more 
black cows or more COWs?" to "Are there more black cows or more 
sleeping cows?" has a considerable effect on children's responses. 
The particular example quoted is one of a series of experiments, 
conducted by James McGarrigle, which suggest that many of the con-
sistently found class inclusion effects may be more a result of the 
strangely contrived format of this particular Piagetian task than 
of the supposed cognitive developmental changes which it is used to 
support. 
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Donaldson and her associates demonstrate, in a number of different 
examples, that slight variations,in Piagetian tasks, which are 
normally made with the intention of making it easier for the 
children to understand exactly what the experimenter requires, can 
considerably affect the performance levels of children from varying 
age groups on these tasks. Donaldson considers that the reason for 
this is that it is unrealistic to consider that a problem can be 
disembedded from the context in which it is presented to the child. 
Thus, minor changes in the wording of questions (as demonstrated by 
the example already quoted from McGarrigle's experiments), or changes 
in the way in which a problem is presented, are, in fact, important 
contextual aspects of that problem, which can considerably influence 
children's performance. A good example of a contextual change in 
the presentation of a problem is to be found in the 'hiding games' 
experiment of Hughes and Donaldson (1979). This experiment was based 
on the 'mountain task' of Piaget, which was used by Piaget to demon-
strate that children below the age of 6 or 7 years are highly egocentric 
and cannot take account of another person's viewpoint (Piaget, 1926; 
Piaget and Inhelder, 1956). In Piaget's task the child is confronted 
with a model of three mountains, each of which is a different colour, 
and a doll is placed so that it is looking at the mountains from a 
different position. The child is shown a set of pictures of the 
mountains taken from different angles and is asked to choose the 
picture which shows what the doll sees. Piaget and Inhelder found 
that children below the age of about 8 years were unable to do this, 
and there was a distinct tendency for children below the age of 6 or 
7 to choose the picture showing their own point of view. This 
finding has been replicated several times by Aeb1i (1967), Dodwel1 
(1963), and Garner and Plant (1972). 
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Hughes and Donaldson changed the context of this task and presented 
it to children as a hiding game, in which they used models to re-
present a situation where a boy was trying to hide, within various 
configurations of walls, from a policeman who was looking for him. 
In order to solve the task correctly, in each case, the children 
needed to take account of what the policeman (or policemen, in some 
of the cases) could see. Hughes and Donaldson found that very few 
3 or 4 year old children had any difficulty with this task and were 
able to conclude that they had been able to "reveal the presence of 
well co-ordinated, "decentred" thinking in 3 and 4 year old children." 
(Hughes and Donaldson, 1979, p138). They go on to discuss why 
children who fail the mountains task can be so successful on their 
task, and suggest 'reasons such as the visual complexity of the array 
in the mountains task, and the fact that with their task children 
immediately grasped what they had to do. As we have already argued 
in Chapter One, there are close similarities between the position 
of Donaldson, and her co-workers, and the positions of Bryant (1974) 
and Brown and Desforges (1977), all of whom are challenging Piaget 
on the basis of the fact that his experimental results often depend 
on the particular contexts of his widely used tasks. 
The parallel which emerges with the work presented here is one of 
challenging existing theoretical positions by varying the experi-
mental methodologies commonly used to provide supporting evidence 
for them. If a theory is robust it should be capable of dealing 
with results from any variety of experimental situations, let alone 
those derived from slight variations of the same situations, and at 
the present time it would seem as though many stage development 
theories (including those of Piaget and Goldman) are susceptible to 
such a scrutiny. 
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There are many reasons why it 1S unfortunate that research into 
the development of children's religious thinking has revolved so 
much around studies investigating children's responses to questions 
about religious stories. The fact that this has been the case must 
surely have something to do with the way that religious education 
has been taught in schools in the past, but this approach has 
certainly narrowed the research efforts into what we consider to 
have been a most misleading and unproductive area. The whole field 
of children's understanding of stories is a largely untapped one 
(recent work by Applebee, 1978; Mandler and Johnson, 1977; and 
Lawrenson, 1978 may mark a step towards the end of this 
situation), which itself presents ~ifficulties, and by their very 
nature, stories present children with a whole variety of problems 
which are extremely difficult to separate out. 
The child has to be able to attend to the story while it is being 
read. He also needs to understand enough of the language used in 
each phrase or sentence to be able to form an understanding of the 
meaning of that part of the story. He then has to piece together 
the elements of the story so that he can form an appreciation of 
the development of the story and its structure as a whole. He will 
also be relying on his existing knowledge and understanding of the 
matters dealt with in the story in order to enhance his understanding 
of the way they are described in this context. After all of this, 
the child will need to understand the experimenter's questions and 
be able to respond to them in a way which the experimenter will 
understand, before his level of understanding of the story can be 
measured. Hence, any answer which a child might give to a question 
about a story may be influenced by a number of different variables. 
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Whichever technique is used for testing the child's understanding 
of the story, it will be extremely difficult to determine which of 
these variables is, in fact, influencing the child's responses. 
Thus, a major disadvantage with dealing purely with the under-
standing of religious stories is that one is not only studying 
the development of a child's religious thinking, but a number of 
other important variables all at the same time. 
In Chapter Two, we highlighted an inevitable problem which faces 
almost any investigation which relates to children's cognitive 
development; that is, the complex relationship between language 
and cognition. The dilemma here, was whether cognitive develop-
ment may be regarded as being so dependent on language acquisition 
that one could assume that one was studying cognitive development 
when one was studying usage and comprehension of language, or 
whether one has to regard them as separate and only loosely 
related entities which have independent developmental processes 
of their own. The conclusion that we reached was that it would 
be unsafe to conclude that language and cognition are entirely 
interrelated, with one necessarily being dependent on the other 
and with there being no possibility of independent developments 
taking place. Because of this, it was one of the aims of the 
studies reported in Chapters Four and Five to try, as far as was 
possible, to investigate separately various cognitive and linguistic 
(we concentrated largely on semantic) factors, which might indepen-
dently affect the development of children's religious thinking. It 
is hoped that these studies will mark the start of a new approach 
to studying the development of religious thinking in children and 
the recent production of a standardised. test of religious language 
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comprehension by Turner (1978) is at least one indication that such 
a change has now started to take place. 
The studies reported in Chapter Four utilised Kelly's (1955) 
triadic comparisons technique in a way which had been suggested 
by Miller (1967) as being suitable for use as a means of studying 
semantic development. A number of groups of words, most of which 
had obvious religious significance, were studied and by an analysis 
of the children's triadic selections and the justifications given 
for making these selections, a greater understanding of the way 1n 
which they associated, and differentiated between, the meanings of 
the words was obtained. These results were set alongside others 
obtained from the application of Eve Clark's (1971) opposites test 
to two other groups of words, which again included a number of words 
of religious significance. The results from the opposites test were, 
however, limited by the fact that they merely reflected whether the 
children in the two different age groups had or had not acquired 
the semantic feature of polar opposition (Clark, E.V., 1973) for the 
various pairs of words studied. Although this in itself was an 
important aspect of the children's semantic development for these 
words, it has to be viewed alongside the many other aspects of that 
same development which are of similar importance. The data from the 
triadic comparisons test were also limited to a certain extent, in 
that they tended to reflect on the children's understanding of the 
meaning of various words by relating those words to certain other 
prescribed groups of words. Although this information gives us an 
insight into another aspect of the child's semantic development for 
those words, it is important to establish that this, too, is only 
giving a partial picture of their overall semantic development, as 
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defined by the individual meaning attached by the children to each 
of these words. In other words, we were not obtaining an exhaustive 
view of the children's lexical competence, but were attaining some 
knowledge about relevant aspects of it through a straightforward 
study of performance on this particular test. We considered it 
unlikely that it would be possible to study children's understanding 
of the meaning of religious words without studying it through use 
and, therefore, aligned ourselves somewhat to the Wittgensteinian 
position that the best way to study meaning is to study it through 
use. In this case, use was studied through the justifications given 
for pairing various words together. 
Through the data from the Triads experiments, it was possible to 
get a considerable insight into various aspects of the understanding 
of the meaning of certain religious words, which the three groups of 
6, 8 and 10 year old children had acquired. This technique seemed 
to be most successful in producing results which would have been 
difficult to obtain through direct questioning of the children. The 
fact that even the 6 year old children related the individual words 
to one another in all but one of the six groups of words, provided 
a valuable opportunity to explore a revealing aspect of their reli-
gious thinking. When one bears in mind that according to Goldman 
(1962) children of this age still have approximately seven or eight 
years to go before they reach the stage of being capable of fully 
religious thinking, then these results become all the more fascinating. 
These particular children mayor may not have been capable of the 
level of abstract thinking about religious ideas and concepts which 
Goldman equated with mature religious thinking, but what is clear is 
that they were capable of some kind of religious thinking and their 
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understanding of the meaning of various religious words was clearly 
going through a state of development and change. 
In Chapter Five, we turned from the question of the meaning of 
religious words to the influence of children's understanding of 
historical time, and their ability to sequentially order events in 
time, on their developing religious thinking. In a preliminary 
series of experiments, the problems which many children in the 6 
to 8 year old age range have with sequential ordering and histo-
orical time were explored. Although the 8 year olds generally 
performed better on the tasks than the 6 year olds did, there was 
an indication in the results that the tasks which the 8 year olds 
were able to master reasonably successfully were all ones which 
involved situations which were familiar to them. This suggested 
that the success of the 8 year olds on these tasks might have been 
more a result of rote learning of the order of events than any 
evidence of a particular development in the ability to sequentially 
order events along a given time span. 
In a second series of experiments, two groups of 6 and 8 year old 
children were presented with a series of more novel sequential 
ordering tasks. These involved sorting out the order of the 
participants in various races from certain given information 
about their relative positions. Both groups of children appeared 
to have considerable difficulty with these tasks, although the 8 
year olds did show some evidence of performing at a level which 
was higher than would have been expected if they had chosen their 
responses at random. 
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In a third series of experiments, the same children were presented 
with information about certain biblical events and were asked a 
set of questions designed to test their ability to sequentially 
order these along a continuum of historical time. Again, the 8 
year olds performed better than the 6 year olds on these tests, 
but on this occasion both groups performed at a level which was 
higher than could have been expected by chance. On the whole; 
the 6 year olds only demonstrated a limited ability to order 
sequentially the biblical events in time, and the large number of 
incorrect responses given by children in this age group suggested 
that this might well be an important area of difficulty for them, 
in coming to an understanding of certain religious facts and ideas. 
It was hypothesised that the method most likely to be employed in 
successfully solving these tasks would be an internal mental con-
struction by the child of the order of the events. Where a low 
rate of success was recorded in responding to the questions, this 
may well have reflected an inability on the part of the children 
to construct such an internal representation of these sequential 
orderings. 
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6.2 Conclusions 
In introducing the approach to be followed throughout the present 
collection of studies, it was suggested that a move towards 
employing new research methodologies in this area of child develop-
ment might lead to a different perspective on the developmental 
changes taking place. This hypothesis necessarily depended, among 
other things, on the success of the various methodologies employed, 
and it is important in making an overall evaluation of the present 
contribution to this area of research to consider first whether 
or not our own methodologies could, in fact, be considered to have 
been successful. 
In child development research, there is always the problem of 
designing experiments which provide meaningful results. Success 
in this field depends partly upon constructing experiments which 
capture sufficiently the attention of young children, so that they 
become willing participants. Linked to this, is the need to con-
struct experiments where the experimenter can communicate to the 
child what is expected of him. It is of little consequence to 
report the results of experiments, which children have failed to 
complete, if the reason for this is not that the child did not 
have the ability to complete the experiment, but is because the 
experimenter failed to communicate to the child what was expected 
of him in the first place. Donaldson's (1978) criticisms of many 
of Piaget's results, as we have already discussed, are based around 
the idea that children frequently fail to successfully complete 
Piagetian tasks, not because of a lack of cognitive competence, but 
because of a communication problem between them and the experimenter. 
214 
A final requirement for experiments which are to be of particular 
use in this type of child development research, is that they should 
yield information which gives a fair representation of children's 
cognitive capabilities. This is clearly much more difficult to 
evaluate than the first two requirements, but in terms of the 
validity of the findings is just as important. 
We would claim that, on all three of these counts, the present 
experiments attained a fairly high level of success. In each 
case the experiments captured the attention of the children and, 
as far as could be seen, they generally understood what was being 
required of them. As far as the last criterion is concerned, one 
can certainly say that the experiments appeared to yield information 
about the developmental state of the children's religious thinking, 
which was more revealing than that provided by a number of previous 
studies which used the basic story ano question methodological 
approach, which we have already described. 
The results of these experiments, apart from providing specific 
evidence about several aspects of the development of religious 
thinking in children, have provided a considerable challenge to 
the existing theoretical conceptualisation of this process as a 
simple unidimensional stage development process. Francis (1976, 
1977a and 1977b) has criticised previous researchers in this area 
concerning their very loose definition of what they mean by reli-
gious thinking, and it would seem as though it is at this 
fundamental level that the whole enterprise has floundered up 
until now. Goldman, Peatling and others have talked authori-
tatively about the development of religious thinking, as though 
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the definition of this phenomenon was apparent and agreed by every-
one. Goldman, in fact, defines religious thinking as normal thinking 
"directed towards religion" (Goldman, 1964b, p3), but we would question 
whether one can talk about this phenomenon as though it is a simple 
process which will develop along a unidimensional scale. Our results 
suggest that there are many aspects to religious thinking, and far 
from being a simple developmental process it is, in fact, a very 
complex one which embraces many aspects of children's development of 
cognition and language, at the points at which these developmental 
processes relate to their developing thinking about religion. 
In the past, studies of the development of religious thinking in 
children have frequently approached the problem by analysing children's 
responses to sets of open-ended-questions about particular religious 
stories. On the basis of the levels of understanding demonstrated 
by the children in answering these particular sets of questions, 
generalisations have been made about the state of their development 
of religious thinking. The assumption being made here was that 
whatever the factors were which were involved in the development of 
religious thinking in children, their effect would be observable 
when children were asked questions about these religious stories. 
We would argue that this is a rather over-simplified approach to 
the problem. 
It would appear to be much more sensible to regard children's 
religious thinking as depending on a large number of inter-related 
factors. Many of these factors have implications for a wide range 
of children's thinking, whereas some are more specifically related 
to religious thinking. Examples of the more general factors include 
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the following:- the ability to entertain abstract as opposed to 
concrete ideas, the ability to conceptualise historical time and 
to sequentially order events in time, and the level of linguistic 
development in relation to an understanding of a variety of forms 
of language, including the meaning of a number of words commonly 
-used in relation to moral and religious discourse. Examples of 
the more specifically religious factors include:- exposure to 
religious ideas, discourse or literature, the level of semantic 
development in relation to an understanding of a number of 
specifically religious words (such as some of those included in 
the triads experiments reported in Chapter Four), and conceptual 
development in relation to religious teaching and ideas. 
At the start of this investigation, it was indicated that the 
intention was to think of religious thinking largely in terms of 
thinking about the Christian religion. This, of itself, may help 
to provide some definition of what is meant by religious thinking 
in the present discussion. We are referring to the child's ability 
to think about, grapple with and also understand the ideas of a 
historical religion based around an approximately defined body of 
teaching. This definition would include, but would not be the 
same as, equating religious thinking with the child's ability to 
entertain in his thinking or imagination anything in the realm of 
superhuman or supernatural beings or forces. This definition 
would also be different from one which equated religious thinking 
with thoughts portraying a relationship with, commitment to, or 
worship of a superhuman or supernatural being or force. These 
things could be included within our definition, but would not 
describe it. We would rather operate from the position which 
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accepts that the person who is not committed to a particular 
religious stance can think about a religion and can reach various 
levels of understanding of that religion. Under this position, 
but depending upon the particular level of understanding of the 
religion attained and on various other more general abilities, 
such as those which traditionally have been associated with the 
concept of general intelligence, all individuals will be capable 
of a certain level of religious thinking, which can be associated 
with the particular religion in question. 
Thus, having stated these constraints, we would conclude by 
rejecting a simplistic model of the development of religious 
thinking in children, which equates religious thinking with the 
ability to be able to apply certain stage related styles of 
thinking to religious stories. Furthermore, we would claim that 
the development of religious thinking can only be understood as 
a much more complex process which allows for the effect of a number 
of different factors, each of which will be influenced by separate 
developmental processes. Because of the nature of these factors 
and the developmental processes associated with them, we would 
anticipate that, to some extent, the development of the religious 
thinking of individuals is something which continues on through 
childhood and adolescence into adulthood, middle and old age. To 
assume that someone has reached a fully developed stage of reli-
gious thinking once they can understand a religious story at a 
non-literal abstract level, would seem to us to be a misrepresen-
tation of the whole problem of investigating the development of 
the way that individuals think about religion. 
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The results reported in the earlier chapters of the present 
investigation all relate to studies carried out with children 
between the ages of 6 and 11 years old, and so it would be foolish 
to claim wider insights into the overall developmental process 
than these results permit. However, the fact that the children 
studied in these investigations would have been widely regarded 
by previous investigators as not being capable of religious 
thinking, leads us to take up a fundamentally different standpoint, 
both about this issue and the broader issue of what the development 
of religious thinking is understood to mean. We would claim to 
have demonstrated various aspects of the developing religious 
thinking of these children, and, of these aspects, we would anti-
cipate that several would continue to develop throughout a large 
part of the children's lives. For example, we have touched upon 
the issue of the development of religious word meaning, and in 
Chapter Four we looked in some length at the relatedness of the 
meanings of several groups of words of religious significance. 
It is difficult to imagine a point in time when one would want to 
claim that the relatedness of the meanings of these words was fully 
developed. Certainly, in the different age-groups within which we 
studied their relatedness, there was evidence of developments taking 
place, which it is anticipated could have gone on for some consider-
able amount of time. Likewise, the ability to abstract meaning from 
parables and the development of a concept of historical time, are 
both things which could easily be assumed to go on developing well 
beyond the limited years of growth within which we chose to study 
them. 
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6.3 Implications 
When one considers the implications of research into the psycho-
logical development of children, one naturally tends to think in 
terms of the application of such research findings to the field of 
education. It is sometimes claimed, however, that developmental 
psychology has been able to contribute very little of any great 
importance to educational policies and practices. Whilst regretting 
the possibility of such an extreme lack of influence, one is at the 
same time aware of the harmful way in which tentative research 
findings are sometimes used as a justification for major changes 
in the way that children are taught. Clearly, there is a need for 
established research findings and theories to be examined in terms 
of their possible implications for education, but this is a process 
which will necessitate careful re-eva1uation, by both developmental 
psychologists and educationalists, of the research evidence, as well 
as the existing teaching practices, and changes should only be brought 
about where clear evidence for their benefits can be observed. 
The research of Goldman into children's development of religious 
thinking is perhaps as good an example as can be found anywhere, of 
a piece of child development research that has resulted in rapid 
and dramatic educational changes. The whole approach towards teaching 
young children in primary schools and Sunday schools about religion, 
both in Britain and elsewhere, underwent a major revolution in the 
mid 1960s, and the influence of Goldman's work in bringing about this 
change was not inconsiderable. It can certainly be argued that the 
way in which Goldman's findings were presented to the general public 
influenced these events, but now we mu~t question whether Goldman's 
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theoretical position is robust enough to be used as a foundation 
for changing educational practices. 
Goldman and others, who sought to apply his research findings, 
claimed that too much exposure to teaching about the Bible at too 
early an age would hinder children's understanding of the Christian 
religion later on. Thus, the suggestion was that teachers should 
move away from biblically based R.E. syllabuses and keep these 
until children reached a stage of "readiness for religion". 
Goldman and his associates, at the same time, introduced R.E. 
teaching guides based around a life-theme approach which, according 
to Goldman, included a certain amount of biblical material because 
the designers had "one eye on those conventional teachers, who might 
find the series more acceptable in this way" (Goldman, 1969, pSI). 
Basically, the philosophy behind the new approach was that the 
children might come to a religious understanding of life through 
studying life in more depth, rather than by studying religion or 
religious teachings. 
We discussed, in Chapter Two, the fact that Goldman can be held to 
have gone way beyond his own research evidence in suggesting these 
educational changes, and he was undoubtedly influenced considerably 
in drawing the conclusions which he did, by his own theological 
position. We would now want to question even the slight relation-
ship, which might have been thought to have existed, between 
Goldman's research evidence and his proposed changes in R.E. 
curricula. It was never completely clear how his stage related 
theory for the development of religious thinking led to the 
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conclusion that it would be harmful to expose children to certain 
religious materials and ideas, before they had reached a fully 
developed stage of religious thinking. Now that we are wanting to 
call the stage related theory into question in the light of our own 
evidence, this would seem to leave the supposed educational impli-
cations of this theory with no more status than any other proposed 
curriculum innovation. That is, if Goldman's proposed innovations 
do lead to enhanced attainment of educational objectives then well 
and good, but without any such evidence there is no reason to believe 
that they are better than, or even as good as, the existing teaching 
methods. 
Thus, the major implications of the current investigation are a 
calling into question of the usefulness of existing stage develop-
ment theories of religious thinking, along with the educational 
innovations which have been based on these theories. No simple 
theoretical alternative is offered in place of the stage develop-
ment theories, as it appears from the evidence of our own investi-
gations that a much more complex multi-dimensional model would be 
required to attempt to describe this whole area of children's 
cognitive and semantic development. The major implication of this 
for religious educators is that much of what they may have accepted 
as necessary changes, resulting from the research findings of 
developmental psychologists, may need to be reconsidered in the 
light of future developments in such theories. 
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6.4 Recommendations 
Our analysis of previous research studies, along with our own 
results, has led us to conclude that there is an urgent need for 
a move away from the existing theoretical approach to this area 
of child development. We have argued that a new paradigm is 
needed, which will give a more realistic explanation of the 
processes underlying the development of religious thinking in 
children. With such a paradigm, it might be possible to make 
more useful applications to the interests of those concerned 
with the religious education of young children. 
One of our major arguments has been that the construction of 
any such new paradigm will depend, in the first instance, on 
radically new approaches being taken into research in this area 
of children's development. In our own studies, we have attempted 
to open up some new methodologies, but we are aware that a great 
deal more work of this kind will be needed before satisfactory 
theoretical models can finally be constructed. In particular, 
we have emphasised the need to approach this area, both as a 
cognitive developmental problem and from the perspective of 
semantic and linguistic development. In the past, this area 
has been treated mainly as a cognitive developmental problem, 
and one of the results of investigating the important influence 
of linguistic development will, we feel, be to reveal the greater 
complexities which, in reality, exist. 
Thus, we would argue that apart from there being a great need 
for new methodological approaches to this problem, there is a 
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particular need to approach it, at least partly, as a problem of 
linguistic development. The field of child language development 
is a particularly rich one at the moment, and we have demonstrated 
in a limited way how research methodologies from that area can 
easily be redirected towards this problem. 
Another limitation, of which we are most aware, is that the 
methodologies employed in our own investigations have relied 
entirely upon cross sectional analyses of different groups of 
children of different ages. We have tended to test the development 
of various aspects of the religious development of these children 
without making any attempt to enquire into or manipulate the factors 
which have influenced and produced that development. This is, as 
we mentioned in Chapter 1, a most acceptable approach within the 
field of child development research, and is not necessarily inferior 
to longitudinal studies whi~h trace the development of the same 
group of children across an age span of several years. There would 
be, however, much to be learned from future studies in this area if 
they were to include some longitudinal investigations, particularly 
if these studies could vary the type of experience that different 
groups of children had of religious materials and ideas. Such 
studies are extremely difficult to mount and the degree to which 
the experience of children can be manipulated is always a limiting 
factor. However, observations of the effects of various religious 
education curriculum programmes on the developing religious thinking 
of groups of primary school children could provide some most interesting 
evidence for those interested in the applications of findings from 
research in this area, to the methods used to teach children about 
religion. Longitudinal studies of this type could also provide 
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useful information for those concerned with coming to a psychological 
understanding of this area of a child's thought development. 
To conclude an investigation such as this, by stressing the need for 
more research and a greater variety of research methodologies, may 
seem like an admission of the inadequacies of the work reported. 
However, in this case, we would claim that our own studies have 
convinced us of the great possibilities that there are for further 
research in this area, and have also provided encouraging evidence 
for those who are prepared to experiment with new research method-
ologies in future attempts to further understanding of this important 
area of children's development. 
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THE PARABLES AND THE QUESTIONS. 
THE RIC H F 0 0 L (Standard Version) 
a. The stoEl' 
A rich man had a very good farm and his barns could not hold 
all the crops that grew. So he said to himself, "I'll tear down 
my barns and build bigger ones. I'll store enough riches to last 
for years, and then I can start hav±:ng fun." 
But God said to the man, "You fool! This night you \dll die. 
Then who will have all your riches?" 
After telling the story Jesus said, "All the people are fools 
who get rich on earth but not in heaven." 
b. The Questions. 
1. What 'vas Jesus trying to teach by telling that story? 
2. Why did God call the man a foolZ 
3. How can vie avoid being like the fool? 
4. What does Jesus i'!ant us to learn from that story? 
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THE RICH F 0 0 L (Modernised Version) 
a. The Story 
A rich man who already had a lot of money in the bank, thought 
that if he got twice as much money stored up then he would be able 
to stop working and have a ggod time. 
But God said to the man "You fool! To-night you are going to 
die. Then what will happen to all your money?" 
After telling this story Jesus said, "All the people are fools 
who get rich on earth but not in heaven." 
b. The Questions. 
1. IVhat was Jesus trying to teach by telling that story? 
2. Why did God call the man a fool? 
3. How could we avoid being like the fool? 
4. What does Jesus want us to learn from that st.ory:? 
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THE GOO D SAM A R I TAN ( Standard VersionJ 
a. The StOry 
One day a young man asked Jesus how he could know who his 
"ri'eighbour was. He wanted to be able to obey the commandment 
to love his neighbour. 
Jesus told him this story. 
"A man was travelling from Jerusalem to Jericho, along a lonely 
road. He was attacked by a gang of robbers who beat him up, almost 
killing him, and they escaped with all his money. 
A priest happened to be travelling along the same road, and 
when he saw the man's body lying by the roadside, he crossed to the 
other side of the road and passed by without stopping. Some time 
afterwards one of the Temple assistants also came along the road, and 
seeing the injured man he too crossed over, and passed by on the other 
side. 
Then a third man came along, who was a Samaritan, and in those 
days the Samaritans were very unpopular and hardly anyone even talked 
to them. When he saw the man lying there, he felt sorry for him. 
Kneeling down he washed his wounds with the oil and wine which he 
was carrying, and bandaged them. Then he lifted the man on to his 
own horse and took him to the nearest inn. He gave the innkeeper some 
money and instructed him, "Look after this man. On my return journey 
I will call in and if you have had any additional expenses I will pay 
them. " 
Then after telling this story, Jesus turned to the young man and 
said, "l,mich of the three men proved to be a neighbour to the man who 
had been attacked?" 
"Why, the one who took pity on him", said the young mal!. 
"Then go and do the same", replied Jesus. 
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b. The Questions. 
1 • What was Jesus trying to teach by telling that story? 
2. Who does Jesus want us to be like in that story? 
3. What kind of people should we help? 
4. What does Jesus want us to learn from that story? 
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THE GOO D SAI1ARITAN (Modern Version) 
THE STRANGER AND THE INJURED MAN 
a. The stOry 
One day a man was going on a journey, but on his way he was attacked 
by robbers. They stripped him of his clothes and money and beat him 
up and left him lying half-dead beside the road. 
While he was lying on the ground a minister came along and he just 
looked at him and went by on the other side of the road. Later an elder 
of the church came by; he crossed the road and looked at the traveller 
but did not help him - he just went away. 
Then a stranger from another country came along the road. The man 
did not think this stranger vlould help him because he w~s from a foreign 
country that was not popular. But the stranger stopped and helped him 
bathe his wounds. Then the stranger gave him some of his clothes to 
wear and took him to the nearest hotel. At the hotel he gave the 
manager some money to look after the man until he was better and said 
that -if it cost any more than that, he would pay the next time he came 
to the hotel. 
b. Questions 
1 • \oJhat was Jesus trying to teach by telling that story? 
2. Who does Jesus want us to be like in the story? 
3. What kind of people should 'lie help? 
4. \mat does Jesus want us to learn from that story? 
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THE TWO H 0 USE S 
a. The StOry 
There was a wise man who built his house on a foundation of 
rock. Rain and floods and strong winds came, but the house stood 
firm on the rock. 
There was also a foolish man. He built his house on the sand. 
The rain and floods and strong winds came and the house on the sand 
blew down. 
Jesus said "Anyone who hears my words and obeys them is like 
that wise man. Anyone who hears my words and does not obey them 
is like that foolish man". 
b. The ~estions. 
1. What was Jesus trying to teach by telling that story? 
2. What kind of house was He talking about? 
3. What kind of storm was He talking about? 
4. vlhat does Jesus vTant us to learn from that story? 
248 
c.The Multiple-Choice Test 
1. Wha~. was Jesus tEYing to teach in this stoEY? 
2. 
3. 
a) That if you are building a house it is better to build it 
on rock or hard ground. It is less likely to fall do\m if 
it is on rock and not on sand. 
b) That He is like a rock and the houses are like peoples' lives. 
If you build your life on Him and obey Him then that is good. 
c) That if they were sensible they would think about things 
before they did them. If they were silly they would do 
things without thinking about them. 
What do the houses represent in the stoEY? 
a) Peoples' liv~s. 
b) OrdinBr'J houses. 
c) Good and Bad. 
What do the rains and stron~ winds reEresent in the sto:ry? 
a) A storm in the night. 
b) Things that bIOI., houses down. 
~) Things that spoil peoples' lives. 
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THE LOS T SHE E P 
a. The StOry 
Jesus knew that the Scribes and Pharisees complained that he 
spoke to tax-collectors and sinners, so to explain why he did this 
he told them the following parable. 
"What man with a hundred sheep, having lost one of them would 
not leave the other ninety-nine and go searching for the missing one? 
And having found it put it joyfully on his shoulders and carry it home 
and call all his friends and neighbours for a celebration and say, 
"Isn't it marvellous, I've found my sheep which was lost." In the 
same way, there is more rejoicing in heaven over one sinner who repents 
than over ninety-nine good men ,.,rho have no need of repentance." 
b. The Questions. 
1. What vlaS Jesus trying to teach by telling that story? 
2. What was the lost sheep, in the story, supposed to be like? 
3. Who was the man supposed to be like, who ,.,rent to look for the sheep? 
4. What does Jesus want us to learn from that story? 
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THE SOW E R 
a. The stOry 
"Imagine", said Jesus, "a farmer going out to sow some seeds. 
As he worked some seeds fell on the edge of the path where they 
were quickly eaten up by the birds. Some seeds fell on the stones 
and rocks, where there was little soil. They sprang up, but, as soon 
as the sun shone, they withered, and having weak roots, died. Others 
fell among thorns and ",eeds and were choked. Others fell on rich 
soil and these grew strong and healthy and produced a rich crop". 
Then He explained the meaning of this story to His disciples. 
The seed, He said, was the word of God. Those on the edge of the 
path are people who hear the word, but, before it takes root in their 
hearts, the Devil comes and carries it off. The man, who hears it on 
the rocky ground, is the one who welcomes it, but his enthusiasm doesn't 
last. The first time he is put to the test the word withers and dies, 
because it has no roots in him. The one who receives it in the thorns 
and weeds, is the one who hears the word, but is more concerned with 
the material things of life, and the word is choked by the lure of 
riches. And the one who receives the word in rich soil is the one 
who hears and truly understands and shares his harvest with others. 
b. The Questions 
1. What was Jesus trying to teach by telling that story? 
2. What did the seeds represent in the sto~J - what were they like? 
3. \lJhat 1,ms the good soil in the story supposed to be like? 
4. ','!'hat does Jesus ',rant us to learn from that story? 
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THE PHARISEE AND TILE TAX-COLLECTOR 
Standard Version. 
a. The StOry 
Jesus talked about false pride. He said. "Two men went into 
the temple to pray. One was a Pharisee and the other was a tax-
collector. 
The Pharisee stood there and said this prayer to himself. "I 
thank you God that I am not greedy, wicked and bad like other people, 
and particularly that I am not like this tax-collector here. I go 
without food tvlice a week and give part of my money to the Temple, 
regularly." 
The tax-collector stood a little distance away, hardly daring 
to look up to heaven. And beating his breast to show his sorrow, 
said, "God, please be merciful to me, a sinner." 
The tax-collector went home on good terms ,.,i th God. The 
Pharisee did not. For the man who is humble will be raised up. 
And the man who sets himself up above others ,.,ill be humbled." 
b. The Questions 
1. What was Jesus trying to teach by telling that story? 
2. Why was God pleased with the Tax-Collector after he had been 
to the Temple? 
3. Why was God not pleased with the Pharisee after he had been 
to the Temple? 
4. What does Jesus want us to learn from that story? 
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THE PHARISEE AND THE TAX-COLLECTOR 
(Modern Version) 
, THE PARABLE ABOUT HUMILITY' 
a. The StOry 
Jesus was teaching about men who were very proud of themselves, when 
they shouldn't have been, and he told the people this parable: 
"One day two men went into a church to pray, and one man who was 
very proud of himself said this prayer "Thank you God that I don't do 
lots of wicked and bad things like that man over there. I never do 
anything wrong like he does and I give quite a bit of the money I earn 
to the church!' 
The other man who felt very guilty for the things he had done 
kept in the background and prayed to God saying: 
"God please have mercy on me because I am a sinner." 
This man_ went home on good terms 'vi th God. The proud man did 
not. For the proud shall be humbled, but the humble shall be honoured." 
b. The Questions 
1. What was Jesus trying to teach by telling that story? 
2. Why was God pleased with the second man after he had been 
to the church? 
30 Why was God not pleased with the first man after he had been 
to the church? 
4. What does Jesus want us to learn from that story? 
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c. The Multiple-Choice Test 
Parable about Humility 
1 • What was Jesus t£Y:in8: to teach by this sto£Y:? 
a) To be good and pray to God. 
b) Not to show off about the good things you have done. ,Ask 
God to forgive you for all the bad things you have done. 
c) Not to be wicked and bad. 
2. Why did the second man 8:0 home on good terms with God? 
3. 
a) Because he had asked God to forgive him for all the wTong he 
had done. 
b) Because he was a good man. 
c) Because he didn't say anything about the first man in his prayers. 
Wh;y did the first man go home on had terms with God? 
a) Because he didn't give enough money to the church. 
b) Because he was too proud of himself and had been showing off. 
c) Because he was a bad man. 
